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ABSTRACT
CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM
AN AUDIENCE RESEARCH ON COURT SHOWS
FEBRUARY 2016
SILVINA BEATRIZ BERTI
BA. UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE RÍO CUARTO, ARGENTINA
MA. UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE CÓRDOBA, ARGENTINA
PH. D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Michael Morgan
Since the mid to late nineteen eighties, the television world has been showing an
increasing number of programs that are presented as “reality programs,” or “reality
shows.” Court Shows, which are also known as Judge Shows, or Syndi-Courts, can be
considered to be part of such a mega-genre. These programs (Court Shows) are offered as
an alternative way for people to find a quick solution to some legal problem they may
have. Meanwhile, millions of people tune in and watch those shows on a daily basis.
Working within the Cultural Studies tradition, this research analyzes, on one hand, Judge
Judy and La Corte del Pueblo comparatively to understand the way in which these
programs operate ideologically. On the other hand, and most importantly, it focuses on
how audiences (Latino and White Americans) read these shows; given the experiences,
knowledge, feelings, (and intertexts) the two different audiences carry with them, they
approach discourses with different “tools” and consequently read them differently.
This analysis allows us to reflect on theoretical matters that refer to the complex
notion of meaning and how it relates to the notion of power (on the side of production),
and to problematize the three theoretical reading positions proposed by Hall in his
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seminal work Encoding/Decoding. It is suggested here that if, as Hall stated, the
negotiated reading is what most people do most of the time, then the concept loses its
explanatory capacity and therefore, it needs to be rethought (mostly in connection to how
hegemonic processes work).
In sum, the present study ultimately intends to accomplish a further purpose
beyond its specific interest: the exploration of the problematic notion of reading positions
and other related concepts. Delving into the possibility of distinguishing hegemonic from
non-hegemonic readings amongst the array of negotiated readings, and exploring the
connection between pleasure and resistance are examples of such interest. And as a
byproduct, there is the hope of making a humble contribution towards a better
understanding of the role that media messages play in the process of meaning making in
modern societies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since the mid 1980's television has increasingly invested in what is known as
Reality TV. One way of defining what counts as reality television is “a variety of ‘new’
or more often hybrid genres (…) [which have] in common an emphasis on the
representation of ordinary people and allegedly unscripted or spontaneous moments that
supposedly reveal unmediated reality,” as suggested by Biressi and Nunn (2005, p. 10).
This mega genre includes a wide spectrum of programs which can be classified in
subgenres, each one having its own peculiarities. Court Shows, for example, which are
also known as Judge Shows, or Syndi-Courts, enact the moment in which litigants attend
a television court to resolve their disputes. Drawing on the Cultural Studies paradigm,
this research centers its attention on two such programs, Judge Judy and La Corte del
Pueblo and the way they are interpreted by White American and Latino audiences.
The importance of the media in public life hardly needs to be addressed -at this
point it is common knowledge. In the case of television, from its inception it rapidly
monopolized leisure time and was able to create or re-create a whole new social
environment; its influence on social life is greater than that of any other mass medium.
When television was finally launched in the United States after World War II, it
soon captured an audience that would not only accompany its growth for the next years,
but that would also prove faithful from thereon. Between 1945 and 1948 alone, the
number of television stations tripled in the country, while audiences increased by 400%
(Head, Spann & McGregor, 2001). The rapidly growing number of television sets being
sold year after year, fueled by an ever-expanding industry, the consistently increasing
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number of people watching television, in addition to the expanding number of hours they
spent in front of the TV set, raised concerns regarding its effects -as had occurred with
earlier media- among researchers as well as lay people and politicians. One of the initial
anxieties, for example, centered on the threat that the new medium imposed over the
existing ones: how were radio and the film industry going to compete and survive in the
face of such a powerful new technology that allowed people to enjoy the pleasure and
power of both sound and image without the need to leave the home at all? Apocalyptic
concerns proved wrong though, and both radio and film survived the birth and growth of
television (although experiencing changes and readapting to the new environment). Yet,
neither was ever able to surpass or cast a shadow over the power of television to become
the center of the remapped cultural landscape.
In more recent years the mediascape is being reshaped once again, this time with
the rapid growth of the Internet. The web has had an enormous effect on the process of
communication in general, introducing changes in the ways in which people
communicate, how traditional media (i.e., the press, radio, and television) produce
information, the ways in which information flows, how people interact with the media, as
well as how contents of different types are now being produced and delivered, and so on.
The profound transformations taking place have caught the attention of scholars from
many different fields of study and there is an interesting range of descriptions and
analyses of what the current process implies, from those who take a celebratory stand to
those more critical of what it entails (for more on this see Castells, 1996,1997,1998,
2001; Hepp and Hasebrink (2014); Igarza, 2008; Shiller, 1996; Urresti, 2008; Wresh,
1996, to name just a few). But despite all the changes (which affect different segments of
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the population differently), millions of people still watch television, read the newspapers,
listen to the radio, and go to the movies; in other words, although these traditional media
have been subjected to innumerable changes, they are still a significant part of everyday
life.
Since its origins, broadcast television in the United States has been privately
owned, firmly commercial and largely advertiser-financed (with the main exception of
the Public Television Service), and the role of the Federal government has been
circumscribed to merely allocating frequencies and “light touch” regulation (Hoynes,
1996). Radio acted as an important antecedent to network television in that it provided a
programming format for it to mirror. However, in its development, television programs
started to acquire their own specificity and characteristics, with the shaping and reshaping
of borrowed genres (mainly from radio, but also from the theater and films) as well as
with the creation of new ones. These are some of the reasons why it could be argued that
(traditional commercial) television constitutes, borrowing Bourdieu’s term, a field. And
like any field, it has a relative autonomy. In other words, although it can't be said to have
total autonomy from the economic, political, and social world, it is ruled by its own laws,
it has its own specific capital (rating), its own characteristic products (programs) and
instances of legitimization (for example, the Emmy Awards), it defines its agents and the
positions they occupy within the field, and of course, it also defines its audiences. Even if
television is increasingly subscriber-supported (and more so in some parts of the world,
like in the U.S., than in others, for instance in South America), the field of traditional
commercial television is still strong and still subjects its products to particular conditions
of production, and the selling of advertising remains a necessary condition for the airing
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and permanence of a program. However, that is not sufficient in itself, and audience
support plays a pivotal role in that matter. It could be argued, therefore, that there is a
dialectic interplay between the audience and the economic support received through
advertising. For one thing, within the structure of the market-oriented television industry
-with the exception of public television, HBO, PPV, Netflix, and others- there can be no
program without ads, yet they cannot guarantee the audience; but on the other hand, a
wide audience cannot necessarily guarantee in itself the interest of advertising agencies; it
has to be the “right audience” in terms of class, age, gender, and other kinds of variables
depending on particular circumstances (for more on the role of advertising see Andersen,
1995, Jhally, 1990, Leiss, Kline & Jhally, 1997).
The television industry is currently undergoing changes in its modes and logics of
production and distribution, from commercial-based television to subscriber supported
television. These two coexisting yet contrasting systems imply the need for new
conceptualization, and the rethinking and or the redefinition of concepts that have seemed
useful for understanding the complex process of (mass) communication so far. Such
theoretical analysis exceeds the focus of attention of this research and therefore I will
limit myself to refer only to the notion of “product” that I posed in making the case for
considering television as a field. It has been argued that it is the viewers which is the
product being sold by broadcasting and ad supported television networks; and that the
programs or the programming are the product being sold by cable networks and
television studios. Although productive from some point of view,I don't subscribe to such
a distinction. I think that it diverges from my understanding of television as a means of
communication, with all its theoretical and practical implications. I believe that defining
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the audiences as the product that is being sold would prevent me from analyzing or taking
into consideration the relationship between producers and consumers / senders and
receivers of messages that have a significant impact on the definition of the world we live
in. Regarding the viewers as the product shifts the center of attention from the process of
communication to a perspective that has less interest in the way in which meanings
operate and how that affects the way in which “symbolic power” works. In short, as I
suggest, logically speaking, people first need to act as audiences, and only then can they
become a commodity to be “sold” for advertising. And for that to happen, messages have
to be produced, delivered, and at least consumed (and whether they are accepted,
rejected, or negotiated is another matter). So regardless of television being commercialbased or not, the programs are the basis for the exchange between producers and
audiences, thus with no programs to attract the public no process of any kind can take
place: no communication, no commerce, no ideology.
So, Bourdieu's definition of a field (1984, 1985) seems helpful in so far as it
allows me to incorporate the logic of production (commercial-based in the case of the
programs that I analyze) without losing sight of my focus of interest: meaning
production and re-production. As I mentioned before, then, a field establishes different
positions that can be occupied by specific social actors, the relations between those
positions, and the struggle for a particular capital. In the case of television, rating is the
particular capital that defines the field, which determines the different positions within it,
and the struggle that takes place among social actors involved in the process (Berti &
Rizzo, 1996). Television networks compete amongst themselves within the same timespot day in and day out, and are compelled to reinvest the capital they already possess in
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an attempt not only to improve it, but frequently in order not to lose it. Since the costs of
production for some programs are so high and the risks so costly, television networks are
continuously looking for ways to improve their profitability with a minimum of risk.
Consequently not innovating, rather than innovating, is one of the strategies that seem to
fit the formula (even when programs might give the impression of novelty). In other
words, if there is a particular program structure (or genre) that proves to be successful
among audiences and acceptable to advertiser expectations, the tendency will be to invest
in it. Hence, the proliferation of similar kinds of programs during certain periods of time.
Following such logic, since the mid to late eighties, television programmers have
invested increasingly in what is called “reality,” which includes a wide range of
programming, such as America’s Funniest Videos, Big Brother, Fantasy Island, The
Mole, Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire, to name just a few. On one hand, by relying on
ordinary people willing to be in the spotlight -either in front of the camera, or capturing
images with it- these types of shows are very cost effective. In other words, the costs of
production are extremely low compared to most fictional programs. Take, for example,
talk shows and the like that are produced in studios; the simplicity of the set, live
audiences that may even pay for the tickets to see the show, participants that are brought
in at minimal expense, in addition to not having to negotiate high salaries with actors,
bring the costs down considerably. The only real expense (besides the obvious one
related to technology and technical/production crew), is related to the hosts of the shows,
which, unless they bring with them a highly priced symbolic capital, can also be
relatively inexpensive. In contrast, the average cost of a half-hour sitcom episode was $ 1
million dollars, and $1.5 million for an hour-long program back in 2001 (Head, Spann, &
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McGregor, 2001); and in 2012 (according to Variety.com), the average cost of a sit-com
like Two Broke Girls was $1.7 million per episode. On the other hand, reality shows have
been “well received” by viewers, which can be seen from the Nielsen ratings, emails and
letters sent to the producers of the programs with suggestions or votes, as well as in the
internet chat rooms1 where fans log-on on a daily basis to discuss the latest about their
favorite shows.
Not restricted to a specific type of show (such as Survivor), this “mega-genre”
comprises a wide variety of programs. Also, TV screens have been increasingly invaded
since the mid 1980s by game shows, talk shows, reality cop shows, court/judge shows,
dating shows, and home video shows that assert a non-fictional status on their supposed
representation of ordinary people in relation to their extra/ordinary lives or involvement
in real events. Such a claim is introduced by way of varied discursive mechanisms
throughout the programs; for example, in their slogans, during their presentation and
closing, in their calling for interested participants, and highly significantly, in the
recurrent appeal to the notion of real. But the construction of a realism effect is also reenforced by the use of certain technical procedures -such as camera movement and sound
that in many cases resemble home videos, as well as their reliance on widely spread
imagery/icons. In court shows, for example, Greek columns, the scale of justice, judges’
robes, hard cover books on wall to wall wooden bookshelves, and a gavel are common
features that are intertextually connected to the television world. These same images can
be seen in cop/law fictional programs, court TV, the news, advertisements, comedies, and
so on. And although they might be well established icons that have gained the power to
operate as metonyms of the justice system, even then an off-screen voice anchors their
1

There are many of these types of chat rooms, for instance: http://chatabout.com/topic/judge-judy
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meaning: “You are about to enter the court of Judge Judy Sheindlin. The cases are real,
the rulings are final. This is Judge Judy.”
However, how important such a claim of reality is amongst audiences is yet to be
seen; in some cases, as can be read on chat rooms on the internet, audiences question the
authenticity of the shows, jeopardizing the status of reality that is claimed by the pole of
production and consequently redefining how they are to be read. From a rather naïve
point of view, it could be argued that reality television, like any other kind, is mostly
entertainment, produced to entertain and consumed as entertainment. But it can also be
argued that this is a deceptive truth. Like any other kind of symbolic product, these shows
contribute to the social construction of meaning, produce and transmit certain values, and
elicit different types of responses from their audiences.
Among the different types of reality shows, Court shows have become quite
popular in American television. The People’s Court, which premiered in 1981, was the
first of its kind. The show, which ran for 12 years -through the 1992-1993 seasonproduced a total of 2,340 episodes, and it was already publicized as “reality television in
a whole new kind of package” [my emphasis]. And it promised to take audiences inside a
courtroom where real plaintiffs and real defendants argue real cases in front of a real
judge. As John O´Connor published in The New York Times on September 8, 1981: [On
the] “People's Court (…) the plaintiffs and defendants on the program are real.” The
cases, mostly of the small-claims variety, are real. But in accepting an invitation to
television's People's Court, the adversaries have “agreed to dismiss the court case and to
have the case settled here.”
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The wave of court shows started a few years later (in 1996) with Judge Judy, a
retired New York City Family Judge who had become well known for her toughness. In
1997, The People’s Court was re-launched and in the following years several other
programs were produced, for example Judge Joe Brown, Divorce Court, Judge Mathis,
Power of Attorney, Judge Hatchett, Curtis Court, Judge Mills Lane, Moral Court, and
Texas Justice, to name only a few.
In an attempt to reach the growing and increasingly attractive Latino population,
the network Telemundo started broadcasting Spanish versions of such programs -La
Corte del Pueblo, La Corte de la Familia, and Sala de Parejas (none of which is
currently on the air). Let us bear in mind that Latinos are the fastest growing minority in
the United States; in the 2000 Census there were 35 million Hispanics representing 12.5
% of the population, and by 2013, Latinos/ Hispanics represented 17.1%. And Spanish, as
López and González-Barreda2 (2013) state, “is by far the most spoken non-English
language in the U.S. today (...) and it has become a part of many aspects of life in the
U.S. For example, Spanish is spoken by more non-Hispanics in U.S. homes than any
other non-English language, and Spanish language television networks frequently beat
their English counterparts in television ratings.”
Court shows, which air on first-run syndication, soon started to climb the ratings,
particularly Judge Judy, which has managed to hold a comfortable first place amongst the
competing courtroom programs, and remains in the Top 10 placing in the Nielsen
Household ratings over the years (in the Syndication category). During the week of
January 19, 2015 she was in second place after Wheel of Fortune, which translates into
over ten million viewers.
2

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/05/what-is-the-future-of-spanish-in-the-united-states/
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With the only exception of Moral Court’s Larry Elder, who earlier had been a Los
Angeles radio talk show host, the rest of the programs’ hosts emerged from the legal
field, having practiced as lawyers, prosecutors, mediators, or judges. Even if how or why
they were appointed as television judges is hard to know, in most cases, public exposure
seems to have played a significant role -at least in the case of English-speaking programs.
For example, Power of Attorney’s Christopher Darden had been a prosecutor in the O.J.
Simpson Trial; Joe Brown, the first African-American prosecutor in the City of Memphis,
was elected judge in 1990 and became well known in the national sphere when presiding
over the reopening of the James Earl Ray case; and Mills Lane, who was a Judge in
Reno, Nevada, became famous not for his role in the judicial system but while acting as
the boxing referee during the well-known Tyson-Holyfield bout3. Curtis had appeared as
a legal expert on TV networks, e.g. CNN, NBC, CNBC, MSNBC, and ABC since the
O.J. Simpson trial and prior to hosting his own show; and Judy Sheindlin caught the
attention of the show’s producers during an interview on television (CBS´s 60 Minutes).
But she was also known by her book, Don’t Pee on My Leg and Tell Me It’s Raining:
America’s Toughest Family Court Judge Speaks Out (which was published the same year
her show launched, in 1996), in which Sheindlin attacks the inefficiency of the legal
system -which she refers to as “dumb justice,” instead of blind justice- and advocates
opening the courtroom to the public eye.
Court shows are half an hour to an hour long. Some of them even run twice a day,
bringing the total airing of these programs to an average of 9 hours per day, every day of
the week, between 9 in the morning and 7 in the evening, on different channels. The
shows are conspicuously similar. The more they attempt to recreate a real courtroom the
3

Source: www. Tvjudgeshows.com
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more they rely on well-established icons and follow a pattern of similar interior design.
Hence, for the most part, the sets are interchangeable: The judge’s bench, placed in the
front of the room and elevated with respect to the rest of the floor; the courtroom seal on
its front and one flag on each side of the dais behind the judge’s seat; in front of the
judge, on the right hand side stands the plaintiff and on the left, the defendant with the
gallery right behind them. This set-up changes only slightly from show to show, with the
exception of Moral Court and Sala de Parejas(which are no longer on the air). In the
case of Moral Court, the room was circular with the judge placed in its center, and
although the plaintiff and the defendant stood in front of him, the gallery was distributed
in a semi-circle both in front and behind the judge. Sala de Parejas, on the other hand,
placed the gallery on a side of the room in such a way that it could only occasionally be
seen, the judge’s desk resembled an ordinary office desk and there were no flags or seals
in the room.
Most shows deal with small claims and family matters, the litigants themselves
presenting their case before the judge. There were two programs which differed in this
respect: Power of Attorney, in which the cases were presented by attorneys and the
litigants themselves were called in as witnesses (it was cancelled during the second
season), and Moral Court, which more resembled a game show (it only ran from 2000 to
2001). In this last case the production awarded money according to the participant’s
“moral wrong doing” (the scale ranged between $500 when found merely wrong, $1000
when considered offensive, and $2000 when found outrageous).
Summing up, the television world exhibits an increasing number of programs that
are presented as “reality programs,” or “reality shows.” And Court Shows, which can be
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considered to be part of such a mega-genre, offer themselves as an alternative way for
people to find a solution to some legal problem in a quick manner. At the same time,
millions of people tune in and watch those shows on a daily basis. Working within the
Cultural Studies tradition, in this research I analyze Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo
comparatively to understand the way in which these programs operate ideologically, and
most importantly, how audiences (Latino and White Americans) read these shows. This
analysis allows me to reflect on theoretical matters that refer to the complex notion of
meaning and how it relates to the notion of power (on the side of production), and to
problematize the three theoretical reading positions proposed by Hall in his seminal work
Encoding/Decoding. I suggest that if, as Hall stated, the negotiated reading is what most
people do most of the time, then it loses any explanatory capacity and therefore, it needs
to be rethought (mostly in connection to how hegemonic processes work). In Chapter II,
“Audience Research. From Manipulation to Semiotic Democracy, The Spaces In
Between,” I briefly revisit the history of the development of communication theories in
the United States and in the European context, and discuss in depth the perspective of
British Cultural Studies and its developments, which frame and inform this research.
Despite the popularity of these shows and the different kind of attention they
received by the media (e.g., press articles, other programs discussing court programs,
comedy shows parodying them, hidden camera shows using their format to fool people,
etc.), hardly any academic research was initially conducted on the subject, and mostly it
derived from the field of legal studies. The initial absence of research in the field of
media studies was conspicuous, and the brief and scattered references to these shows
seemed to underestimate the subject. For example, Head, Spann and McGregor (2001)
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when referring to court shows alluded to the “[possibility] to learn some things about the
justice system from these programs, [however,] the cases and the personalities involved
seem to be selected for their ability to engage viewers emotionally rather than
intellectually.” It can be argued, in their defense, that the purpose of their book was not to
analyze any particular product of popular culture, hence the lack of further discussion
about these types of shows. Yet, at the same time, the contrast established between
learning (about the legal system) and (merely?) feeling implied first of all that it is
already known what those kinds of shows intend to produce; and secondly, that emotions
are empty/void of content, which consequently belittles any possible ideological effect. In
Chapter III, “Cameras in the Courtroom,” I present and discuss many different early
approaches and positions which were triggered by the use of cameras inside real courts
that emerged almost exclusively from the field of the Law, and some recent studies more
concerned with the problem of media representations regarding the law, gender and race
specifically in reference to court shows.
In Chapter IV, I present the methodology that I followed for the analysis of the
shows and the audiences. And in Chapter V, “Court Shows, An Invitation to Believe,” I
analyze the particular way in which these programs construct the sense of reality, paying
particular attention to the way in which intra, inter, and extra textual mechanisms operate.
Chapter VI, “Order in the Court,” centers on the analysis of Judge Judy and La
Corte del Pueblo. The main focus is on the interaction that takes place on the screen, and
the different mechanisms that the judges use to impart order, set the boundaries, and
establish hierarchies. I analyze the commonalities and differences that both programs
present; differences which become particularly evident when matters of gender and
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ethnicity are involved. Finally, I offer an interpretation of the overall ideological stand of
the programs.
Chapter VII, “People Watching Judge Judy,” focuses the analysis on how three
different groups interpret Judge Judy. The main topics that I present and analyze refer to
how these groups read the judge, the participants, the interaction that takes place in the
courtroom, and the notion of the reality of the program and the relationship the groups
establish between this show and other television programs. Finally, I direct attention to
the meaning of entertainment and how that relates to or affects the overall meaning
assigned to Judge Judy.
In Chapter VIII, “Don Manuel. Audiences Reading La Corte Del Pueblo,” I
follow a similar structure to the previous chapter. I address how the program is
characterized in general and then I present the way in which Judge Manuel Franco is seen
and evaluated by the members of the groups; how they see and interpret the interaction,
their view of the participants, the comparison between the program and real courts, and
the connection they establish between La Corte del Pueblo and different television
programs. Finally, I analyze how an underlying matter of identity is present throughout
the interviews and affects the aforementioned aspects and the groups' reading of the
program as a whole.
Finally, in the Conclusions (Chapter IX), I address some questions that I posed at
the beginning of this research regarding theoretical matters such as the power of the text
to fix a particular reading and the possibility of opening up and exploring the notion of
negotiated reading. I search for some kind of spectrum that can help us better understand
the notion of hegemony in media discourses. In addition I reflect on the social
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significance of reality shows, particularly in terms of matters that refer to the role of
laughter in the construction of meaning and the assuming of reading positions, and the
blurring of boundaries between public and private. I close the Conclusions with
reflections about the importance of doing audience research.
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CHAPTER II
AUDIENCE RESEARCH:FROM MANIPULATION TO SEMIOTIC
DEOMOCRACY, THE SPACES IN BETWEEN
Among all the different institutions that participate in the social construction of
meaning, the media, and particularly television, today represent a privileged point of
struggle in the definition and constitution of hegemony. Yet, the power to produce certain
effects, that is to say, pleasures, ideas, or practices of any kind assigned to those
discourses must not be taken for granted. Audiences, although constrained to select
among a limited range of messages, which might be suspected to carry similar ideology
(Gerbner, 2002), have the potential power to bring into play a whole set of intertexts,
which allow for different readings and deciphering of the discourses to which they are
exposed. This research, which centers on Court shows, is built upon qualitative audience
studies within the framework of the cultural studies tradition.
The Encoding/Decoding model constituted a seminal piece within the cultural
studies tradition. When it first emerged, in the late 1970s, it had the power to suggest an
alternative way of thinking about the process of mass communication and to open the
field to new problems and new approaches. At the same time he introduced his model,
Hall contested theoretical (and ideological) assumptions about the media, offering deep
and well sustained arguments against the linearity of the prevailing model of mass
communication, against the suppositions about the message (and the lack of theorization
about the notion of language and representation), against the lack of interest -or excessive
focus- on power in relation to the media, and about how the audiences were regarded. In
that sense, it could be argued that the model constituted a critical response particularly to
the “effects paradigm,” but to a certain point also a response to the Frankfurt school, and
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certain semiotic perspectives. Communication is a complex process and in order to
understand it we need to focus on the relation between the media, their messages, and the
audiences. And understanding the density of the moment of reception can neither be
taken for granted nor can it be assumed. In the following pages (before centering on some
theoretical discussions, critiques, and developments in the Cultural Studies paradigm), I
will revisit -albeit briefly- some main theories which have addressed the problem of mass
communication, pointing out what I believe were their positives and/or shortcomings,
keeping the moment of reception and how audiences have been regarded as the central
point of focus.
A. Media Effects
The history of audience research in the U.S. began with the explosive growth of
the media -which started to take place in the late 19th century (with the press) and
beginning of the 20th- on one side, and on the other, with the perceived pivotal role
played by the media during World War I. In an attempt to understand the degree of
influence of the media over its publics, intellectuals from various disciplines became
interested in its analysis. This paradigm, which accentuated the study of effects mainly
emphasizing the notion of change (Gerbner, 1973) has been named by some authors as
“administrative research” (Wolf, 1991) because of its connection with power institutions
which subsidized the studies. Two main disciplines played a central role in the initial
approach to the relationship between the media and their audiences: psychology and
sociology, which brought with them their distinctive methods of research (predominantly
experiment, and survey, respectively). The original conception of the omnipotent power
of the media laid out by “the magic bullet” or “hypodermic needle” theory had no
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empirical base and assumed that the media had the power to manipulate their audiences
(and have them do virtually anything). Such assumption was grounded on one hand, on
the sociological conception of mass society; a concept that emphasized the qualitative
aspect of society -i.e., its organization and in particular the way in which its members
related to each other- more than its quantitative characteristic (De Fleur & Ball Rokeach,
1975; McQuail, 1987; Wolf, 1991). Based on sociological formulations from the
Eighteenth century -primarily by Comte, Spencer, Tonnies, and Durkheim-, the passage
from what was considered traditional society -or Gemeinschaft- to a more complex form
of organization, i.e., modern society -or Gesellschaft- led to the notion that “[i]n mass
society (…) individuals are presumed to be in a situation of psychological isolation from
others, impersonality is said to prevail in their interactions with others, and they are said
to be relatively free from the demands of binding social obligations” (De Fleur & Ball
Rokeach, 1975, p. 210). On the other hand, the psychological perspective based on a
biological approach argued that people basically shared the same psychic structure
(McQuail 1987, Wolf, 1991). These two hypotheses became the two basic pillars upon
which the notion of instinctive S-R relationship between the media and the masses was
built. If members of society were alienated from each other, and they shared the same
basic biological structure, then, exposed to the same stimulus they would react in very
much the same way.
The troublesome assumption of the power of the media, therefore, called for
empirical research. The first experimental research led by Hovland (1959) can be
considered one of the first foundations of audience research. This perspective was based
on a different psychological approach than that of the “magic bullet,” and the accent on
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biological similarities loses explanatory power when faced with a set of interrelated
variables that lead to individual differences between the members of the audience. Thus,
the environment in which people grow, as well as the centrality of the learning processes
and selective perception have a direct incidence on their attitudes and motivations. The
notion of manipulation is substituted in this perspective by that of persuasion. From this
standpoint, then, audiences do not respond homogeneously to any message sent by the
media, but are subject to be persuaded to act in a certain way when messages pull the
right strings. But even if the direct relation between stimulus and response is affected by
individual differences, the notion of a passive audience subject to the power of the media
is still in place.
Parallel to the experimental research, another theoretical approach grounded on a
sociological perspective takes place. What is challenged in this case is the notion of mass
society. Briefly, from this perspective society is organized in different strata, for example:
gender, age, level of education, income, and place of residence (in other words, strong
demographic variables). And people who share the same social characteristics tend to
expose themselves to the same sort of media and messages, consequently responding to
them in a similar way. It was on this theoretical ground that Lazarsfeld (1940) initially
framed his research in relation to political campaigns. However, the Erie study -later
published as “The People’s Choice”- led to a new finding in communication research,
i.e., the centrality of personal influence (Opinion Leaders) in decision making. The focus
of attention pointed to the formation, change and development of public opinion and the
results suggested that one of the functions of opinion leaders is to mediate between the
mass media and other people in their groups (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). The common
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assumption that individuals gathered their information directly from the media was not
supported by the study. On the contrary, according to the author, “the majority of people
acquired much of their information and many of their ideas through personal contacts
with the opinion leaders in their groups.” From this standpoint, then, “ideas often flow
from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the
population” (emphasis in the original text) (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). In other words, the
Two Step Flow challenged the omnipotent power assigned to the media (bear in mind
that we are talking about the pre TV era) and suggested that their effects were much more
limited than previously assumed. It is worth remembering, though, that it was Lazarsfeld
who pointed to media effects more in the sense of accompanying the perceived social
changes than producing them. From that standpoint, there was no evidence to support that
the media affected people's behavior and attitudes, there was no perceived change. Such a
statement was later reinterpreted differently; instead of an indicator of the lack of power
assigned to the media, it was re-signified as the power of media to reinforce and maintain
the status quo. Despite the fact that the media were no longer considered almighty,
audiences still weren’t granted much agency. Note that Lazarsfeld speaks of less active
portions of the population, so can we assume that that translates into less exposure to the
media? Nevertheless, the Two Step Flow meant a significant finding in recognizing the
importance of interpersonal relations in the process of mass communication.
The Uses and Gratification perspective took things a step further and it can be said
to represent a turning point in this line of research. A fundamental change in the question
of what the media do to people, to what people do with the media implies a significant
change in the conception of the audience. It is within this approach that the distinction
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between passive and active audience makes sense. There are various connections that can
be established between Uses & Gratification and the perspectives presented above, and
the most obvious is with that of Individual Differences. The connection is more direct in
terms of the theoretical assumptions regarding its psychological approach than in relation
to its methodology. Although there were attempts to conduct experimental research, as
Klapper (1963) suggested, most of the investigation followed descriptive designs and
relied on people's explicit responses as to why they exposed themselves to specific
content or media units. The assumption was that since audiences were considered active
(therefore having a motivated use of the media), they could also give a conscious account
of their consumption practices; the problem lies, though, in the fact that people are not
always conscious of why they do what they do, on one hand, and that the theory left aside
any consideration about other types of effects, on the other. It is worth mentioning that
there are differences in the way authors have undertaken research under the umbrella of
this perspective. That becomes evident in Klapper’s critique of those studies which pay
too much attention to giving an account of the long lists of needs and satisfactions related
to the media, but which place too little emphasis on the study of functions and
dysfunctions the media play in society. In that regard, the author’s position and the call
for more experimental research to be conducted in this matter make clear the connection
this approach still holds to the effects paradigm. In general terms, as Katz, Blumler and
Gurevitch (1986) pointed out, there are some basic premises that lead Uses &
Gratification, the first being that audiences are active in their approach to the media; in
other words, people voluntarily decide to expose themselves to the media regarding a
certain preexisting need which they intend to gratify. Another is that it depends on the
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audiences whether the communication process takes place or not. And the third is that the
media compete among themselves and with other sources of gratification to satisfy
audiences’ needs. It is assumed from this standpoint that any media unit (a television or
radio program, news, novels, etc.) may satisfy different needs. For example, a single
program may fulfill the need to feel accompanied in some members of the audience, or to
reinforce their own identities in others, or to be in control of the environment, and so on.
It could be argued that with this perspective the conception of power of the media over its
audiences ends for this particular paradigm. If the Magic Bullet overemphasized the
power of the media through the concept of manipulation, Individual Differences set a
limit with the notion of persuasion, and the Two Step Flow with that of influence, Uses &
Gratification emphasized the power of audiences in relation to the media. Yet, the basic
model of communication remains unidirectional and the status of the message is hardly
questioned.
B. “The Enemy Defeated: The Thinking Individual”
The Institute of Social Research formally opened in 1923 and operated in
Frankfurt until 1933 when, in the face of the imminence of the Nazi regime, the
intellectuals involved in it, most of whom were Jewish and Marxist, decided to emigrate
to the US or England -with the notable exception of Walter Benjamin4, who committed
suicide after a frustrated attempt to cross the French-Spanish border.
The Institute stressed the integration of philosophy and social analysis with the
intention of exploring the possibility of social change through human praxis, in what
became known as Critical Theory (Jay, 1973). The Culture Industry, a term initially
4

Despite the fact that Benjamin was never formally accepted as a member of the Institute, the author is
usually recognized as part of the Frankfurt School.
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coined by Horkheimer and Adorno (1948) had enormous repercussions amongst
intellectuals from different disciplines, but probably most strongly amongst those
preoccupied with the role of the media in modern societies. The basic assumption that
society had to be analyzed as a totality led the authors to regard the media as only one
part of it -although an extremely important one because of their symbolic function. The
notion of Culture Industry, chosen for its anti-populist connotation and which implies the
rationalization of the means of production and distribution as well as the standardization
of its products, opposed that of Popular Culture for its implied connection to the notion of
“spontaneity,” of culture springing from the people, a term they considered deceitful and
misleading. Several implications can be drawn after the introduction of the new concept;
for example, that Culture Industry differs from democracy, that it is an administered nonspontaneous phony culture, that with it the old distinction between high and low culture
vanishes in the “stylized barbarism of mass culture,” that art is no longer the expression
of critical thinking but the result of the needs imposed by the market, and that men and
women are enslaved in a more subtle way and end passively accepting what is imposed
upon them (Adorno & Morin, 1967).
From this perspective, all the media (radio, film, newspapers, magazines, and later
on, television) suffer the same imposition from the Culture Industry, becoming an
interrelated system, a whole, which makes them ever more powerful. The very same
assumption of rationalization and standardization mentioned above led to the idea of
sameness5, which implies that most products produced by the Culture Industry appear to
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I have already referred to this idea of sameness in the Introduction in reference to the way in which
television producers invest in the same successful formulas. Contrary to what might be expected, there is a
vast investment in non-innovating to increase or maintain the ratings avoiding the risks inherent in new,
different, innovative programs.
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be different, but are all the same underneath; in other words, they have all become
commodities and share the same ideology. As Horkheimer and Adorno (1948) put it, “the
totality of the Culture Industry consists of repetition. Its characteristic innovations are
nothing more than improvements of mass reproduction.” The “masters” of the Industrial
Culture only invest in what has already proved to be successful; therefore, the new or the
different is excluded, swallowed, or annulled. Moreover, via omni-comprehensible,
standardized and stereotyped products, audiences are considered to be deprived of their
critical thinking to the point of becoming conformist "objects of consumption" rather than
subjects. The pleasure emerging from the act of consumption lies in not thinking, in
forgetting the suffering even when shown, because that would be futile. In the end,
pleasure, in Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s words, “is a flight not from reality, but from
resistance.”
Despite the strength of the argument and the productivity of the concept of
Culture Industry, the analysis of the pole of production, considerations regarding the
characteristics of the products, and the need to incorporate the economic, social and
political context into the study of the media (that is to say, not to take them in isolation),
one of the main weaknesses of the Frankfurt School lies in the pole of consumption. In
that sense, the statement that “the stronger the positions of the Culture Industry become,
the more it can deal with consumers’ needs, producing them, controlling them,
disciplining them (…) the enemy who is already defeated: the thinking individual”
deserves further analysis. Even if one could partially agree with the first part of the
argument, the second is more troublesome and problematic since it takes for granted
audiences’ uniform response. The declared death of the thinking individual, now
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relegated to the category of mere object of consumption, carries along with it an
oversimplified notion of meaning production and reproduction, and fails to acknowledge
that one cannot foresee what happens in reception simply by analyzing the products or
their conditions of production. In that sense, the formulations underestimate the
complexity of the moment of reception which derive in a simplification of the process of
communication itself. In other words, the School did not escape the linearity of the causeeffect model, even when the “cause” was problematized and analyzed attending to its
complexity and probably partly because of its lack of any empirical research.
Nevertheless, it would be hard to measure the enormous repercussion the School of
Frankfurt had in the academic and intellectual world. The term Culture Industry is widely
used by critical analysts to refer to the mass media. Ultimately, the provocative and acute
critique of the capitalist world and the media system was much more enlightening than
these few pages can give credit to.
C. Cultural Studies
1. The Beginnings
What became known as the British Cultural Studies or Birmingham School began
with the urge to understand the latest changes in British cultural, political, and social life
in the period after World War II. New social groups were emerging and there was a call
to trace and explain the map of social life.
Questions that had been posed by Marx regarding the emergence of class, power,
and conflict between classes, the global reach of capital, as well as the attempt to build a
general theory capable of explaining the connections between different domains of social
life, such as the economic, the political, the cultural, the ideological, were also central to
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what became known as the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Yet, Marxism -in
Hall’s (1977) own terms- never stood as a completely ‘fitting’ theory, mainly because of
Marx’s unresolved or underdeveloped (and at the same time conflictive) analysis of
culture, ideology, language and the symbolic.
The centrality that reached the concept of Ideology within the Center and
therefore Hall’s studies can be explained regarding two main historic aspects. On one
hand, the massive growth of the culture industry, which is seen as a privileged place in
the shaping and re-shaping of social consciousness; and on the other hand, due to the
troubling consensus of post-World War working classes to the advanced European
capitalism which threatened the ‘classical’ conception of ideology within Marxist
thought.
Despite the fact that Marx’s use of the concept of ideology is quite variable,
ranging from a narrow sense (as bourgeois consciousness, or false consciousness) to a
wider one (laws, sets of ideas, philosophy, any sort of consciousness), there are a set of
theses that dwell in his writings and were (and still are) the focus of criticism. Those
theses are that ideas emerge from the base, that consciousness is the echo or mere reflex
of the economic base and its modes of production (the same as language), that the ruling
ideas are the ideas of the ruling class, and the notion of false consciousness.
Although Hall acknowledges the criticisms that those theses received, criticisms
to which Hall himself contributed, he holds on to the notion of materialist theory and
calls for a re-reading of Marx, bringing into play other sets of ideas and theories
(fundamentally important for the matter of developments in the realm of linguistics,
semiotics, and psychoanalysis). Hall goes back to Marx and begins tracing the conflicting
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relationship between base and superstructure, particularly to what he considers
fundamental texts regarding the subject: the German Ideology, The 18thBrumaire of Luis
Bonaparte, the 1857 Introduction, the 1859 Preface, and Capital. Hall distinguishes two
different ‘moments’ in Marx’s thought, which could be synthesized in terms of “identity
theory” and “theory of articulation.” The former can be traced to The German Ideology
and the 1859 Preface, and the latter to the 1857 Introduction and Capital.
It is from the theory of articulation that Hall urges further theoretical
developments while at the same time he justifies remaining within this materialist/
Marxist theoretical framework. The so-called theory of articulation gives rise to other sets
of concepts such as unity of difference, partial vs. adequate consciousness, and multiple
determinacy. Two main reasons can be identified for Marx’s shift from the previous
construction of ideology in terms of false consciousness. On one hand, the analysis of the
1858 failed revolution, i.e., the lack of change at the political level when given the “right”
economic conditions for a revolutionary change. On the other hand, from a more
theoretical standpoint, the detailed and rich analysis of the process of production which
Marx begins to develop in the 1857 Introduction and translates to the analysis of
Capitalism in Capital. In that sense, Marx distinguishes between different interconnected
moments in the circuit of production -in the broad sense- each of them necessary to the
other, but still holding specific conditions of existence. Then, if on one hand production
and consumption can be identified as one and the same from a certain perspective
(productive consumption, for example), they are, at the same time, two very distinctive
moments which respond to particular sets of logic and determinations. Going specifically
to Capital, the introduction of the notions of value and surplus value are pivotal to
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understanding the relations of production that give rise to capitalism. However, although
value is produced during the moment of production, it can only be ‘actualized’ during the
moment of circulation (in the broad sense, including exchange and distribution), which
has its particular specific logic. Marx argues then that in the passage from the moment of
production to that of circulation/exchange there necessarily occurs a series of
metamorphoses, of changes of form. What once was a process of production apparently
disappears in a congealed product, what was previously a social relation between the
producer and the owner of the product is concealed in a relation between objects, what
was previously an unequal relation (between the exploiter and the exploited, the owner of
the means of production and the out-of- the- work-place owner of labor power) becomes
an equal exchange among products that have “equal” values. It is from that point, that is
to say, from exchange, that according to Marx, Bourgeois consciousness emerges. This
shift in Marx’s analysis is what allows Hall a different reading (a more productive one) of
the Marxist conception of consciousness/ideology. Since exchange relations are real, the
ideological structure that emerges from it can no longer be thought of as false. Ideology or bourgeois ideology- can therefore be considered partial or inadequate, since it fails to
give a holistic understanding of the real, but is not false or the product of mere illusions.
Going further into this analysis Hall argues that Marx is implicitly acknowledging that
there are different ways of giving account of the real through language and ideology, and
that he (Marx) is attempting to substitute what he sees as an inadequate understanding of
the real (Bourgeois ideology) for one based on the understanding of the real economic
relations which are concealed by the process of exchange. In sum, in the passage from
Identity theory (which implies that the superstructure is a mere reflection of the base, and
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consequently assumes the opposite notions of truth and falsehood), to the theory of
articulation, Hall finds a fundamental point in the beginning for a new theory of ideology
still grounded in the material base but not reductionist in its explanation at the level of the
superstructures.
Another relationship that, according to Hall, needs to be revised is that of ruling
ideas and ruling class. At this point Gramsci becomes pivotal. There are two main aspects
in the centrality of Gramsci’s thought for Hall, one is more theoretical and the other one
more political. In terms of the latter, Gramsci’s conceptualization of the role of
intellectuals is fundamental for the project of the Center of Cultural Studies: the
formation of organic intellectuals devoted to understanding their historical social context
in a deeper and more thorough way, while at the same time transferring that knowledge to
the “non-intellectual” class; i.e., translating the theory into political practice (the
quotation marks are intentional, since, according to Gramsci, we all are intellectuals,
although only some work as intellectuals).
Going back to what might be considered Gramsci’s theoretical legacies, and as
was mentioned before, Gramsci is key in understanding the way in which the level of
superstructures work. Problematics that were central to the interest of Hall and the Center
and had been left unresolved by Marx had been the focus of attention in the work of
Gramsci. Gramsci’s central interest in the arena of political struggle drives him to a much
richer and more complex conceptualization of culture, ideology and hegemony, in an
attempt to explain the complicated interconnections between the base and the
superstructure at the same time as their inter-determinacy. The concepts of culture,
ideology, and hegemony, as well as philosophy and common sense are central within this
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framework. It is important to bear in mind that all these concepts are interwoven and
make deep sense (probably) only in their interconnections. Basic to the understanding of
hegemony is its double character in terms of consensus and coercion, which is connected
to a more complex conception of the State. Gramsci considers that civil society and
political society constitute the State. Civil society, commonly regarded as the realm of
private interests, is formed by a varied group of institutions like the family, the church,
the school, the unions, and of course (particularly nowadays) the media. The gravitational
importance of civil society lies in the fact that it is within its realm that consensus is
constructed. The other arm of the state, political society, is formed by political
institutions that are in charge of coercion, or the mechanisms of punishment such as the
judicial system, and the police.
Hegemony, understood as the process of building, of putting together, the
coordination of interests of the dominant groups and those of the non-dominant (subaltern
groups) implies, on one hand, that what leads at a certain time is never the ruling class in
toto, but more specifically a historic bloc (e.g. financial groups over industrial groups at a
particular historic moment). But it also means that the dominant class has to put aside
some of its interests in order to gain consensus6 among the other classes. In the same
way, the subordinates have to give (a little?) to receive a little; it would be misleading to
believe that it is only the dominants who need to put some interests aside since this is,
after all, a relation of forces (although it is obvious who needs to yield the most).
The connection between philosophy and common sense is particularly important
in Gramsci’s thought and is central to Hall. Common sense, says Gramsci (1971), is
never one, it is dynamic, ever-changing, and incorporating new knowledge. It is half way
6

Actually, it would probably more accurate to speak of consent rather than consensus.
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between philosophy and folklore. Common sense is particularly important because it is in
its arena where political and ideological struggles take place in an attempt to impose a
particular definition of the world. If ideology cements a particular hegemonic movement,
it does so through the construction and “organization of the masses of people.” In sum, it
is through Gramsci’s analysis that the direct relation between ruling ideas and ruling class
is overcome. The concept of hegemony (and all the concepts associated with it) raises the
superstructure to a level of relative autonomy, yet it is still connected to the base which
“in the first instance” has the power to determine the categories of analysis but not to
define their content.
Gramsci, then, enables Hall to assume the role of organic intellectual critically (in
the sense of permanent self-reflective intellectual activity) at the same time as to analyze
cultural, political, and ideological phenomena in keeping with the material grounds while
still retaining their historic and complex specificity. For example, in the analysis of youth
working class subcultures in post-World War Two Britain, Hall and Jefferson (1976)
bring Marx and Gramsci together. On one hand, Marx helps them frame subcultures
within the general analysis of class, while Gramsci, on the other, helps them understand
the complex relations between young subgroups to their parent culture and to the
dominant culture, which give birth to different and characteristic ways of “coping with
the times.” It is then made clear that there can be different sorts of responses to the
material situation. Some may be hegemonic, and some counter-hegemonic, but the
emergence of class-consciousness is no more than one possible outgrowth and it cannot
be guaranteed. It is not a natural consequence, and if expected, it has to be worked out,
built within particular relations of forces, taking into consideration the particular historic
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circumstances not only in relation to the nation state, but also aware of the international
context.
2. Redefining the Field of Study
Thus, the study of audiences in Great Britain developed in a quite different
theoretical context than those of the Effects paradigm and even the Frankfurt School.
Based on a Marxist paradigm, the influences of semiotics and textual analysis are
fundamental. And, as mentioned earlier, Hall’s Encoding/Decoding model is a clear
response and alternative to the linearity of the models hitherto presented for the study of
the relation between the media and their audiences and of the way in which the message
had been conceptualized (Hall, 1994).
On one hand we could sum up the most outstanding characteristics of the products
of the cultural industry -characteristics which emerge from the works of the Frankfurtian
intellectuals- as generally invariable, omnicomprehensible, standardized, predictable. In
consequence, the audience (and in this case purposely in the singular) is brought to an
infantile state, docile, and afraid of the new and the unknown, deprived of its critical
capacity and transformed into an object of consumption, and conformist7. It is evident
that the status of the message is not problematized nor is its complexity recognized; but it
is also evident that the possibility of different readings is denied to the “consumer” from
the very beginning.
On the Effects side, Hovland’s 1959 article is quite illustrative; centering on the
potential of both survey and experimental methods in the measurement of attitude change
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This may sound like a noticeably rigid description, but that is the effect of bringing together the terms they
use to describe the products of the Culture Industry.
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as the result of exposure to the media, it fails to question the status of the message or the
receiver’s ability to interpret it in different ways. Or, as Bauer (1964) puts it, “no one
[referring to Hovland et al. at Yale and Kurt Lewin] stopped to record explicitly the main
findings: that given a reasonable large audience, [the message] varies in its impact. It
affects some one way, some in the opposite way, and some not at all” (p. 330). However,
Bauer’s interesting review of the Functionalist approach and his call to pay more
attention to the audience and the persistence of opinions rather than change –a strong
point made by Cultural Indicators theorists- fails to acknowledge the complexity of
meaning production and of the relationship between the message and the audience.
Moreover, the fact that there may not be a change of attitudes is understood as a noneffect. This critical aspect has been thoroughly counter-argued by Gerbner and his
associates, who maintain that “no change” should be interpreted as the maintenance of
the status quo, one of media’s -and particularly television’s- main effects.
It would probably be an overstatement to argue that the Effects approach
completely disregarded the problem of meaning. As early as 1954, for example, Hastorf
and Cantril published an article that argued against the conception of events, happenings,
or things as having significance in their own right. In other words, the authors stated that
an “occurrence” becomes an “event” when it becomes significant. Although the article
made a strong point regarding the notion of meaning as a construction, its emphasis on
the individual and its failure to incorporate a sociological perspective restricted the
understanding of meaning production. That is to say, centering on egocentrism (“a person
selects [those occurrences] that have some significance for him from his own egocentric
position,” p. 310), uniqueness (“we behave according to what we bring to the occasion
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and what each of us brings is more or less unique,” p. 311), and difference (“there is no
such thing as a ‘game’ existing out there… significances are different for different
people,” p. 309), the authors were unable to look at or avoided looking into the
relationship between power structures and meaning production/reproduction.
Thus, Hall argues that the process of communication is more complex, and that it
is a structure formed by different, relatively autonomous moments. Drawing closely from
Marx’s 1857 Introduction, Hall borrows the terms used by Marx in relation to the
analysis of the process of production: production, distribution, circulation, and
consumption, and suggests that they be regarded as a totality. The relative autonomy of
the parts that constitute the process of communication implies that each of them has its
own internal logic and structure, however, relative because there is a necessary
connection to each other for the process of communication to be completed.
The influence of Althusserian thought becomes evident in the centrality of the
notions of language and ideology to this model. Althusser (1969) defines Ideology as “the
representations of the imaginary relations of individuals to their real conditions of
existence” (p. 162), and as having material existence. Althusser asserts that Ideological
State Apparatuses (ISA) and their practices are the realizations of ideology. The author
defines the Ideological State Apparatuses as “a certain number of realities which present
themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions”
(p. 143), and differentiates the ISA from the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA), which
are defined as “a force of repressive execution and intervention ‘in the interest of the
ruling classes’ in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the
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proletariat” (p. 137)8. Among the former can be included the school, the church, family,
and the media, and among the latter, the police, courts, prisons and the army. The ISA
function primarily by ideology and secondly by repression (punishment, selection,
discipline); and the RSA, firstly by violence and secondly by ideology. Althusser
considers that in the pre-capitalist historical period the Church was the dominant ISA,
“which concentrated within it not only religious functions, but also educational ones” (p.
151), and that the educational system is the dominant one within a mature capitalist social
formation.
The notion of ideology becomes central first of all because it is opposed to class
reductionism; in other words, although Althusser assumes that ideology is connected to
the base, he doesn’t think of it as determinate or ‘fixed.’ The concept highlights the
central role played by discourse in the construction of the world, the real, consciousness,
and knowledge. From this point of view, ideas appear in language (defined as a set of
signifying practices that involve the use of signs in the semiotic domain, i.e., the domain
of meaning and representation). But language does not “reflect” the world as a mirror
would. The relation of ideas and the material world can no longer be thought of as
specular; “the ‘world outlooks’ are largely imaginary, i.e., do not correspond to reality”
(p. 162). Ideology is a construction; it comes out of or is a consequence of a particular
kind of practice, a symbolic practice. This allows Hall to say that we all live in ideology which is very clear, for example, in his work “Encoding/Decoding.” The concept of
representation becomes, then, pivotal to Hall’s work.

8

The difference between ISAs and RSAs can be related to the difference Gramsci establishes at the level of
the Superstructures between Civil Society and the State, respectively.
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Despite the fact that Hall (1978, 1994) criticizes Althusser for tending “to present
the process as too unidirectional, too functionally adapted to the reproduction of the
dominant ideology” (1978, p. 78), the concept of ideology is still relevant to him because
it helps solve the problem of false/true consciousness, which implies that social relations
themselves have an inherent meaning (therefore, all one has to do is look for it carefully).
This allows Hall to say, addressing Althusser, that “social relations have to be
represented in speech and language to acquire meaning” (1978, p. 97).
However, saying that ideology operates through language, or that social relations
are constructed through language, is not the same as saying that there is nothing but
discourses. It does not mean that there is no material ground at all. What is being said is
that the bases -the “real conditions of existence”- which are imaginarily experienced, may
be differently represented. There is no one-to-one relation; meaning is not fixed, but
constructed within the historical process of representation. Thus, it is understood that
although reality exists outside of language it is constantly mediated by and through it. In
this sense, knowledge is produced by discourses and is “the product of the articulation of
language on real relations and conditions,” (Hall, 1980) instead of a transparent
representation of the real.
So how do these notions of language and ideology affect our understanding of the
process of communication? And how does that affect the way we approach the study of
the media (or mediated communication)? It follows that from the moment of production
to the moment of circulation there needs to be a passage of forms. Before entering the
moment of circulation any given phenomenon, act, or fact is required to be submitted to
the logic of language, which is referred to as the encoding moment (in the case of TV, a
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complex language composed by different codes: mainly those of sound, image,
linguistic). We need to bear in mind that this moment is in many ways constrained by the
laws and rules of production or, as Verón (1987) would call them, “conditions of
production.” But I would extend his concept and include not only determined social,
historical, economic, and political constraints, but also technical and professional when
referring to the media. This needs to be remembered in order to give an accurate account
of the complexity that this moment implies. In the same way, once distribution has taken
place, a process of decoding on the reception side must happen. Only then can meaning
be effectively completed.
Now, if language does not merely reflect the real but constructs it (on real
relations and conditions), it follows that there can be more than two (beyond truth and
falseness) possible ways of articulating the real. Understood as an attempt to stop the
infinite semiosis and fix one of the possible meanings, ideology is an instance when the
text is set for a particular reading, discouraging -although not necessarily preventingothers. Naturalization is probably one of the most effective and subtle mechanisms
through which ideology operates, since it turns “natural,” it gives a sense of “nearuniversality” to what has been constructed through language/discourse. Naturalness hides
the work invested in the process of production of meaning and by making it invisible
denies its own existence. By disguising the connection between events and ideological
meanings, the rhetoric of connotation “asks us to imagine that the particular inflection
which has been imposed on [a] story has always been there: is its universal, ‘natural’
meaning” (Hall, 1973, p. 83). At the same time, it demonstrates “the degree of
habituation produced when there is a fundamental alignment and reciprocity -an achieved
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equivalence- between the encoding and decoding sides of an exchange of meanings”
(Hall, 1980).
Although both first order or literal meaning (denotation), and second order
meaning (connotation) show the different levels at which “ideologies and discourses
intersect,” the connotative order is the one that most clearly manifests the
conventionalization, historicity, and cultural facet of signs, which affect not only the
production of meaning but also their readings, narrowing the symbolic world to what Hall
(1973) refers to as “maps of preferred implied meanings.” According to Hall (1980), the
codes of encoding and those of decoding are hardly transparent, leading to what is
commonly referred to as misunderstandings. Even if the model was initially meant for the
study of messages/programs which could be said to have a “real” referent (or nonfictional programs), I suggest that the general idea posed by the model can be extended to
any referent based message (be it real or fictional). Thinking that fiction could or would
escape from this logic would mean ignoring the fact that meaning-making processes are
all subjected to the laws of language and ideology. And only if we were caught in a
certain notion of reflection (or mirrored ideal) could we exclude fiction from this
paradigm.
Much has been said about the decoding positions that Hall initially proposed. Let
us briefly go back to them and see how they were defined. The three theoretical possible
decoding positions are: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional. Dominant (or hegemonic
or preferred) reading happens when there is a correspondence between the codes that
have been used in the encoding and decoding moments. Negotiated, is the result of the
acceptance of the encoding code but introducing aspects from the code that the decoder
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brings into play; it “contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements: it
acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand
significations (abstract), while at the more restricted (situated) level, it makes its own
ground rules (p. 137).” Finally, oppositional is the case in which the decoding is done
using different codes; it implies the “understanding of both the denotative and
connotative meaning of the message but nonetheless constructs one’s own meaning
which contradicts the preferred meaning (p. 138).” This standpoint opens up the
possibility of superseding those unidirectional models which implicitly sustain a univocal
conception of the message, at the same time as establishing limits to other perspectives
that would assume that any interpretation is possible. But also, and equally important,
Hall is able to pay particular attention to the ideological role of the media in their attempt
to close, circumscribe, or constrain the emergence of possible interpretations, which is
present in the concept of preferred meaning. In sum, Hall is able to hold to the notion of
power on the side of production while avoiding getting caught by the notion of
determination, and is able to acknowledge certain freedoms audiences have at the
moment of reception. Thus, whereas he considers that the audience can assume (at least
hypothetically) three different positions, power is not equally distributed between
producers and consumers. Since these moments are relatively independent and “each has
its specific modality and conditions of existence” (1980, p.129), the moment of
production cannot guarantee the way in which the text will be read; that is to say, the
effects cannot be anticipated simply by analyzing the instance of production or the text
alone. Let us remember that once the circulation of the program/discourse has taken
place, it needs to be “translated” or transformed into some kind of social practice; in other
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words, if no meaning is taken there can be no consumption, and if the meaning is not
articulated to some sort of social practice, then there is no effect.
3. Rethinking the Encoding/Decoding Model
However productive in terms of thinking alternative ways of understanding mass
communication and opening the field to new problems, the Encoding/Decoding model
paid little attention to empirical matters, and some concepts were merely sketched and
needed further development, such as the decoding positions which are central to this
project. In that respect, Hall stated a few years later (1994) that “negotiated is not one
position at all, it’s filled out by a number of positions in relation to subcultures, [and that]
negotiated readings is probably what most of us do most of the time” (p. 265). Thus, a
number of questions arise. If only preferred readings are to be considered hegemonic and
most of the time most of the people engage in negotiated readings, how is hegemony
constructed and sustained? Should therefore the relationship between hegemony and
decoding positions be rethought? Can one think of preferred meaning and reading
positions as being independent of types of programs? How do subcultures filter
audiences’ readings? Moreover, should we rethink the statement that the media occupy
the privileged place of symbolic struggle for the definition of common sense in modern
societies?
From a semiotic point of view, the concept of intertextuality helps us understand
the relationship or connection between the moments of production and consumption, and
may help us understand how subcultures shape audiences’ readings. Not only are both
moments (production and consumption) intertextually connected to each other but also to
an infinite number of other texts which circulate within a social formation. This has
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further implications; on one hand, it is assumed that discourses carry marks (Verón,
1987) of their conditions of productions, which are, in themselves, other discourses. It is
important to bear in mind that from this particular perspective, discourse is understood in
a broad sense as the investment of meaning in any significant substance; in that sense,
any linguistic, iconic, or social practice can be thought of or analyzed as a discourse.
Whether a particular discursive unit is considered a condition of production, a discourse,
or an effect depends on the perspective of analysis or the interest of the analyst. Effect,
from this semiotic perspective, is any discourse which “recognizes” (carries marks of) the
discourse under analysis independent of its agreement or disagreement with it. It implies
an intertextual connection between two discourses that are separated from each other by
space and time, referred to as the “moment of circulation.” In other words, one single
discursive unit is never an isolated text, it is always immersed in the infinite production
of social discourses, and is always part of the infinite social semiosis. For example, in
analyzing any one episode of Judge Judy one would be analyzing not just the single
program in isolation (as an Immanent Semiotic Analysis would -e.g. Generative
Grammar, Greimas, 1983, which is a productive tool to access the discourses but cannot
give a complete comprehension of the broader communicational phenomenon), but
would be following the marks/traces that have been left (or carved) on it by other social
discourses, i.e. judicial/legal discourse, family discourse, moral discourse, religious
discourse, and of course, other media discourses, amongst others9. These different

9

Even if it could be argued that the discourses are potentially infinite it doesn't follow that they are
infinitely diverse, a statement that would contradict most of what has been said so far regarding how
language, culture, and ideology operate. What can be said is that not all the conditions of production that
help give shape and constrain the production of any given discourse might be identified, which leads Verón
to establish the distinction between marks and traces.
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narratives meet in a single significant substance, shaping it, limiting its meaning, and
favoring some over others. However, at the moment of reception the same thing happens.
The discourse, in this case, Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo, is read in connection to
other discourses familiar to the audience, which help interpret it and close its meaning.
This is what Morley’s (1992) Nationwide research tries to identify; as one of the earliest
and most serious attempts to put the model to work, the author combines semiotic and
sociological analysis in order to understand the relation between the program and the way
it is interpreted by the audience. Or, as Hall puts it, the research looks for “distinctive
interpretive communities which share some decoding frameworks in common”(Hall,
1994, p. 262) by assuming that readings emerge from the family, the workplace, the
institutions that people belong to, where similar kinds of discourses circulate and shape
their world views. As an outcome from this research, Morley was able to pinpoint the
overemphasis of class in the production of readings in Hall’s theory and the consequent
underestimation of other determinants of readings, such as the family, the workplace, etc.
(Fiske,1987 a.).
Despite the fact that an infinite number of discourses may circulate within a given
space and time -i.e., within any given social structure- it does not go without saying that
they are unlimited nor that everyone has equal access to them all. For one thing,
endlessness affects only the quantity of discourses produced within a social state and not
their range; the very same ideas can be voiced -with slight variations- over and over
again, through different material substances. The apparent symbolic infinitude may blind
us and have us believe in the coexistence of both infinite and unlimited production of
meaning or in a true democratic semiosis, which is the same. However, there are limits
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that narrow the process of production and restrict the emergence of the new,
circumscribing the conceivable, confining the imaginable10. Nevertheless, the fact that
there is a hegemonic order does not imply that everyone is subjected to it in the same
way; neither does it mean that there is a simple re-production of meaning11 (as the
Frankfurt school may have assumed). Different groups of people have access to different
types of discourses according to different life styles or living conditions (Morley, 1986,
1992, Fiske 1993, Radway, 1986). Thanks to the experiences, knowledge, feelings, (and
intertexts) they carry with them, audiences approach discourses with different “tools” and
consequently read them differently. And how differently is a matter that is yet to be
understood. For example, regarding Court shows, there are many questions that arise,
such as how gender, ethnic, economic, educational and cultural conditions amongst
Latino and White American audiences stamp their imprint on their readings of the
programs. And we can ask ourselves whether some sub-groups are more prone to a
particular type of reading, for example in terms of gender and authority, or in accepting
or defying the proposed meanings regarding those very same matters. And if there are
pleasures involved in the moment of reception and how they operate; are they liberating
or conformist? And what do they liberate from or consent to?

10

Foucault refers to this as Discursive Configurations (1971) and Angenot (1982-1989), as Hegemonic
Social Discourse.
11
The use of production/reproduction can be tricky. For instance, Hall prefers reproduction while Verón
uses production, and yet, they share a similar idea. It is interesting to note how the theoretical discussion
each author engages in leads them to choose one term or the other. Verón considers that reproduction
would not help to understand historic changes, connoting the repetition of the same meanings over and over
(contradicting his idea of how the semiotic process works). Production, on the other hand, recognizes a
certain degree of freedom while at the same time acknowledges social constraints in the process of
discursive production. Hall, on the other hand, uses reproduction to escape from the notion of "necessary
no correspondence." However, emphasizing the constraints under which discourses are produced he
recognizes, too, some degrees of freedom for the emergence of the new.
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The question regarding the relationship between hegemony and decoding
positions, and the one that refers to the preferred reading to be considered as the
hegemonic reading, lead to further queries. For example, could the negotiated reading
also be considered hegemonic? Hall (1973) defines this type of reading as that which
“accords the privileged position to the dominant definitions of events while reserving the
right to make a more negotiated application of local conditions” (p. 66). Since Gramsci’s
concept of hegemony refers to the process of coordination of the interests of the
dominant with the interests of the subordinate groups, could it not be interpreted from the
former that that is a construction of consensus (or consent)? Would it be fair to interpret
such acknowledging or according privilege to the dominant definitions of events as an
acceptance of its legitimacy? And regarding the making of its own rules, would it be a
threat to the preferred meaning when it only applies to a restricted level? Or put in
another way, if we think of the grand significations as the bulk, or the core, or the
substantial aspect of meaning and we leave space for some dissent that affects only the
marginal, isn’t it a way of coordinating the interests of the dominant and those of the
dominated? Hall says that the negotiated reading operates with exceptions to the rule,
which is different than saying the breaking of the rule. The former implies that the rule
stands while the latter suggests its destruction, its divide, therefore, a change. In
summary, by accepting the grand significations, isn’t the negotiated reading accepting
the basic ground upon which some “mild” form of dissent can be structured?
Keeping the above arguments in mind, let us consider for a moment the following
situation: members of the audience frequently criticize Judge Manuel Franco for the way
he mistreats people who participate in his program (La Corte del Pueblo). Discussions
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and even arguments can be frequently read on the web (chat rooms or foros de discusión),
where viewers interact and exchange their perceptions of the program. Without
attempting to exhaust the range of responses, it can be said that some people simply reject
the judge’s attitude altogether, accusing him of being a ‘phony judge,’ and asking for the
program to be removed from the air. Others support the show saying that the judge is a
“real” judge, and defend him by saying that he is forced to act like that because of
participants’ misbehavior; while others do not agree with the “form,” yet most of the time
approve the “content,” in other words, they disapprove of the judge’s “style” (mostly
regarding the language he uses to address the participants) but think he reaches the “right
decisions.” Would not the latter be a reading in tune with a meaning proposed by the
program despite the fact that it does not share its meaning integrally -that is to say,
regarding both its content and form- assuming that “form” also carries meaning? And
what about the hypothetical case in which members of the audience would approve the
form, but not the content? The problem with negotiated reading is that it opens up a
whole array of positions that need to be interpreted and classified. As Hall (1994) says,
then, “[negotiated] is not one position and is what most of the people do most of the
time” (p. 265). However, by opening the concept without further consideration we run the
risk of losing sight of the limits of interpretation and forgetting the notion of power
involved in any attempt of closure of the text. Nonetheless, it would not be accurate to
assume that any negotiated reading may be hegemonic. Some might be, as in the example
presented above, while others might stand farther from the preferred meaning. Only
empirical research can help discern among different readings, and analyze under which
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conditions or in which situations some negotiated readings might become hegemonic -a
distinction which the current research investigates.
4. Unfolding Discussions
Further developments of cultural studies in a different context led to an emphasis
on audiences’ resistant reading. Fiske (1987b, 1989), for example, argued for the need to
study popular pleasures, those which are connected to powerless subgroups which in
some way oppose the discipline imposed by the hegemonic, dominant groups. What
constitutes popular pleasures and why are they so central? For one thing, the author
argues that the popular had been disregarded for too long from ‘serious’ academic
research12, which considers it banal and ‘mere’ escapism, refusing to acknowledge its
ideological power to produce meanings or the varied resistant readings generated
amongst different audiences. But what is popular? Seen from the perspective of those
who ‘produce’ meanings, i.e., from the standpoint of those involved in the culture
industry, popular translates into numbers; it is equated to many: many people watching,
many people liking. From this standpoint popular becomes what most people watch and
ratings is its best indicator. This definition of the popular is today probably the most
found amongst non-academics; lay people tend to think of “popular” in such terms. But
popular also connotes to others something that emerges from the people, serving their
own interests; in other words, popular is equated to an idealized concept of “the people,”
conceived as “an oppositional force whose culture and social experience are in some way
authentic” (Fiske, 1987a, p. 310). In this case, then, television cannot be considered
‘popular’ since it does not conform to such a definition. The author is clearly dialoguing
12

This has changed over the years and researchers from all over the world address and investigate what
once was ignored or dismissed.

46

or contesting some versions of Marxist analysis, more specifically, the old Frankfurtian
discussion regarding the opposition between culture industry and popular culture and its
consequences in terms of related conceptions of the structure of the products (as basically
simple, omni-comprehensible, and carrying the same ideology despite their apparent
variety), reading (as a uniform act), and audience in singular and as a mass (of
manipulated subjects responding uniformly). But reflecting upon the complexity of late
capitalist societies, Fiske understands ‘the people’ as a variety of relatively powerless
social groups and subcultures that accommodate and/or oppose the dominant system of
values in different ways. Thus, the people is no longer thought of as a monolith but as a
changing multiplicity, and for that reason understanding the popular as a site where
conflictive forces meet becomes critical.
By focusing on popular pleasures Fiske positions himself in the realm of everyday
politics, of the microprocesses of power which take place in the day to day interaction
that occurs in different contexts and imply different hierarchies. These micro-politics,
thus, deal with the attempt to provoke changes in such places, without necessarily
threatening the macro structure or attempting structural -radical- changes. Fiske (1989)
distinguishes between two types of popular pleasures, those of evasion, “centered around
the body, which intend to cause offense and scandal,” and those he is more interested in,
the pleasure of producing meanings, “centered around social identity and social relations,
[that] work socially through semiotic resistance to the hegemonic force” (p. 56). In a
way, a fundamental question that arises is what do people escape from, and to, and what
are its consequences? It is worth remembering at this point that according to Horkheimer
and Adorno (1948), the pleasure resulting from the act of consumption of products of the
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culture industry is “a flight not from reality, but from resistance,” which is the opposite of
what Fiske intends to demonstrate. To him, pleasure is the result of the intersection
between meanings and power; it is the affirmation of “one’s social identity in resistance
to, in independence of, or in negotiation with, the structure of domination” (Fiske, 1987a,
p. 19). Therefore, the point can be made that rather than being a passive and conformist
act of reproduction of ideology, the act of consumption is interpreted as an energizing
moment of production. But I think it is legitimate to pose a question: it is a production of
what, and what is its social significance?
Fiske’s notion of resistant readings also needs to be distinguished from Hall’s
decoding positions. Although both authors conceive the notion of polysemy, Hall (1980)
deals with it first on a more general level accentuating the way in which discourses are
socially produced and circulated responding to an order and/or hierarchy that is imposed
upon them. From this standpoint, then, polysemy cannot be confused with pluralism since
“connotative codes are not equal among themselves. Each culture tends (…) to impose its
classifications of the social and cultural world (…) The different areas of social life
appear to be mapped out into Discursive domains, hierarchically organized into dominant
or preferred meanings” (p.134). On a more specific (less abstract) level, the notion of
preferred meaning recognizes, at the same time as it imposes, a limit to the implied
polysemy of the text giving rise to the three decoding positions.
Fiske (1987), on the other hand, not rejecting but elaborating on Hall’s model,
emphasizes a more open structure of meaning. Taking polysemy a step further, Fiske
suggests that instead of a singular preferred meaning it would be more productive to think
of “structures of preference in the text that seek to prefer some meanings and close others
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off” (p. 65). Central to Fiske’s argument is Bakhtin/Voloshinov’s (1994) definition of
sign as a “social construct between socially organized persons in the process of their
interaction” (p. 55). Bakhtin’s definition of the sign as a social construct implies that the
social organization of participants of a dialogue, in addition to the immediate social
conditions, influence the form of the sign in such a way that whenever they change so
does the sign. Meaning, then, does not belong to a word in itself but “to the word in its
position between speakers” (p. 35). The utterance is social; it is the result of the
interaction of social beings in a social situation, under specific conditions, and as part of a
broader social context. It is also worth noting that according to Bakhtin, the domain of
ideology coincides with the domain of signs since ideology is a representation, a
depiction of something that lies outside itself (the same as the sign). Fiske acknowledges
this multiaccentuality of the sign and the struggle that takes place in order to control it.
(Bakhtin/Voloshinov textually affirms: “the sign becomes the arena of the class struggle”
(p. 55)). On one hand, the dominants try to annul polysemy, and on the other, social
groups resist the tendency to homogenize meaning, and try to impose “diversity over
singularity” (Fiske, 1987, p. 316). These opposed tendencies towards homogeneity and
diversity can be seen both in production and reception. On the side of production
diversity can be seen through the fragmentation of the public and specific kinds of
programs that are produced according to different target-audiences, or in the reliance on
or the production of ambiguous texts that appeal to varied audiences. But Fiske
accentuates diversity in reception even under the strongest homogenizing tendencies.
According to the author, a widely distributed TV program across national and cultural
boundaries such as Dallas does not translate into homogeneous readings since the text’s
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openness becomes necessary to reach a great variety of consumers. In other words, and in
tune with this argument, as Radway (1986) would say, meaning is the result of the
interaction of the verbal structure and a socially situated reader -a reader who positions
her(/him) self in front of the text by means of bringing a whole set of experiences,
knowledge, and codes (and different types of intertextual relations, I would add). The act
of reading (or consuming a particular text) goes beyond the text itself, and its meaning
needs to be understood. It becomes evident that from this standpoint, audiences are
granted more agency than they previously were. However, the assertion that a program
can mean different things is a complicated one and it can have some implications. Are we
dismissing the notion of power of the text? Is this semiotic democracy as democratic as
Fiske would like it to be? How does this idea fit in with the ideological role of the media;
an ideological role that can be said to work promoting some type of messages over
others, and the shaping of common sense? What are the tools that audiences rely on to
activate one reading over another? We need to put the two ends together and try to make
sense of its complexity, but is Fiske going too far? Using the metaphor of “semiological
guerrillas” (which we can traced back to Eco), Croteau and Hoynes (2000) suggest that
“[t]he weapons these guerrillas use are their own interpretive skills, which they deploy
against the purveyors of ideological conformity. However, the resistance thesis has a
tendency to be far too casual in its dismissal of social structure” (p. 284).
Thus, the loosening of the structure of meaning via the concept of polysemy (and
the connected idea of a semiotic democracy) allows Fiske to establish the distinction
between readings that are produced from the text (resistant readings) from those that are
produced by the text (such the case of Hall’s decoding positions). And it is this notion of
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polysemy that Condit (1989) strongly contests, not by dismissing the concept altogether
but by putting limits on it. In that sense, according to her, it would be more appropriate to
substitute the term for that of polyvalence and keep the notion of polysemy for those texts
that clearly imply contradictory meanings. So she establishes the difference between
intertextual polysemy, which accounts for the variety of messages on mass
communication channels; texts that are internally polysemic, or open texts that offer
contradictory meanings; and polyvalence, which refers to audiences evaluating the text
differently. The argument is sustained by an analysis based on two interviews in relation
to one episode of Cagney & Lacey which deals with the problem of abortion. In the
Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy, Condit presents the analysis of two interviewees that
manifest clearly opposite readings: Jack's, who is openly pro-life, and Jill's, pro-choice.
The difference in the readings by Jack (oppositional) and Jill (dominant) lead Condit to
argue that the difference between the two is grounded not in textual polysemy, but in
polyvalence. In other words, Condit maintains that both Jack and Jill agree on the
interpretation of the denotative level, but disagree on the way they value the program:
negatively in the case of the oppositional reading, and positively in the case of the
dominant. Condit points to the limits or constraints of interpretation, which relate to the
(more or less limited) access to counter hegemonic texts, as well as to the ratio between
pleasure and work. In that sense, it becomes clear in her analysis that Jack’s oppositional
reading demands much more work than that of Jill’s, and consequently, his oppositional
reading is less pleasurable. The point that Condit makes is interesting since it reminds us
that, contrary to Fiske’s argument, not all pleasurable readings may be resistant.
However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the difference between Fiske’s and Condit’s
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approach lies in making sense from the text and by the text, which therefore gives a
different account of the two perspectives and makes them distinct from each other
although not necessarily opposite. Lewis (1991) helps us by making clear the difference
between resistive and oppositional readings: “the oppositional reading assumes a
preferred reading (which it subsequently questions), while the resistive reading questions
the very idea of a preferred reading” (69).
Finally, a subtle distinction between Fiske’s and Radway’s notions of resistance
seems pertinent. While the former could be said to celebrate the popular and resistive
reading, the latter emphasizes the need to identify the interstices that are left by ideology
and patriarchal practices, which are both incomplete and imperfect, in order to produce a
significant change. In other words, Radway attempts to understand the process of
interpretation and reading from within in order to initiate a dialogue that may lead the
audience (in this case, women who read the romance) to see those practices from a more
radical perspective. This perspective can therefore be translated in a more subversive
practical change. In that sense, Radway’s work brings to mind the commitment of the
intellectual not only to know better how ideology works, but also to attempt a significant
progressive change. It is probably this distinction that drives Gray (1987), who assumes a
critical perspective towards notions of resistance that tend to forget about the power of
discourses to produce particular readings, to recognize the importance of Radway’s
analysis and the necessity to continue that line of research.
D. In the Reshaped Television World Audiences Meet Court Shows
How is reality constructed? How do systems of value and knowledge (and
ideologies) emerge, persist and/or change through time? Why do people think the way
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they think? What are the major institutions involved in the process of making meaning? It
could be argued that these, among others, are leading questions for anyone interested in
understanding the processes that govern any particular social state. The last thirty
something pages have dealt with different theoretical paradigms in the realm of social
communication. These paradigms address some of those questions, in some cases more
directly than others, assuming different perspectives and putting more emphasis on
certain aspects, centering on different -but connected- problems, and standing on
different philosophical grounds. This brief account of what could be considered a[n
incomplete] history of audience research in the U.S and England has attempted to
disentangle some of the central points in the understanding of the role played by one of
the major institutions in contemporary societies, the mass media. This has helped me in
many different ways to pose my own questions and lead this research.
The present study of the way in which Court shows make meaning and how
different types of audiences relate to them within the frame of the Cultural Studies
paradigm ultimately intends to accomplish a further purpose beyond its specific interest:
the exploration of the problematic notion of reading positions and other related concepts.
Delving into the possibility of distinguishing hegemonic from non-hegemonic readings
amongst the array of negotiated readings, and exploring the connection between pleasure
and resistance are examples of such interest. And as a byproduct, I hope I will be able to
make a humble contribution to understanding better the role that media messages play in
the process of meaning making in modern societies.
The above mentioned are some major theoretical issues, but answers can only be
found by studying and analyzing actual, concrete communication processes (which
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involve the analysis of messages and the interpretations made by the audiences). The
subtitle of this section reads “The New Television World.” In subsequent chapters I will
highlight certain characteristics that apply to the television discourse. Even if there are
evident changes that can be observed in the course of time, common features distinguish
and typify each different period, and they can be traceable. There have been
technological changes, there have been changes in the modes of production, and there
have been changes in genres (with the introduction of new ones or the reshaping of the
old), and there have been changes in policies that govern (or not) the media (although this
is not a matter that I address in this research). The same old stories are told with new
faces to tell them, and old faces tell us new stories. Some narratives persist untouched
and others have mutated. So when I say “television world” I refer to the whole
environment that is captured by our television set; and in this particular context I am
thinking of television programming as a whole (Gonzales Requena13, 1998). This
research is not centered on an analysis that would document the different stages of
television and offer a detailed description of its transformations; nevertheless, there are
some evident manifestations of how the television landscape has changed. And one of
them is the amount of hours dedicated to programs that respond to what can be referred to
as the “mega-genre” of reality television. And within the realm of reality television we
find court shows; a type of program which stands in the interstice where television,
reality, and justice cross. And there are many television judges. And there are many hours
of court shows on the air. And in some of those shows they speak English and in others,
Spanish. And audiences engage with these programs. So what do we make of all that?
What are the implications of so-called reality television? How do they impact on our
13

The author refers to it as “macrodiscurso televisivo.”
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perceptions of what is important and what is not? What does diversion mean in this
context; and what meaning are we to give the term: detour or entertainment? And are
they really antagonistic expressions? And how does justice fit in all this? And how do
audiences signify the meanings that are offered to them? The analyses that I will present
in the following chapters should help to disentangle some of those issues and by that
means try to find the answers to the more general theoretical questions.
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CHAPTER III
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
As mentioned earlier, despite the success of Court shows since their re-launch in
the 1990s, most of the early background knowledge emerged from the field of legal
studies and it referred almost exclusively to the relationship between fictional television
trials and the justice system. More recently, research has been conducted focusing
specifically on court shows, and although some of the old concerns persist in reference to
the law and their (mis)representations of the judicial system, there have also been
interesting contributions from the field of communication. Nevertheless, the most
common tendency is to analyze the programs themselves and there is less precedent
involving the audiences. Consequently, it is common to read about speculation as to how
the programs might affect the viewers' perception of the law but little data about their
actual responses.
A. Early Concerns. The Law vs. Television: Two Conflicting Systems
The People’s Court, which premiered in 1981-1982, was one the first modern
television court programs to appear and started in the middle of a widespread debate
about the role of cameras in the courtroom and their effects not only in the judiciary
system but also in public life. The controversy involved mainly lawyers and some media
researchers and reached the public arena through specialized journals as well as articles
published in various papers around the country.
As early as 1937, the American Bar Association (ABA) had suggested (Canon 35)
that “the taking of photographs in the courtroom … the broadcasting of court
proceedings, are calculated to distract from the essential dignity of the proceedings,
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degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the
public, and should not be permitted.” In 1952 the ABA amended Canon 35 to include a
prohibition against television coverage of courtrooms, adding the clause that the cameras
“distract the witness in giving his [sic] testimony” (Hoyt, 1977, p. 489).
However, fundamental to the debate that took place in the late 1970s and early
1980s were a series of televised trials. Among those, the Estes case gained particular
notoriety when, in 1965, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned Billie Sol
Estes’ conviction on the grounds that the accused had been denied a fair trial because it
had been televised. The arguments of the Court majority, expressed by Justices Tom
Clark and Earl Warren, centered on “the psychological distraction of participants in a trial
knowing they are being televised.” These trials triggered a series of arguments for and
against the right of television to place cameras in the courtroom and to broadcast live,
which led to debates over the rights of a defendant to a fair trial -related to the
psychological impact of cameras on juries and their competence for reaching a more or
less impartial decision, First Amendment freedoms, and finally, the social impact and
institutional consequences.
In an article entitled Debate rages. TV on trial -how does it affect courts?
published by the Los Angeles Times, on June 15 1980, Barry Siegel synthesized the
arguments for and against TV cameras in the courtroom as follows. Advocates for the
presence of cameras argued that television in the courtroom would correct the distortions
created by television entertainment programs, such as Perry Mason, quite popular during
those days; that it was more desirable to have the public see what went on in the
courtroom than the depictions they received from entertainment programs; and that
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television had become so commonplace in people’s lives that it could not possibly bother
them. The arguments against allowing television in the courtroom focused mainly on the
fact that jurors would be distracted by the physical presence of cameras mostly in terms
of their awareness of being on television; that by showing only brief portions of the trials,
television would unfairly condition the public either for or against the accused person;
and finally, that both attorneys and judges could be subject to any kind of pressures and
could be tempted to use television publicity for their own gain.
In the meantime, research was conducted in order to gain a better grasp of the
situation, but mostly regarding the judiciary field itself rather than the relationship
between the media and audiences. In that regard, a 1970 survey of 483 trial judges had
concluded that 92% believed TV cameras should not be permitted in the courtroom(Hoyt,
1977). And in 1977 an experiment was conducted to determine if individuals were
affected by the awareness of being televised. The experiment predicted -based on the
reasoning of Justices Warren and Clark mentioned above- that when participants had
knowledge that they were being televised, they would recall significantly less correct
information about a film. The participants in the experiment, 36 volunteers enrolled in a
Media and Society class at the University of Wisconsin, were divided into three groups.
After showing them a film containing a large amount of information about a subject
matter they were not familiar with, they were randomly assigned to different
experimental conditions: obtrusive camera condition, non-obtrusive camera condition,
and no camera condition. The results indicated that subjects who faced the obtrusive
camera included more correct information in their responses, spoke for a longer time,
used more words, and gave the quickest answers, leading the researchers to the
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conclusion that people apparently feel more compelled to speak more and to pause less
when they are clearly aware of being televised, and that the data “indicate that far from
being a danger and a potential hindrance to a fair trial, in this context television cameras
can lead to a fairer trial” (Hoyt, 1977, p. 492). In other words, and according to these
results, witnesses would be more prone to give more and more accurate information when
aware of the presence of a television camera. It should be noted, nonetheless, that some
methodological questions arise from this study that affect its validity; on one hand, the
fact that the participants were volunteers, and on the other, that they were enrolled for the
purposes of the research from a Media and Society class, which implies a certain degree
of awareness about the subject matter as well as of the use of cameras.
But there was yet another preoccupation involving what happens inside the
courtroom in relation to television. The focus of attention shifted from the presence of the
camera in the room to the distorted images and representations that television gave of law
through programs such as Perry Mason and the like and that subjects involved in the
(law- trial) process consequently brought along. From this standpoint, attention was
drawn to how fictional television influenced the way that jurors thought of trials and the
way they were supposed to be handled. In other words, television was also seen as
invading the courtroom, but in a very distinctive way, regarding juror expectations and
consequently forcing officers of the law to readjust the way they presented evidence and
carried out trials. In that sense, in his 1980 LA Times article Siegel explains that
prosecutors considered that jurors “with television-formed expectations assume
defendants are often falsely charged, because Perry Mason always defends innocent
clients. But in the real courtroom, 90% of all defendants plead guilty” (my emphasis).
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Furthermore, according to the author, prosecutors also complained that jurors exposed to
television often expected sophisticated scientific proof to be introduced as evidence in
cases where such was either not available or not needed, and would comment after a trial
about the lack of certain kinds of evidence or regarding the proceedings and the
questioning of witnesses, not realizing the constraints of the very same system of law.
The pace of trials was another aspect of concern in relation to this matter. According to
lawyers, “jurors, expecting trials to be as fast paced and dramatic as TV shows, often
grow bored and restless in the courtroom. Jurors seeking drama also seem to expect
witnesses to look and talk like actors on TV shows.” The author concluded that faced
with all the TV–fed expectations, some investigators and lawyers found it best simply to
give jurors what they expect, altering their own work patterns, e.g., asking for some
evidence, such as fingerprints, even when not really needed.
The importance of such arguments rests in the ulterior justification of the need for
cameras in the courtroom. In other words, if the publics were presented with the ‘reality’
of trials, they would learn about the judiciary process and correct the distorted images
presented by fictional law programs, therefore changing the expectations that juries
would bring along. More and more, cameras were allowed in courtrooms nationwide,
particularly in Florida, where in 1975 the Post-Newsweek company had filed a petition
with the Florida Supreme Court asking for a change in the State’s Code of Conduct in
order to remove a ban on cameras in the court. After considering the petition, the Court
“launched a one-year experiment in the summer of 1977, opening the courtroom door far
wider than any State ever before had done” (Davis, 1981, p. 8).
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According to Davis, after the “experiment” was set in motion, viewers in Florida
were exposed to nothing that remotely paralleled Perry Mason, moreover enabling them
to realize that “[t]he courtroom doesn’t resemble a movie set and the participants don’t
look and act like a Hollywood cast.” However, what stands as more disturbing about this
argument is the way the author presents the televised image as undoubted “objective
reality.” From Davis’ perspective, “what people see and justifies the presence of the
camera is reality (emphasis in the original), which a sketch, or a newspaper report, or a
television reporter taping a stand-up outside the courthouse, can’t quite convey. (…)
When one reads about these qualities they are abstract; to see and hear them is to
experience them. ‘The camera itself neither dramatizes nor diminishes. It simply shows
what’s there’ (p. 13).” Thus, according to the author, people will better understand what
goes on in their courts, they will support law enforcement more effectively, and for that
reason, local television stations should continue to campaign resolutely for the right to
bring TV cameras into the courtroom.
This argument is at its best, naïve and simplistic, and at its worst, deceitful. The
belief or pretense that a camera is solely a tool that will offer or give us back a mere
reflection of reality, that imposes no particular perspective, and stands as a bare witness
of events, ignores any knowledge about the production of meaning and how signs (in this
particular case, iconic signs) operate. It ignores that the image, as any other form of
representation, is an ideological construct and as such reflects and refracts another reality
outside itself. It fails to recognize that, as any sign, the image constitutes a “construct
between socially organized persons in the process of their interaction. [That] the forms of
signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and
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also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. (…) [And that they, as signs,]
become the arena of [social] struggle” (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 55)14.
The argument that images are bare witnesses of reality has been used recurrently,
particularly but not exclusively, by media producers to reinforce the effect of objectivity,
e.g., of the news, and therefore enhance the legitimacy of the media, and more
specifically television, in the public perception.
The intervention of George Gerbner (1980) brought a different and critical
perspective to this debate. Concerned about the social impact and institutional
consequences of televised trials, Gerbner argued that they would “alter the historic
relationship between two institutions that have largely divergent and partially conflicting
functions.” On one side, “entertainment and news representing the conventional pressures
of the social order,” and on the other, the judicial process representing “an effort to
adjudicate individual cases according to the law” (p. 417).
What moved Gerbner in this debate was his theory of communication. According
to his perspective, communication is the most important humanizing process, in the sense
that it is through the exchange of messages that people understand the world, make sense
of it, and establish shared beliefs about what is right and what is wrong. Since the
industrial revolution and the mushrooming of the mass media the process has undergone
a radical change. The storytelling through which culture is produced and reproduced now
has a localized center: the mass media. The ownership of the means of communication by
powerful cultural, social, and economic élites that are capable of determining the content
of the messages that circulate socially is critical to the theory. In summary, this

14

For more on signs and images as signs see Aumont, Bergala, Marie & Vernet, 1983; Barthes, 1968, 1972;
Eco, 1983, 1984; and Peirce, 1940, 1977, 1991; among others.
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perspective considers communication as a process of interaction through messages that
tell us how things are, how things work, and what to do about them. And the focus is
centered particularly in the analysis of television, considering it the most pervasive and
the most accessible of all media, since it requires no particular knowledge, operates
continuously, and is immediate to human experience since “it’s at home.”
Gerbner et al.’s Cultural Indicators theory argues that cumulative exposure to
congruent, pervasive messages over the years tends to reproduce similar images of the
world. Its political implication resides in its indicating the importance of the structure and
ownership of the mass media in terms of institutions, which have become, during the last
century, the cultural arms of capitalist society. Its analyses call for a revision of the
policies (or lack thereof) that govern the media in order to attempt a positive change in its
structure, which could therefore affect the production and circulation of messages; in
other words, in an attempt to democratize the production of stories that mediate between
the (ever smaller) direct experience of life and the consciousness people have of it.
Why, then, would Gerbner be against the broadcasting of trials? If television had
so far produced and cultivated congruent messages and images about the judiciary system
through its fictional programs, the broadcasting of ‘real’ trials would bring new and
different images, some even contrary to what had been ‘taught’ until then and therefore
allow for a different social construction of the system of Law. However, Gerbner argued
that the broadcasting of trials would not offer a more accurate portrayal than fiction did.
The argument revolved around the idea that trials would be swallowed by the logic of
television, i.e., they would be edited to fit the dramatic ritual characteristic of the
medium. Television would create “popular spectacles of great appeal but deceptive
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authenticity as it selects and interprets trials to fit the existing pattern of law in the world
of television” (1980). In this sense, the judiciary system would become part of the
television world, subject to its logic and, hence, to the conflicting relationship between
the two systems and its social implications.
The fact that real trials would enter the arena of entertainment was not seen as a
minor event since it had moral implications. According to Gerbner, it meant the
entertaining of values and norms of the community simultaneously to the cultivation of
conformity. In other words, through entertainment, popular prejudice would be reinforced
and “support for the suppression of threats and challenges to the social order” would be
cultivated.
In synthesis, from Gerbner’s standpoint media messages tend toward the
maintenance of the status quo, shape common images of the world, and bring people who
are more exposed to the media to hold similar perspectives. In addition to this, the media
are owned by elites, which tend to reassure their interests and operate in a void of policies
that defend the interests of the people. Thus, not only would television not democratize
the public representation of law but it would threaten the very independence of the
system by transforming the courtroom into its own appendage.
In the following years, the attention of those involved in the legal system shifted
from the cameras in the courtroom to privileging crime-drama shows, probably due to the
number of such shows on the air as well as to the high percentage of them during prime
time programming. For example, between 1981 and 1990 the number of crime-shows on
prime time television fluctuated between 10 and 25, ranging between 16 percent and 37
percent of prime time programming (from data presented by R. Surette, 1992). The
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distorted images that television produced of the judiciary system remained central to the
problematic, but this time with a more critical perspective than in the previous years and
more concerned with the social impact and the institutional consequences, partly
influenced by Gerbner’s perspective.
For example, in 1985, James Carlson conducted a study on the relationship
between crime show viewing and attitudes toward the criminal justice system. According
to this study, mainstream television is characterized by a crime control15 point of view,
“which is highly supportive of the status quo and conventional views of proper behavior,
ethics and morality.” The analysis of the content of crime related programs showed that
there was a lack of information regarding criminal legal processes and that the little
information that was provided was often inaccurate. Moreover, the emphasis in such
programs was on people, not on the rules or “abstract elements of the law,” thus making
it hard for heavy viewers to be more informed about the legal process than light viewers.
In other words, the study showed that amongst heavy viewers there is no relationship
between crime show viewing and knowledge about the criminal legal process and rights.
More specifically, the research concluded that the cultivation hypothesis stating that what
is being cultivated is ignorance of the criminal system appeared to be supported. In sum,
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The difference between “due process model” and “crime control model, ” becomes central not only to
Carlson’s research, but also to a series of studies that deal with law and television, and its effects within the
social structure. Due process model presumes that subjects are innocent until proven guilty and it tends to
emphasize the formal structure of law and the elimination of the mistakes that might affect individuals. Its
most important goal is to protect citizens’ rights and prevent capricious government actions. Those who
support the model are concerned with protecting the individual from the civil authority. Within the Crime
control model the main goal is to punish criminals and to deter crime. The presumption of guilt, which is
implicit in the model, is a reflection of confidence in the efficiency of the criminal justice system. Public
order in addition to high regard for crime control is considered a precondition for social freedom. It is
implicitly assumed in this model that, since the police make very few mistakes, those who have been
arrested are guilty.
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it was concluded from this research that “television crime dramas are morality plays that
encourage viewers to be good law-abiding moral people, [which] is accomplished by
portraying law breakers as basically immoral individuals, whose motives for criminal
activities are never treated sympathetically” (p.119).
The conflictive relation between the two institutions, the justice system and the
mass media, particularly television, which had been pointed out by Gerbner in 1980, was
reintroduced in the following years. Led by the premise that people rely on images and
knowledge they obtain from the media to construct a picture of the world, and in an
attempt to better understand the dynamics of society, Surette (1992) argued for the need
to examine the relationship between “society’s primary information system (the media)
and its primary system for legitimizing values and enforcing norms (the criminal justice
system)” (p. 6). The difference in the logic that drives these two institutions is made
evident, for example, in the way they handle and deliver information. In one case,
through a story line that follows strict legal procedures of evidence before a restricted
audience -the judge and/or the jury- and on the other, through short, fragmented,
entertainment-oriented, time and space limited stories before a massive audience. Such a
difference would not be as problematic if we were dealing with two very independent
spheres of social life; however, these two storytelling institutions intermingle and
compete for a particular construction of reality in an unbalanced relation of forces that
favors the media. If the court’s main functions are not restricted solely to solving
individual disputes but also to legitimizing the laws that govern society as well, then
anything that can influence the image of the law can at the same time influence its
legitimizing effect. And on that point the media -and the author particularly points at the
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electronic media- are crucial. On one hand, the media -according to national surveys
conducted by Hearst Newspapers, and Yankelovich, among others- “are a much more
important source of information about the judicial system than are lawyers, personal
experience, schools, or libraries. In fact, TV dramas alone rank ahead of all non media
sources, and media sources occupy the top five positions” (Surette, 1992, p. 82). But also,
on the other hand, media trials have become news events that have transformed the
justice system into just another (among many) source of entertainment and drama, which
ends up eroding the court’s ability to define and legitimize the law.
The television landscape was changing rapidly in the 1990s as a result of the
blooming of cable television in the 1980s. The number of cable networks rapidly
increased as did the number of subscribers nationwide, which grew from 15 million in
1980 to approximately 53 million in 1990, to 68 million in 2000 (Head et al., 2001). And
whether to allow cameras in the courtroom was no longer a subject of debate. CourtTV
was launched in 1991 as the first and only cable network dedicated to crime and justice
seven days a week, providing -according to its producers- “a unique window on the
American legal system.” The network was intended to both inform and entertain the
audience by daily trial coverage focused ‘on America's most newsworthy and
controversial legal proceedings [that] deliver powerful, real-life drama, and an evening
schedule centered on the crime and justice genre.16 Counting on a team of ‘legal experts’
(lawyers, anchors, and reporters) that provide information and opinion about the trials, it
was supposed to offer viewers “the opportunity to learn about the key issues and nuances
of compelling cases.” The media landscape was also reshaped by the bombardment of
16

In the beginning of the XXI Century, Court TV featured shows like America’s Most Wanted: Final
Justice, Cops, Court TV Movie, Forensic Files, Hollywood and Crime, Hollywood at Large, Homicide,
NYPD Blue, and Perry Mason.
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information regarding criminal cases. And of course the O. J. Simpson trial that began on
Monday, January 23rd, 1995 became a daily spectacle that caught the attention of most
Americans around the country.
In summary, the early debates regarding cameras in the courtroom and their effect
on the judicial system and in public life were motivated by a series of televised trials. The
research conducted during the late 70s and early 80s dealt specifically with issues
regarding the judiciary field itself; first regarding the effects of cameras in the courtroom
and later regarding the effects of distorted images of the law emerging from television
fictional shows about courtrooms. Gerbner’s intervention in this debate shifted the center
of attention from distorted images and their effect on the judiciary system to their social
impact and institutional consequences. By the 1990s, when Court TV launched and the
first court shows were produced, the television landscape had already started to change
and the theme regarding cameras in the courtroom was no longer a subject of debate.
B. The Blossoming of Court Shows: Law and Entertainment
In September 1996 Judge Judy went on the air, followed the next year by a
revival of the 80’s show The People’s Court. Then came Judge Joe Brown, Mills Lane,
Ed Koch, the same Joseph Wapner, Divorce Court, Judge Mathis, Judge Hatchett, Curtis
Court, and Moral Court on the English speaking syndicated networks; and later on, La
Corte del Pueblo, La Corte de la Familia, and Sala de Parejas on Telemundo.
Despite the changes that have taken place and the new mediascape, by the year
2000 the controversy and debate around the relationship between law and television has
changed little in some respects. The erosion of the law as the result of the intermingling
between the legal system and the media is a recurrent topic. Although recognized as a
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historic relation between these two institutions -the judiciary and the media- it is argued
that what has changed is the extent to which the law is converging with popular culture
and the consequent deleterious effect on the stability and legitimacy of the law, as George
Gerbner had predicted. More and more, the limits between what is “real” and what is
“fictional” seem to be blurring in the television world, posing the threat of transforming
the legal into televisual reality. Such a metamorphosis that implies the
“sensationalization, subjectification, and fragmentation of authority” (Sherwin, 2000, p.
38), becomes critical in light of the fact that the mass media are considered to be the
primary -if not exclusive- source of public knowledge about the legal system.
Consequently, more attention is being paid to narratives in general and media
narratives in particular gaining the concepts of entertainment and spectacle a renewed
central place. For example, Friedman (2000), referring to the legal process, proposes the
term lexitainment, which alludes to its theatrical and entertainment features, or more
specifically, to the accelerating American drift away from viewing the courtroom as
didactic and toward seeing it as pure entertainment. According to the author, a distinction
can and should be made between the didactic, the instrumental, and the entertainment
aspects of the legal process. From this standpoint, what accounts for the difference
between what may be considered as didactic or entertainment is basically the fact that the
former deliberately tries to make a point while the latter does not, and if it does so it is
only indirectly or unintentionally. Throughout history, governments as well as private
parties have been inclined to use trials in order to make an example of someone or to
send a political message, and in that sense, most legal actions impart a lesson particularly
those that are very open, public, and/or dramatic. And for this same reason, the legal
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system calls for some kind of bridge that will connect it to the ‘public sphere,’ to the
people the moral is intended to reach. However, and as could be expected, the connection
between the judiciary system and the people has changed according to different periods
in time. For example, in the late 1700s public executions accomplished the exemplary
role of teaching a lesson, while in the nineteenth century those kinds of spectacles were
suspended because it was believed they did not deliver such an effective moral message.
Since the legal system has become more complex it requires more than ever before what
Friedman calls “information brokers,” i.e., specialists that translate and communicate the
complexities of the law to lay publics. However, there are certain factors that work
against widespread public comprehension of a more “sophisticated” conception of law.
Friedman points to two main factors; one is related to the lack of interest of those in the
legal profession itself to have a more knowledgeable public that could threaten the
professional monopoly. An example is the American Bar Association’s opposition, in
1935, to radio programs like Good Will Court that offered free legal advice to the
audience. The lobbying was so strong that it resulted in the cancellation of such types of
programs. The other factor is related to the media and their increasing dominance of or
tendency towards pure entertainment; one of the best examples regarding this point
arejudgeshows, which are “part of the triumph of lexitainment in an obvious way. They
open the window to what purports to be a civil process (…) Justice becomes something
that we can, and ought to see. And it has to be entertaining” (Friedman, 2000, p. 554).
Notwithstanding the entertaining factor, the author points to the image judge shows also
present of the system of law. A representation of the legal process that is apparently open
and popular and in a certain way, democratic, where people can get fast and positive
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answers; in other words, that is closest to ‘a people’s court’. In such kinds of programs
“justice is raw, with none of the excrescencies of due process, technicalities, and the
games lawyers play” (p. 554).
However, and despite the fact that the author opens the debate to some interesting
directions, there are some points that weaken Friedman’s analysis. In particular his
assumptions about the participants and the audiences of judge shows who are disqualified
and belittled by the author in a rather simplistic way, the former for being “so foolish or
so greedy for their fifteen minutes of fame,” and the latter as ‘the millions out there who
watch these shows [as] peeping toms.” Furthermore, there is an over-simplification of the
moment of reception in the assumption that all that the audiences see is “a bunch of
pitiful marital losers, dimwitted ex-boyfriends, dead-beat dads, faithless wives, a
menagerie of people who put no value on privacy, who have forgotten that dirty linen
should not be washed in public, who have lost sight of the line between entertainment and
private life” (p. 552). The fact that media messages are considered mere messages of
consumption, of self-realization through consumption, of hedonism, fun, and ultimately,
enjoyment, prevents the author from focusing more closely on the moment of production
or from establishing the complex relationship between production and consumption of
media messages. In the end, if we already know what audiences see, and if we already
know what content media messages convey, there is little space left for research.
However, this is only possible due to the lack of acknowledgement of the complexity of
the process of meaning and of the practices that are involved in its production/
reproduction.
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In sum, it could be argued that the controversy surrounding the intermingling
between the system of law and the media has been updated. And in some respects, the
lexicon/terminology has changed more than what lies behind it. Television is now
referred to as visual mass media, programs as popular culture, and content as narratives.
The knowledge and the values that emerge from the television world are now communal
tool kits or meaning-making skills -depending on the context-, and when referring to law
on television it is addressed as “law going pop.” Yet, in other respects there is little that is
new. For instance, Sherwin (2000) maintains that any attempt to understand the way that
law works in contemporary society adequately, requires that popular culture be taken
into account. True, but hardly original.
Nevertheless, something has changed, something is missing from the initial
debate; more specifically, from Gerbner’s concerns. And if I point to Gerbner it is
because of ongoing references to his 1980 article dealing with cameras in the courtroom.
What is missing is any notion of power structure, any allusion to the importance of media
ownership and to understanding media as institutions (with all of its implications), or the
call for the democratization of the system of storytelling. Of course, interesting questions
are raised, such as what are the common narratives that organize our daily experience,
what are the stories that are being told, what kind of stereotypes help us organize our
everyday life, and where do they come from? However, there is no reference, there is no
questioning about who produces such stories, under which constraints, and in light of
what ideological frame. In sum, there is no concern for the critical moment and process
of production. No reference is made to the media as the cultural arms of capitalist
societies, and all of its political and ideological implications. Now we are dealing with
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popular culture, an abstract entity that apparently needs no definition (it is interesting to
note the election of the concept of Popular Culture over that of Culture Industry).
Although one may agree only partially with the ‘original’ definition of the concept of
Culture Industry as stated by Adorno and Horkheimer, and their own stake in relation to
what the concept of popular culture implies, it is obvious that the latter is more sensitive
to the moment of production and carries the implicit notion of power, the complicated
issue of the ownership of the means of cultural production, the role of elites, etc. On the
other hand, and in the way that Popular Culture is conceived in these late perspectives,
the concept is deprived of such connections and emphasizes the popular as a given. The
interchangeability in the use of terms such as television, visual mass media, and popular
culture dilutes the problem of power as if it had been resolved, overcome, or superseded.
C. Later Debates
More recently, the matter has been addressed by scholars of law and
communication, and court shows are not simply seen as mere entertainment or
amusement that people tune in to. They have been taken seriously. Part of the recent
academic work echoes some of the old discussions and concerns regarding the conflicting
relationship between these two significant and influential institutions: television, and the
justice system. Other studies, on the other hand, bring to light some aspects that had been
previously ignored when fictional trials were the main focus of attention. One thing is
common to them all, though, Judge Judy is at the center of their attention, either because
they focus almost exclusively on this show or because they take it as the main example
which most of the rest of the programs in this particular genre follow.
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The fact that these television programs present themselves as if they were "real
courts" has led some authors to consider that aspect to be one of the major
misconceptions that need to be corrected. The problem lies partly in the fact that, since
television is considered to be the main vehicle through which most people learn about the
justice system, the distorted images it creates affect people's expectations in more than
one way. The judges' behavior in court is a significant feature which is highlighted by
many scholars; as Banks (2009 a) puts it, "the new court shows [after Wapner's People's
Court] grossly distort public notions about acceptable judicial behavior..." (p. 41). Real
judges' personal reputation is so highly regarded that most States have laws which
regulate their behavior; in other words, they are expected to conduct themselves
according to the position they hold in society, not just inside a courtroom, but at all times.
But in the case of syndi-judges, "who are afforded the same protections that an arbitrator
would have (...) this protection can shield a syndi-court judge from liability, regardless of
how he or she conducts the arbitration" (Kimball, 2005, p. 5), their demeanor is far from
acceptable. Hence, if there are laws and committees which control real judges, ratings are
the ones setting the standards for syndi-court judges, and thus, "they are allowed to
engage in acts that would generally not be appropriate in court" (p. 9). But how could this
affect the real legal system? It would have an impact, he argues, "upon ... the most
malleable and important group of people that are involved with the court on a daily basis
... potential jurors" (p.12). Kimball refers to Podlas's (2002, 2004) Cultivation Study (to
which I will refer in more detail in subsequent pages) which states that some of the
implications court shows might bring to bear on those who watch this type of program
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regularly, is that syndi-courts lessen respect for the bench, are a model for litigant's
behavior, and increase the tendency to bring cases to court.
Besides focusing on the way in which these programs might affect people's
expectations in terms of acceptable judiciary behavior, Banks (2003, 2009 a, 2009 b) also
introduces gender and racial composition and demeanor in her analysis. Most court
shows are presided over by female and non-white judges, something that could be
interpreted as a good sign, unless... Unless one takes a closer look at the way in which
they are portrayed. At first glance we might be led to believe that as minorities are
represented as being well-educated, holding positions of power, and, for example, acting
as judges, this would be a way to counter their more general negative image offered by
mainstream media. In other words, instead of being "the misfit" (as Judy likes to call
those who don't adapt to certain criteria), minorities are granted the chance to redefine the
negative image of the group in which they belong. But that does not seem to be the case.
Banks analyzes how black and Latino court judges (on English language television) are
portrayed and comes to the conclusion that in most cases the tendency is to reinforce preexisting racial/ethnic and gender stereotypes. Thus, for example, Glenda Hatchett's
program opening in which she promises "unconventional brand of justice and whatever it
takes to make a difference... this description [states Banks] fits the more general racial
stereotype of black Americans as lawless and disrespectful of conventional justice" (2009
a, p.47).
But the overrepresentation of women and non-white judges might also be
problematic from yet another point of view. Since television judges tend to be women
and most of them are members of a racial or ethnic minority, then, asserts Banks,
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television creates the wrong idea that "the world is more integrated than it truly is [and
that] it is conceivable that these shows mislead viewers about the racial and gender
composition of real judges" (2003, p.3). But how would this affect the judiciary system?
Well, this type of virtual integration could weaken public support for more racial and
gender diversity on the bench because white viewers would be led to doubt claims of
underrepresentation of minorities in the judicial system, and as Banks puts it: "the
presence of female and nonwhite male judges in integrated settings reassures viewers that
justice in the U.S. is meted out impartially" (2009 b, p. 316).
Another point that is singled out by some scholars is that these programs
contribute to the creation of the confusion between what "court" and "arbitration" are.
This is considered so highly detrimental that Kimball suggests that the shows be
redefined as arbitration and that some practical measures should be implemented to
overcome some of the negative effects that these programs might have on real courts.
Such a distinction seems necessary because the confusion might lead regular viewers
(and potential litigants and/or jurors) to form an erroneous idea as to how the legal
process is supposed to work. Therefore, he proposes some sort of federal regulation, such
as the inclusion of a "disclaimer at the beginning and the end of shows indicating that
syndi-court programs is an arbitration, not an actual trial" (Kimball, 2005, p.15). Really?
Would that be enough? It makes one wonder what the purpose of the disclaimer might be
or how effective it is believed it would be in order to correct those persistent
misrepresentations of the legal process. Put differently, if court shows are believed to be
so pervasive and to create such distorted ideas about how the legal system works, a
disclaimer alone sounds more like a warning which will eventually allow us to say: told
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you so... than really making a difference in terms of how people are "educated." The
disclaimer sounds so legally "right," that it is hard to tell whether it is simply naiveté or a
legal artifice to protect corporate interests (i.e., the judiciary, regardless of whether it
works well or not).
In short, both Kimball’s and Banks's analyses very much reverberate some of the
early concerns; the fear of the distorted images of justice emerging from television that
was instilled years ago by fictional trials have now been reinstalled through reality court
shows, although with some additional concerns (such as those of gender, race and
ethnicity) that were previously not part of the studies. An old concern despite the new
locus: how television imagery impacts on the justice system.
But the focus on gender, and race/ethnicity, and class, has not been limited to the
analysis of syndi-judges. A whole range of studies have placed their attention on a more
thorough and in-depth examination of the programs, and are more inclined to disentangle
the ideology surrounding court shows. Foust (2004), for example, offers an interesting
analysis of Judge Judy. The author suggests that there are two interconnected narratives
within the program: the "explicit" one refers to the litigation itself, in which people come
in front of the judge to resolve a dispute. This gives way for Judy to operate in an
"implicit" narrative (or second level of signification, I might suggest), which Foust refers
to as "a culture war" (p. 278). Foust argues that Judy represents a modern form of
femininity that emulates a well-established cultural myth, that of the Tough Mother,
which, like any myth, favors the connection of old values with present times. Via this
Tough Mothering model, Foust is able to connect Judy to another female cultural
archetype, the Virtuous Woman, and to a Tough Love discourse. The ensemble results in
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a neoconservative stand that enables Judy, the Tough Mother, to emerge today " as an
ideologically conservative, virtuous agent who employs practical advice to rescue a scene
corrupted by morally lax citizens... Such virtuous qualities allow dispensation for
aggressive verbal style... like Judge Judy" (Foust, 2004, p.276). So in the end, Judy is
more of a moral preacher than a law-dispensing judge; the explicit narrative (presenting
itself as a court) serves as the vehicle for her ideological neoconservative critique of
society (and women in particular). An idea not too far from Shugart (2006), who drawing
after Foucault's theory of discipline states that “the judge show genre is disciplinary in
ways that far exceed the final outcome; indeed, the crux of the show has less to do with
the 'facts of the case' and more to do with the exposure, review, and discipline of the
participant's very lifestyle and behaviors" (p. 83).
I would suggest that the "culture war "described by Foust (and reinforced by
Shugart), which Judy embarks on, can be signified in terms of a war between good and
evil, and that this is a war that both uses and goes beyond the justice system. Yes, it is an
attack on what, in her books, Judy describes as a corrupt and distorted delivery of justice,
but most importantly, it is a lesson about how wrong society is, and what to do about it.
As Foust suggests, "the Tough Mother offers Judge Judy a virtual ethos in the
contemporary neo-conservative scene, her aggressive popular persona encourages
audiences to scapegoat the downtrodden" (288).
This line of thought brings us closer to other ways of tackling court shows; for
example, the analysis of the ideology conveyed by these programs which permeates into
everyday life. "Daytime television [affirms Kohm (2006, p. 697)] has evolved putting
less emphasis on formal legal intervention by the state and stresses personal
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responsibility in the management of one's own disputes and legal affairs." And such an
assertion can be extended to Ouellette's (2008) and Shugart's (2006) pieces on the shows;
the first focusing specifically on gender and the latter on both gender and race. Court
shows are integrated within the world of representations, once again returning to the old
discussion about the relationship between the two institutions, the law and television,
with yet another twist. As Ouellette puts it, "Judge Judy's claim to facilitate 'justice at
lightning speed' boldly implies that commercial television can resolve problems faster
and more efficiently than the public sector, [thus] the program affirms a neoliberal
rationale for 'outsourcing' state-owned institutions and services" (2008, p. 145). While it
is accurate to say that Kohm (2006) agrees with Ouellette's general view and
understanding of the programs, it is interesting to note a distinction between these two
authors, a distinction which might seem subtle but which remains significant. For
Ouellette, Judge Judy understates the role of government institutions in favor of private
institutions, while Kohm affirms that much of Judy's argument "still relies (...) on the
symbolic of the law in her neoliberal address to women (...) Judy uses the law as a
symbolic tactic to demonstrate how certain litigants are undeserving victims and
therefore not entitled to the protection of the state" (2006, p.721). I agree with Kohm on
this point; as will become clearer in following chapters when I analyze Sheindlin's show.
Judy does not want to tear down the justice system, but to redefine or remake it to fit her
own ethos. Nevertheless, and despite these differences, I would suggest that most of these
authors share a basic common understanding of Judge Judy and of most of the programs
within the genre: they would all agree on the neo-liberal ideology syndi-courts convey,
regardless of their emphasis on one aspect of the programs or another. Thus, in Shugart's
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article we find some basic opposing terms which are evidence of the shows' ideology,
such as the stress on (personal) choice vs. (external) circumstances, or the stress on
"individual accountability and [the denial of] the relevance of economic, social and
cultural conditions" (p. 95). While in Kohm we find (individual) Choice, this time put
against (citizens) Rights.
In order to make his point, Kohm distinguishes two contrasting models of law
emerging from this genre. On one hand there is People's Court and on the other, Judge
Judy, and he argues that "the supersession of one model of the law over the other [in this
case the neoliberal model of law promulgated by the latter over the older liberal-legal
model by the former] is symptomatic of wider preferences in North American society"
(p.698). The author considers three dimensions to establish the difference between the
two models (the source of judicial authority, the style of judgment, and the general
outlook of the law) from which we can infer some enlightening characterization of what
Judge Judy and most other court shows stand for. So a Liberal-legal tradition
(represented on television by People's Court) might be described in terms of participatory
democracy. Its main features could be summed up as a tradition that is ruled by the law,
in which the judge acts as an instrument of the law, where the law is taken as an
inflexible neutral principle, where rights prevail, and the rule of formal legal procedure is
indisputably followed. Whilst the neoliberal tradition represented by Judge Judy is almost
its exact opposite and can be defined as an anti-democratic vision of the law where a
single voice is to be heard, that of the judge (as both the lawmaker, and moralizer) who
uses the law as his or her instrument, and in malleable and creative ways. Within this
model of law, the notion of "rights" is weakened and substituted by "personal choice,"
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which leads to the logical connection with individual responsibility. Therefore, following
this logic it seems plausible to think that if citizens' rights are no longer the measure by
which justice is administered, people are on their own (or their fate lies at the discretion
of the almighty judge). Narrowing down the two models we could present these sets of
terms: on one side we find Rights + Blind Justice + Due Process, and on the other (lack
thereof or) Choice + Unveiled Justice + the Judge as the Law. I think Sheindlin wouldn't
disagree with such a depiction; on the contrary, she would find enough arguments to back
it up. As a matter of fact, her view is made explicit in her book Don't Pee on my Leg and
Tell me it's Raining. When referring to the justice system she affirms that it is not about
Blind Justice but "Dumb Justice" and that we should not think in terms of Due Process
but "Doo Doo Process."
As we have seen, there has been an interesting amount of research regarding court
shows in the last few years, and although there is much speculation in reference as to how
these programs might affect people's perceptions, there is little information available
regarding audiences' actual responses. So Podlas's (2002, 2004) Cultivation Analysis of
prospective jurors is more than welcome. No matter how independent the judicial system
might be it goes without saying that it needs the support of public opinion. And opinions,
as Podlas suggests, have three distinct sources. They are shaped differently based on
personal experience people have had with the law, or as the result of some kind of
academic work, but mostly and very significantly, from the media portrayals that they are
exposed to. In brief, Podlas affirms that since court shows are viewed by large portions of
the population it implies that they are a "strong vehicle for cultivation and social learning,
[and that w]hat viewers see on syndi-court will teach them how judges act" (2002, p. 39).
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She initially surveyed 241 individuals reporting for jury duty, and followed this by
replicating the study with adults enrolled in college classes. Then she proceeded to
differentiate between frequent viewers (FV) and non-viewers (NV) of court shows. This
allowed her to compare their responses in an attempt to discover if those watching these
programs regularly held different opinions and expectations regarding the judges. She
observed that 66% of the respondents were FV (a remarkably high number, I would say)
and that frequent viewing was associated with "beliefs that judges should have an opinion
regarding the verdict (FV: 75%, NV: 49% ) and make it 'clear and obvious' (FV: 77%,
NV: 32%)" (Podlas, 2002,p. 39). The reduction of respect for the judge, the altering of
expectations of the legal system, and the presentation of a model for litigant behavior are
the three main points singled out in the initial survey. Podlas affirms that this type of
show promulgates values reinforcing the cultural acceptance of lawsuits, the perceived
commonality of pro se representation, and the belief that the courtroom exists as a forum
for any kind of disputes. She remarks that there is enough evidence to support the idea
that court shows encourage litigation: "FV have become so comfortable with the prolitigation norm broadcast by syndi-court that, when contemplating behavior, they are
prone to act in accord with that previously-defined norm" [my emphasis] (2004, p. 37).
Although some of the findings certainly sound disturbing, a few observations still need to
be made. The relationship between the viewing of court shows and the bringing of a case
to court seems too straightforward. Podlas herself gives enough evidence that despite the
increase in the number of stories told by television from the 70's on, the "litigation
explosion" is nothing but a myth. "Once adjusted for population growth, statistical
evidence not only disputes an increase in litigation, but also suggests a decline over the
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last decade," states Podlas (2004, p. 8). So where is the evidence to support her
conclusion that watching court shows will make people prone to act? "Showcasing
litigants operating without the aid of counsel portrays pro se representation both as a
reasonable alternative to representation by paid counsel, and an undertaking that anyone
can handle," affirms the author, or not necessarily, in my opinion. It all comes down to
the questions we are asking and the answers we are expecting. I'm not suggesting that we
throw the baby out with the bath water, but that we might want to rethink the idea of what
it is that court shows could affect in a more subtle way. In the same way that Cultivation
Theory has proven that violence does not produce more violence, but on the contrary it
cultivates fear, we should probably be thinking of a different possible outcome other than
that these shows instigate people to litigate.
Summing up, interesting critical analyses have come to light in the past few years
regarding court shows. These studies shed light on the ideology conveyed by these
programs, which affect not just the judicial system but which also have implications for
the definition of gender, race, ethnicity and class. As we have seen, some of the old
discussions and concerns are still in force, though with new perspectives and approaches.
And despite all the interest surrounding these programs, there is still very little research
based on the actual audiences who tune in day in and day out to watch Judge Judy and
the rest of the shows, turning some of their assumptions into interesting speculations
deserving of more serious analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
In the Introduction I outlined the main interest that guided this research. Reality
shows have been growing and developing in many different sub-genres and take up more
hours of programming on the small screen than one might imagine. This subject has had
an enormous impact not only in the world of television but also in our everyday world, an
effect that has yet to be measured and evaluated. Many years ago, and in many of his
writings, Gerbner suggested that a great deal of our knowledge and experience of the
world is shaped, more and more by television, and even if he was centering the attention
on fictional programming, I would dare to say that reality shows could perfectly well be
included in his theoretical preoccupation. Yes, it can be argued that the new media
landscape has changed with the introduction of the internet (and all its implications not
only in terms of consumption of content but also in its production), nevertheless, people
still spend hours a day watching television programs and forging an idea of the world
from it (as well as from other institutions and contexts, of course).
Court shows, one subgenre of reality TV, have run on a large scale on American
television since the mid 1990s. Almost twenty years after its launching, Judge Judy is
consistently high up in the ratings of syndicated television, outperforming all similar
shows (as I have mentioned before). And as I have already noted, the television landscape
is full of court shows and other syndicated reality shows. In addition, there were, at the
time I started this research, other Latino shows produced by Telemundo, one of which, La
Corte del Pueblo, used a similar structure to Judge Judy. So the question arose, what is it
about these shows that appeals to audiences? Such a general question implied looking
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into the meanings that the shows convey and the meanings that audiences give to them.
But behind it lies the need to understand how texts operate, how this complex process of
meaning-making takes place. We are immersed in the world of communication, we are
who we are and live, and feel, and experience the world (to a great extent) because of the
meanings that we make. However, those meanings are never free of constraints nor are
they the result of our own exclusive independent will and or determination. How are we
to understand such constraints, then, given that both the television text and the meanings
audiences make are structured by cultural, social, and ideological forces? We know,
because there is enough evidence, that neither does the text stand alone nor does it have
the power to determine (in the strongest sense of the term) the meanings that the
audiences finally give to it. But we also know that there are strategies employed and that
they do have some effect in guiding some readings. If I didn't believe this to be the case,
it would make no sense to study the meanings that television produces (in this particular
case, the meanings that court shows generate). So the search for the audience is almost a
given, or rather, an imposition. We cannot understand the process without looking at the
major parts involved in it. Thus more questions emerge, not necessarily original by the
way, since the academic world produces more questions and suggests more answers than
one can read. Even if questions have been posed regarding court shows and there have
been some discussions about them, in a great extent those studies are more focused on the
programs and the judges and less on its audiences. So here's the challenge, to look at
both ends of the chain, to read into the meanings that the shows deliver; comparing them,
looking into their similarities, and trying to understand their differences. But also, and
more importantly, centering on the moment of reception, trying to understand how people

85

read these programs in particular, and trying to figure out where and which are the
reservoirs of meanings that they rely on when in front of a TV set in a more general
sense, a more theoretical sense.
In sum, regarding the aim of this research, there are two different kinds of
discourses that cross and intertwine, the ones that circulate freely through society (public
discourses), and the ones that are artificially induced by the observer. In this particular
context, thus, the former is the discourse of the media -court shows- and the latter is the
one produced in an interview situation. The intention, then, is to establish a dialogue
between the discourse of the medium and the interviewees' discourse (through the
mediation of the researcher). Thus, in the following pages I present a description of the
methodology I followed to gather the data from the programs, and the audiences, and the
corresponding lines of analyses.
A. The Programs
As I mentioned before, Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo were the focus of
interest; the first one because Judy is definitely the most well-known TV judge; in many
ways, Judy is synonymous with court shows. And in terms of the audiences, her show
holds the highest ratings in comparison to the same type of programs. And La Corte del
Pueblo was chosen because it was its closest Latino version. The corpus of analysis
comprised all the programs that were shown over fourteen days in the months of June and
July 2002. I taped-recorded those programs; there were four episodes of each show per
tape, which gives us a total of 54 cases tried by each judge. There were regularly two
cases in each program (and two programs per day), and in two occasions a case took the
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whole show. Besides, I became a regular viewer of La Corte del Pueblo and Judge Judy
for quite a long time before and after the taping of the shows.
Many questions guided my first approach to the analysis of the programs. Since
one can easily include them as part of a mega genre (reality shows), how is the effect of
realism produced by the shows or how is the "reality effect" constructed? And what are
the patterns followed to represent law, order, justice, and civility in court shows? We
need to bear in mind that it is not the goal, or purpose of these shows to teach any kind of
lessons; rather, they simply exist to attract audiences that TV stations can sell to
advertisers. However, one might question what kinds of lessons are potentially being
taught by these programs (moral lessons, civic lessons, legal lessons) regardless of their
intent? Since knowledge can be related to power, what kinds of knowledge are actualized
in court shows? How is the judge’s authority and legitimacy constructed? How does the
process of legitimization of these particular social actors (judges) work? What legitimizes
them to become mediators/authority? How are boundaries between the judge and the
person drawn, if at all?
1. Brief Description of the Shows
Before centering on the methodology of analysis I believe it might be useful to
my readers to have a brief description of some of the usual features of the shows, such as
regular characters, recurrent icons, and most common topics resulting from my analysis.
The judge, the litigants, the bailiff, and the gallery are always on the program. The
bailiff17 (in both shows) is the familiar face that accompanies the judge on a daily basis.

17

Petri Hawkins Byrd has acted as Judge Judy's bailiff since 1996. At the time I gathered the sample, Judge
Manuel Franco was assisted by a black male officer who only spoke English, but changed to a woman
bailiff (who spoke Spanish) later on.
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Dressed as an officer of the law, the bailiff is there to assist the judge (which includes,
among other things, calling the litigants, handing the cases to the judge and announcing
the case number and the claim). As the litigants take their places (one on the left, the
other on the right) the bailiff introduces them and their names appear on the screen with
additional information regarding their age, occupation, and city of residence. Sometimes,
there are witnesses present in the room; they occupy a seat next to the plaintiff or the
defendant and might or might not be called to the stand. Only when they are called to
testify do their names appear on the screen. The Gallery is usually full of people (I would
estimate between 50 and 60 the number of people in Judge Judy and around 20 to 25 in
La Corte del Pueblo); they are not allowed to speak and there are hardly any close camera
shots of them (it is somehow, and in some respect, as if they were part of the scenery); we
can only see the faces of those sitting behind the litigants. There is another character
common to the shows: the commentator. Played by a man in both programs, the role of
the commentator is to interview the litigants in reference to the ruling. Sometimes he can
offer a brief synthesis of the case or make a comment. In La Corte del Pueblo, the
commentator, who would usually offer a brief summary of the case before the show
started, would sometimes offer a follow-up of the participants after the show.
There are steady icons that refer to the Justice System: Greek columns, the scale
of justice, the judges’ robes, the gavel, the United States and the State flags, the court seal
on the judges' benches, people rising when the judges enter the room, and the litigants
swearing under oath.
The most common topics in my sample are monetary disputes of different kinds
regarding unpaid bills, debts, or loans. The disputes can also be over objects or things,
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like furniture, cars, or even pets. The litigants may have a familial bond, for instance
between parents and children, or former couples. Or they may be or may have been
friends or shared some kind of living arrangement (such as sharing a house or having
been room-mates). Or they could be or could have been neighbors (for example, there are
cases of complaints of loud noises, dogs barking, lawn mowers, etc). Or they could be
strangers who happened to be involved in some sort of accident. And last but not least,
there are cases involving a job situation, for example between employer and employee,
co-workers, or a client and a vendor/provider. In other words, these are the kinds of
disputes for which people would go to Small Claims Court.
2. Exploring the Shows
Although I had initially anticipated the in-depth analysis of some of the programs
that I had tape-recorded, I finally decided on a more comprehensive analysis following
the logic of theoretical saturation; in other words, I analyzed the programs until I reached
the point where I could not find any new categories or meanings to be extracted from, or
found in them.
I proceeded in a rather eclectic style and tried to take advantage of different
methodological approaches. Realism, asserts Fiske, “is not a matter of any fidelity to an
empirical reality, but of the discursive conventions by which and for which a sense of
reality is constructed” (1987, p. 10). It can be said, thus, that realism is not simply a
matter of content but also a matter of form. So, for one thing, as these are programs that
form part of a specific genre (reality/court show) I needed to identify all the aspects that
helped characterize them. In addition, given that the programs emulate real courts, I had
to pay special attention to signs of different kinds that stand for the Justice System. In
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other words, I needed to identify and classify the signs (both verbal and iconic) used to
anchor the sense of reality and the shows' appeal to the sense of “liveness.” Thus there
were, among other things, technical issues that needed to be taken into account: camera
shots, angles, lights, music, takes, and editing. Technical issues are central in giving
shape to the interaction. While the set and the characters offer a regular steady
environment, technical matters add an extra meaning. Camera shots are relevant in the
relationship that is intended to be established between the characters on the screen and
the viewer; for example the use of mid-shot to close-up shot for the Judges, litigants, and
bailiff, and long shots for the public in the gallery convey different strategies in their
appeal to the audiences. Thus, for instance, a long close-up shot of one of the litigants can
help give away his or her nervousness, which with the help of the judge will be classified
as a sign of guilt or innocence.
Since the interaction has a central importance in my perspective, I made use of the
classical Symbolic Interactionism approach. In that respect, the concepts offered by Paul
Watzlawick (1976) and Ervin Goffman (1970, 1981) were key in grasping the form and
the rules that preside the exchanges on the screen. Understanding communication as a
complex process of interaction that involves all sorts of verbal and non-verbal signs
forced me to pay close attention to the performances of the actors. The language, the tone
of voice, the glances, the body language, all made part of a rich totality; a totality that
was not only mediated by the cameras but many times also enhanced by them.
Watzlawick's axioms (and particularly the classification of relationships as symmetrical
and complementary, based on positive or negative feed-back) offered a useful
understanding of the relationship not only between the judges and the litigants, but also
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between the judges and rest of the people involved in the shows; e.g. the bailiff and
people in the gallery. Goffman added an extra richness to this approach. The main
concepts the author brings into play (performance, definition of the situation, front,
idealization, face, line, and their differentiated combination according to the contexts,
etc.) allowed me to further analyze the situation on the screen and helped me get a deeper
understanding of the process. As I hope I will make clear in the following chapters, the
different shapes and forms these relationships take matter because they imply particular
ways of delivering meanings and leading specific ways of readings (though whether they
are successful conveying the intended meanings or not is a matter that can only be
resolved by analyzing the audiences' responses). To put it another way, what happens on
the screen may tend to produce a closer relationship between the enunciator and the
receiver of the shows (a relationship that clearly exceeds the analysis of the programs on
their own) insofar as he or she can develop some sort of identification with the
judge/program.
Then again, and since these are court shows and they imply that decisions about
legal disputes need to be made, knowledge stands as a main issue. Yet, is legal
knowledge all that matters? And is it the most important? Consequently, a distinction
between types of knowledge was required and Bourdieu’s (1980) classification proved
handy. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: academic, everyday, and
social (the latter can be subdivided into “of people in general” and “of a specific
individual”). The first two are based on facts (factual) and the last refers to more human
or social skills; it has to do with the ability to see into people. So this classification
allowed me to identify them, their use by the judge, and to assess each one's own weight
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in the process of decision-making. For example, the reference to codes and laws, the
mentioning of contracts, the asking for certain evidence, etc., were clear indicators of the
first type (academic, the one expected to take priority) while “do you think I'm stupid”
was a mark of the latter. By the same token, it allowed me to identify which kind of
knowledge was permitted or denied to the participants and/or when to use it (or if it could
eventually play against the litigant's own interests). This aspect also enabled me to focus
on the lesson(s) taught by the programs; could we say that it was mostly about the law
(therefore helpful for real situations people could potentially face)? Was it more about
common sense (and what type of common sense)? Was it more moralistic? (Note that the
fact that they could be more about one type of lesson than another implies that they are
not mutually exclusive.)
The differential use of language was another aspect that needed to be addressed.
The usual jargon, the verbal expressions, the modes of addressing each other in the court
helped me to not only analyze and classify the most common types of knowledge used,
but also the power structure between the interlocutors. And furthermore, it helped
characterize the judges and the way they impose order, control the situation, assume their
authority (and/or adopt an authoritarian behavior). I relied on semiotic approaches, as
well, but since they were also used for the analysis of the interviews I will explain them
in the following pages.
B. Approaching the Audiences.
The fact that I was trying to establish a dialogue between the programs and the
audiences led me to conduct interviews. And the necessity to access the meanings that
audiences assign to the programs led to a methodological problem: I needed social actors

92

to produce meanings for me. In other words, the problem lay in the need to artificially
induce people's discourses. I am aware of the fact that, as Grignon and Passeron suggest
(1991), the interview situation must be taken into consideration as a social situation in
which the different positions held by the researcher and the observed (in this case, the
interviewees) influence or condition the very nature of the information obtained. But in
the same way that the particular interview situation is part of the conditions of production
of these discourses, I can affirm that there are traces of other discourses which
intertextually inhabit the discourses produced by the interviewees, which transcend the
interview situation. Such a statement is based on the idea that it is in the semiotic web
where the notion of social reality is constructed and that the tiniest act of an individual
presupposes the actualization of a socialized cognitive frame (Verón, 1986), and on the
assumption that anything that is said or thought is crossed by intertextual vectors, and
that a text can only make sense in the indefinite contiguity with other discourses
(Angenot, 1982, 1984).
1. The Interviews
Group interviews are a very useful and productive tool in the generation of
discourses; the conversation between the participants allows us, the researchers, to obtain
information and opinions that are not just individual but also interactive. Although I agree
with the fact that group interviews hinder the possibility to delve deeper into the matters
and subjects that surface during the discussion (insofar as the situation restricts the
possibility to re-question and to concentrate at length on very specific matters), on the
other hand it opens up the emergence of topics and perspectives that would be hard to be
reached in a one-to-one interview. A group interview is a device that opens the door to
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discover the way in which interpretations are collectively constructed; such construction
is the result of the speech and the interchange that takes place between participants in the
group interview. I subscribe to Morley's assertion that “the meaning of the text will be
constructed differently according to the discourses (knowledge, prejudice, resistance)
brought to bear on the text by the reader” (1992, p. 87). Social positions allow access to
differentiated repertoires of discourses, consequently producing different types of
readings. In view of the fact that individuals bring along with them a whole series of texts
which are part of their everyday lives; subgroups, and subcultures, which share the same
kind of experiences, tend to produce similar types of interpretations. It is this same logic
that lies behind Katz and Liebes' (1985) statement, when they propose that reading
programs is a process of negotiation that happens within a particular context between
what is shown and the culture of the viewer. The authors suggest “that people everywhere
bring their experience to bear in the decoding process and seek the assistance and
confirmation of others in doing so” (1985, p. 188). Thus, how to proceed? The
interviewees were recruited following the snowball method (Taylor and Bogdan, 1982)
under the assumption that this is one plausible way of encountering those reading patterns
that I expected to encounter.
2. Some Interview Logistics
The focus of attention centered on Anglo and Latino audiences' interpretations of
those shows, the relations of forces that are put into play between producers and
consumers, the kind of pleasures or displeasures that the programs might elicit (if any),
and how matters such as social standing, occupation, gender, and ethnicity interact at the
moment of consumption/interpretation.
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The interviewees were selected among residents of Western Massachusetts. Two
groups came from the city of Springfield, “a fairly typical small North American city
[which] has rich and poor neighborhoods, it is racially mixed: predominantly white, but
with prominent black and Hispanic populations” (Jhally and Lewis, 1992, p. 9). Three
groups came from Amherst, and one from Northampton.
Searching for people who would take part in the group interview was not an easy
task. As those who engage in this type of methodology well know, this is always a very
difficult moment. People are not always willing or able to participate (for various
reasons) and scheduling a group interview makes it even harder. I was able to organize
six groups, which were formed around a main characteristic: three English speaking (selfidentified) white Americans and three Latinos. I am very thankful to those who attended
the discussions and generously shared their time and opinions and made this research
possible.
I used various strategies in order to recruit and organize the groups. For example,
I contacted some students through a Latino organization in the Student Union at the
University of Massachusetts, a Community Center in Springfield, and La Casa Latina in
Northampton. And professors from the Department of Communication and personal
acquaintances familiar with these towns helped me reach other groups. I audio-recorded
the interviews and transcribed them literally, making sure to include any extra verbal and
non-verbal signs (such as silences, tone of voice, faces, type of laughter, etc.) that would
help me interpret their readings of the programs.
In my first approach with the groups I explained to them that I was a student from
the Department of Communication at UMASS, that I was conducting a research about
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Judge Judy or La Corte del Pueblo (depending on the group), and that I was interested in
their opinion about the program. I followed the same structure in all the interviews. Once
we met, I first asked the interviewees to fill in a Consent Form which included some
personal information: first name, last name initial, age, level of education, marital status,
how they self-identify (regarding race/ethnicity), parents' level of education, household
yearly income, hours per day they watched television, and finally whether they had ever
seen Judge Judy or La Corte del Pueblo (depending on the group) and how often they
watched court shows (a complete list was provided). In the case of the Latino groups I
added an extra question to the form: what languages they spoke (Spanish and/or English).
After they had completed the forms we watched a case of Judge Judy or La Corte del
Pueblo that I had edited in order to avoid the commercials (since that would add extra
time to the interview situation). Since the cases were meant to trigger the discussion and
the main interest was on the show and not in the motive of the dispute, I purposely
exposed the groups to two different cases; to be more specific, one American group
watched one show and the other two watched another, and the same with the Latino
groups. That was because I wanted to avoid concentrating on the details of the suit and
thus missing the more general picture. Although this was a risky choice since not having
the same “stimulus” could have introduced some extraneous noise, it actually proved to
be a good decision; I was able to analyze the readings of the programs without getting
lost in the singularities of the cases.
After viewing the case, I asked the participants a very open question: “if you had
to tell someone what you just watched, what would you say?” In other words, I wanted to
see how they organized the narrative and how they defined the broad sense of the show,
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what it was about. As will be seen in the next chapters, they offered some variations in
their definitions of the show. From that point on, and although I had a protocol of very
open questions that would help me address some main issues (regarding, for example,
their view of the ways in which the judges impose order and reach their decisions, about
the participants, and about the interviewees' thoughts, beliefs, feelings, likes and dislikes,
agreements or disagreements with or about the show, etc.), I tried to follow their
conversation and intervene only when necessary. Rephrasing what they said was a
productive and unobtrusive way of asking them to elaborate further on their discourses
without giving my own opinion about any particular matter. On some occasions, when
the interviewees engaged in some tangential conversation, I redirected it reintroducing a
subject and asking for their opinion. And only when I was dealing with larger groups did
I need to take a more active role in controlling the interaction.
In the following pages I will present a description of the groups -some
information was gathered before the interview (through the consent form) and the rest
came up spontaneously during the discussion of the programs-, the location where the
interviews took place, and brief comments about the situation itself, before presenting the
methodology of analysis. I will identify the groups with the number I gave them when
presenting the analyses in subsequent chapters.
3. Meet the Groups
Group 1. I met with Ben (22), Jennifer (20), Michelle (21), Evan (21), and
Elizabeth (21), all undergraduate students (Communication majors) at UMASS -Amherst.
The interview was held on campus, in a room at Machmer Hall. All single, they selfidentified as white, and their family yearly income ranged between 25 and 80 thousand
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dollars. Regarding television, most of them said they watched between 20 minutes to an
hour a day, except for Evan, who watched between 3 and 4 hours. All the students
(except Ben) had watched Judge Judy and were familiar with the program; however, only
Evan acknowledged watching the program from time to time while Elizabeth admitted
watching not only Judge Judy but also Judge Joe Brown, Divorce Court, and Judge
Hatchett. The two-hour long interview took place in a very relaxed environment. The
students laughed while watching the case and they laughed while discussing it. They also
took pleasure at noticing things (“I don't know if you noticed when the cop...” says one of
them and the other continues: “yeah!”) and had an amusing time when making fun of
themselves, for instance when Michelle commented “So… 'cause we know, we are
communication majors” (in a very humorous tone) and the rest of them laughed. But
aside from the joke, they seemed to be enjoying the moments when they were able to
point at things that have to do with the process of production, like technical strategies (“in
the way they would cut and come back from the commercial”), etc. During the interview,
different topics came up as did the reliance on other television shows (even as distantly
related as The Three Stooges) to make a point or explain an idea. Some of them had some
kind of experience in a real court; as the conversation evolved it arose that Jennifer had
had a direct experience, so I asked who else had been in a courtroom, besides her; this is
the side note I have on the matter: [Both Ben and Evan raise their hands so I make a joke
that I won’t be able to see that on tape… they all laugh.] Ben: “I’ve been to one in
Noho´… I had to do a court report for one of my classes.” Evan: “Yeah, actually, on the
show that … totally agree with what the courtroom looks like, for what I saw, from going
there. It looks like a courtroom, yeah; it looks like in real life!”
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Group 2. I was able to make a first contact with the manager of a company
located in the city of Springfield. He was very receptive from the very moment we met
and he arranged for a group interview with some employees who were willing to
participate during their lunch time. The day of the interview I arrived and they were
waiting for me in a conference room where they and I watched an episode of Judy and
then talked about it. Those in attendance were: Patrick (25) single, high School, had
never watched court shows; Susan (46) single, high school, watched court shows; Dan
(35) single, high school (though he has attended some college), watched court shows;
John (40), married, high school (though also attended some college), had seen Judge
Judy; Mike (24) single, some college education, never watched court shows; David (26)
married, college education, never watched court shows; and Roxanne (31) married,
college education, watched the show regularly. They all self-identified as white.
Although they all had different occupations within the company (technicians, shippers,
programmers, quality manager, and office manager), they knew each other very well,
which became obvious once they started talking, offering their ideas quite openly and
even giving examples of their personal lives (in one case, for example, one of the men
commented on a situation in which he had been arrested and had to appear in court,
something most of them were aware of). Even if the interview was held in a familiar
environment and they enjoyed the moment, the fact that it was at their workplace meant
that there were some brief interruptions (for example when one of them had to answer the
telephone); but other than that, the fact that the facility was open for the interview made
this experience not only possible but quite productive. (Their long hours at work would
have been an inconvenience difficult to overcome otherwise.)
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Group 3. I met Linda (51) through an acquaintance. She and her husband Daniel
(54) (both white) lived in a quiet neighborhood surrounded by trees near Puffer's Pond, in
Amherst. From the moment we spoke, Linda seemed very enthusiastic and after talking it
over with her husband and arranging for another couple (friends and neighbors) to join
us, they offered me their home for the interview. I arrived one night after dinner and
everything was ready, except for their friends who had had to withdraw at the last minute.
Since we all know how complicated it can be to rearrange a meeting, and not wanting to
disappoint my interviewees, I decided to do the interview with just the two of them.
Daniel, an architectural designer in charge of a small business, and Linda, a literacy
paraprofessional also engaged in the family business, were familiar with Judge Judy but
claimed not to watch any court shows, nor had they ever been to a real court (except,
probably, to contest a traffic ticket, “but that doesn't count, right?” says one of them).
They both watch television approximately 2 hours a day. They found the episode of
Judge Judy entertaining and watched it very attentively, which became obvious at the
moment of the discussion, when they alternated in giving their opinion and very kindly
exchanged their ideas. Their cozy home, the fireplace, and the cold night gave the
interview a very friendly and open ambiance.
Group 4. New North Citizens' Council was the place where I met with G. 4. New
North Citizens’ Council “offers organizational capacity in the areas of community
development, advocacy and human service provision from a neighborhood-based
perspective18.” Since there were eleven people participating in this group (all of them
employees at the Council), I arranged them according to their income. Between twenty

18

https://www.facebook.com/NewNorthCC/info?tab=page_info. For more information about the center
http://www.livewellspringfield.org/partner/new-north-citizens-council/
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five and forty thousand dollars yearly we have: Maria (33), married, some college
education, case manager, Hispanic; Carmen R. (58), widow, high school, housing
coordinator, Puerto Rican; Elía (57), married, some college, home visitor, Latino; and
Flora (31), single, high school, home advisor, Hispanic/ Puerto Rican. Between forty and
sixty five thousand dollars a year: Juanita (27), married, college degree, case manager,
Hispanic; Carmen O. (27), married, high school, social worker, Puerto Rican; Sylkia (22),
married, college student, case manager, Puerto Rican; and José (31), divorced, high
school, community liaison, Puerto Rican. Between sixty five and eighty thousand dollars
a year, Jackeline (29), married, some college, social worker, Hispanic. And more than
eighty thousand dollars yearly, Olga (51), divorced, high school, home visitor, Puerto
Rican; and Rosa (34), married, high school, program manager, Puerto Rican. According
to the information they provided, most of them watched 2 hours of television per day,
with the exception of Flora, Olga and Carmen R. who spent over 4 hours a day watching
TV. They are all fluent in Spanish and English and are used to switching back and forth
from one language to the other which became apparent from their conversation during the
interview. Although they spoke mainly Spanish they used many English expressions.
This is the group that used "Spanglish" the most. Thus, in order to be faithful to their
mode of expression, I used Italic font in my translations of the dialogues (the same
applies for the rest of the Latino groups). As we can see, there is a variety of terms they
used when I asked them to self-identify: Hispanic, Latino, Puerto Rican, and in one case,
more than one. (This is partly why I use the terms interchangeably during this
dissertation.) They had prepared a conference room with a TV set; there was a round
table where they sat and chatted about the program which they were all very familiar
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with. Having so many people in the room was very challenging. I had to intervene more
as a moderator than I did with the other groups so they wouldn't speak all at once, as that
makes the transcription and the analysis of the interview more difficult. Nevertheless, it
was a comfortable and friendly situation, where people who were very familiar with each
other made the exchange of ideas very agreeable and productive. Except for Elía and
Rosa, the rest of the people watched La Corte del Pueblo and other court shows (both
Latino and/or Anglo) and they were well disposed towards bringing their own personal
and work experiences into the discussion of the program and made quite interesting
comparisons.
Group 5. I made contact with these graduate students through the Student Union.
Erika (28), in a relationship, was a teaching assistant at that time. She watched TV one
hour a day and said she had never seen La Corte del Pueblonor any other court show. She
self-identified as Colombian. Farid (34), also in a relationship, was a teaching assistant as
well. He watched television three hours a day and was familiar with the program, but did
not watch it regularly. Of all the categories he had to choose from, he ticked other and
wrote down: Latino Americano. Yamile (26), single, teaching assistant, said she didn't
watch television at all, and had never seen any court show. She self-identified as both
Latino and Hispanic and informed me that she did not speak English very well. Both
Erika and Farid had a background in law and were fluent in English. (Their yearly
income was twenty five thousand dollars.) I met with them on campus, in a Machmer
room.
Group 6. Casa Latina, in Northampton, provided me with the opportunity to meet
with a group of charming talkative women. "Casa Latina is the only Latino-led and
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Latino-focused organization in Hampshire County, Massachusetts. Our mission is to
promote self-sufficiency and a sense of community among local Latinos. We endeavor to
fulfill this commitment by working directly with Latino residents to develop educational,
access, and action programming based on the community's capabilities and needs19." I
arranged our meeting at Urdaliz's house, in Northampton. Those present were: Daisy
(33), married, with some college education, cashier (income below 25 thousand dollars
yearly) who watched between 2 and 5 hours of television per day, almost always Sala de
Parejas, La Corte de Familia, and La Corte del Pueblo, and sometimes Judge Judy
(despite not speaking much English). She self-identified as Hispanic. Nanette (41),
divorced, had some college education and worked as a teacher's assistant helping students
who had difficulties understanding English (less than 25 thousand a year). She watched
Sala de Parejas once or twice a week and La Corte de Familia and La Corte del Pueblo
from time to time. She self-identified as Latina. Antonia (39), married and a housewife,
had attended elementary school, spoke both English and Spanish, and self-identified as
Hispanic. She watched three hours a day of television. Although she was familiar with
La Corte del Pueblo, she watched Sala de Parejas once or twice a week, and almost
always La Corte de Familia, but never the rest of the court shows. Finally there was
Urdaliz, our hostess, 36 years of age, married, who attended college and spoke both
languages fluently. She had two jobs, as a sales person, and as a house cleaner through
which she made less than twenty five thousand dollars a year. With two hours a day of
television, she watched Sala de Parejas once or twice a week and La Corte de Familia,
and La Corte del Pueblo and Judge Mathis once in a while. She self-identified as Latina.
Unlike the other two Latino groups, the program triggered an interesting yet brief
http://www.casalatinainc.org/
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discussion about the situation of Latino immigrants in the United States; their bad image,
which the program does not help [“su mala imagen... que el programa no ayuda”], and
consequently the need to unite [“unirnos”], to show solidarity [“ser más solidarios”], and
to be of the same mind [“tirar para el mismo lado”]. And they were also the only ones
making explicit references to lower class people being exploited by talk shows and the
like [“explotan a las personas más humildes”], while the rest of the groups resorted to
euphemisms when addressing this matter. Both Urdaliz and Antonia have had direct
experience in real courts, and in Nanette's case, a close family member had to appear in
court. The resulting fear became evident in the discussion: the court intimidates [“la corte
intimida”], it subdues you [“cohibe”], and one doesn't know...and does not know how to
behave [“uno no sabe... y no sabe como actuar”], court is tough [“la corte es dura”].
4. Interpreting Meanings, Analyzing Discourses
Analyzing texts, delving into meanings, and tracing ideology unavoidably leads to
questions of validity. How can someone be sure about the interpretation of a text? Why
should a particular reading of a discourse -the one of the analyst- be more trusted or
believed than any other (lay reading)? How does the analyst’s decoding differ from the
audiences’ decoding? These are questions that have been posed time and again, and there
is no complete agreement about the answer. Hall (1994) stated that the researcher must
take the risk of the analysis, even if or because there is no fully objective scientific
method that can guarantee the interpretations. Semiotics, however, offers the possibility
to ground the analysis in the operations of language allowing for an account of the text
that goes beyond “subjective prejudice” (p. 269).
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But of course Semiotics is a vast field and offers many different theoretical
perspectives and methodological approaches. So I took advantage of my background in
the field and brought various methods of analysis into play. For example, I proceeded
with the analysis of the programs and interviews following Angenot's (1982-1989)
methodology. In his book La Parole Pamphlétaire, Angenot (1982) has a double
purpose: to describe and to analyze a particular genre (the pamphlet) from a “typological”
point of view, and to construct a general methodology for what he calls the “literature of
idea” in relation to a “topos” and a doxology of the modern ideological debates. He is
looking for the presence of the enunciator, discourse vs. counter-discourse, ideological
system, resentment, and vision of the world in a wide corpus constituted by discourses
produced in France and other French-speaking countries between May 1868 and May
1889. Angenot operates in a “bricolage” way (in his own words), gathering hypotheses
and methodological procedures from dispersed theories, among others, Aristotle's
rhetoric, the Semantic of presupposition, the analytic Philosophy, Marxist concepts,
Bakhtin's concept of dialogism, and Perelman’s rhetoric of persuasion.
His theoretical supposition is that intertextual vectors intertwine all writings and
that the text only achieves sense in the indefinite contiguity of social discourses. He
considers that the production of discourses is regulated by general principles and,
following Aristotle, he calls them places or topoi. The essence of discourses is never
completely explicitly said; therefore the theory of common places becomes a reflection
about the implicits. In other words, topoi function as a mask of knowledge which allows
a reading of what the other is saying literally, but inferring what is intended to be said or
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to be silenced. Once a thief always a thief is just an example of the many "common
places" we find in the shows.
Concepts are organized through contrasted (or notional) couples; this is thought to
be the original and permanent way of thinking. When we analyze discourses we find
“elementary, irreducible, and ambiguous dyads” (Angenot, 1982, p. 111). Therefore, one
of the first operations to be made within the semantic analysis is to identify and establish
the correspondence of the pairs (or couples) that are in the origin of the stable paradigm
of a group, of a discursive formation.
Semantic couples (or pairs) present two poles; the criterion which serves to
differentiate them simultaneously implies a distance and a path that links them together,
and a field of pertinence. These semantic pairs are not isolated. Paraphrasing and
agreeing with Perelman (1992), I would suggest that these notional couples relate to and
mutually influence each other. The axiological coupling is pivotal to the analysis of the
discourses of the interviewees. The mechanisms of dissociation produced by determining
the coupling allow us an insight into their vision of the world; i.e., their eidos. Working
with axiological couplings opens up the possibility to comprehend the complexity of
quotidian discourses, which sometimes appear as isolated and disconnected dyads. For
example, in a study that examined the meanings and values assigned to the new and the
old by a particular group of social actors, workers and employers who work on farms and
live in the city of Rio Cuarto, Argentina, I distinguished a basic series of dyads which
apply to the new and the old in family relations (Berti, 1997):

Non-communication
Communication

Hidden
Transparent

Distance
Contact
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Verticality
Horizontality

Formality
Informality

Old
New

These connected dyads show the changes produced within the family. Grounded
in the place of direction, the first three pairs refer to a change that has taken place through
the years and that is valued positively by the interviewees.
The pair verticality/ horizontality is specifically focused on the family members’
changing roles. I was able to compare the precise boundaries between the duties of
husband and wife in what could be considered the Old marriage relationships and the
interviewees’ present situation, where boundaries seem less clear. But if in the first three
dyads each of the first terms (non-communication - hidden - distance) has a negative
axiology, and each of the second terms (communication - transparent - contact) has a
positive one, the axiology of the terms verticality/horizontality is not clear cut. The
axiological ambiguity is then explained by the interrelationship established between the
pair with other systems of concepts, such as independence (women are now seen as more
independent), work (women are now integrated into the job market), and economy
(women now contribute to the household economy). At the same time, women are
perceived as having less time to spend with their families and for household chores even
when they remain the primary housekeepers and child caregivers. Different kinds of
responses therefore emerge and two main narratives are identified, which I identified as
fatalistic and perplexed narratives.
The reader will find different moments in which I employ this logic of analysis,
such as, for example, when in Chapter V I analyze Judy's ideology emerging from her
books:
(People)

(Media repr.)

(Justice)

(Prison)

Impotent
Strong

Victims
Misfit

Inefficient
Efficient

Light
Harsh
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=(-) Society Today
=(+) Society as it should be

In this particular case, the contrast lies between how society is (perceived to be)
today and how it should be, which manifests itself via the opposition of terms that
characterize different actors and institutions. Although the full analysis follows the
presentation of the interconnected dyads, the axiology is evident. In sum, I would suggest
that this process of articulation and disarticulation of concepts -a process which is active
and subject to historic changes- is one of the ways in which systems of values
(ideologies) can be traced.
In order to identify the semantic couples that form the basis of the stable paradigm
of a group, of a discursive formation, I began the analysis of the discourses following A.
J. Greimas' (1983) Narrative Semiotic methodology. The author considers that in order to
construct cultural objects people start with simple elements that follow a complex path.
This is the reason why, according to Courtés (1976), in order to give full account of such
an itinerary three different stages have to be identified: the first one, the deep structure,
through which the fundamental being of the individual or society is defined; the second,
the superficial structure, where the grammatical semiotic that orders the contents into
discursive forms is produced; and the third, the structure of manifestation, where
signifiers are produced and organized.
It is pertinent to make clear that the analysis relied mainly on the discursive level
(the third) tracing the emergence of semas (minimal units of signification) which account
for the basic oppositions of meaning, while referring occasionally to the deep structure,
particularly the semiotic square since it is a unique tool for reaching the ideology of the
text.
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In sum, different methodological perspectives were followed for the analysis of
the programs and interviews. Semiotic analysis of specific programs and of the
interviews focused on tracing the interconnection between these two types of discourses
and differentiating different reading positions (in relation to gender, class and ethnicity).
At the same time, these analyses allowed me to rethink theoretical matters that have
already been discussed (such as the concepts of preferred meanings, the exploration of
possible hegemonic-negotiated readings, resistant readings, pleasure, etc.) and which I
will address more directly in the conclusions of this research.
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CHAPTER V
COURT SHOWS: AN INVITATION TO BELIEVE
We all have an idea of what a reality show is. There are marks in the modes of
production of certain programs that tend to fix the meaning of realty. However, there are
distinctions to be made since not all of them appeal to the same strategies. In this chapter
I will center my attention on the particular way in which -despite the fact that this type of
program does not fit what we could describe as an evident, or obvious, reality show
rhetoric- certain intra, inter, and extra textual mechanisms operate to construct the sense
of reality.
As contradictory as it might seem, the world of television is both dynamic and
predictable. It is dynamic if we look at it from a diachronic point of view; it is predictable
from a synchronic perspective. If we took a day of programming from the 1950s, the 60s,
the 80s and today we would appreciate the difference more clearly, e.g., the changes in
the fashion of the characters on the screen: short or long, blond, brunette, black, blue or
green hair; suits or jeans, miniskirts or long skirts, make-up, piercing, tattoos. From a
technical point of view, the first thing a lay eye would notice would be the change from
black and white to color television. There have been more sophisticated changes that
have affected, for example, the conditions of production of television, i.e., the way of
making television; and in terms of consumption, the mode of interacting with the
medium. (New technologies such as VCR, DVD and TiVo, have had enormous
consequences in terms of modes of consumption, not to mention downloading from the
web or watching on cell phone or tablet).But the main point I would like to address in this
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chapter refers to the noticeable changes in genres, grammatical structures, and narratives,
all of which affect, among other things, what I refer to as the “reality effect.”
Thus, if we take a single period of time we will see tendencies, recurring
structures, a profusion of programs of a same genre, and the same formulas repeated over
and over. In that sense, television becomes predictable beyond its overt predictability: its
fixed schedule, its organized structure, its known faces, its established routines, and so
on. As a result, not only do we have CSI, but CSI Miami, and CSI New York; Law &
Order, Law & Order Criminal Intent and Law & Order SVU; American Idol1, 2, … n;
Latin American Idol; Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire; Who Wants to Marry a Prince;
The Bachelor1, 2, 3…n; The Bachelorette1,2, … n; Extreme Makeover; The Swan, and
the list goes on. And in terms of consumption, not only do we have access to all those
shows during their fixed schedules; if one is willing to watch a single type of show one
will most probably be able to find a marathon: “72 uninterrupted hours of your favorite
show!” (Paraphrasing channel advances).
Even if this sort of predictability might hold true for all periods of time, it has,
nevertheless, changed from one period to another. As I have mentioned before, since the
beginning of the 1990s television has increasingly invested in reality programs, probably
a trademark of American television nowadays; a mega genre which includes a great
variety of television shows.
Although there is an indisputable economic explanation for the phenomenon, it
would be an oversimplification to reduce it to that single matter. Yes, it is cheaper to put
a group of unknown ordinary people on an island than to pay a cast of famous actors and
actresses millions of dollars per sitcom episode. Yes, it is cheaper to put together a show
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based on home footage than producing a whole show. Yet, that does not explain the
success of such types of shows if by success we mean public acceptance, i.e., high
ratings, willingness to participate in such shows, chat rooms discussing latest events of
their favorite programs, etc.
A. “The Cases are Real, the Rulings are Final”
It’s four o’clock in western Massachusetts, you turn on the TV set, flip around
and finally settle on channel 22 (NBC). It can be any day of the week, or any time of the
year. You hear the music, a voice announces “You
“You are about to enter the court of Judge
Judy Sheindlin.” The camera leads you into the court house, a door opens and you see the
Judge. A close-up
up shot freezes on her face, she looks at you through the camera eye and
smiles (this is actually the only time she’ll be looking into your eyes).
). She’s wearing a
serious black robe, though with a feminine touch: a white lace collar. Her makeup is
subtle. The announcer keeps talking “The cases are real, the rulings are final. This is
Judge Judy.” The image fades, on blue background Greek columns can be seen and,
superimposed, the logo of the program emerges:

Another camera cut and you are already inside the courtroom. As the plaintiff
enters the room and takes his or her place the announcer briefly sums up the cas
case.
Today’s litigants are introduced, they stand in front of the judge's bench, the camera
alternates between one and the other and you see their names, ages, and occupations
written on the screen. A new shot and now you can see one of them raising their ri
right
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hand and saying “I do.” You can hear background voices, they come from the live
audience; you see them talking. The judge enters the room from a side door, papers in her
hand, and walks towards her bench; you hear “order, all rise” and see the people in the
gallery stand up. Judy takes her seat, the bailiff -who is dressed as a police officer- turns
around and addressing her he starts: “case number … X vs. Y,” and facing the live
audience he adds “you may be seated.”
Every day of the week Telemundo broadcasts La Corte del Pueblo. The program
begins with the image of what we might recognize as a Courthouse and a superimposed
image of an American Flag. An outdoors take shows a man walking towards the building
in a black robe; a voice-over says: “En una corte de Justicia siempre existen dos
versiones de la verdad” [“In a court of justice there are always two versions of the truth”].
In the following shot the Judge is framed sitting at the bench, one flag on each side (the
United States' and the State's flag), a computer screen on his desk. The scenery resembles
that of La Corte de Familia, another Latino court show broadcast by Telemundo.
Addressing the bailiff in English he says: “Let’s see the first case”. The officer introduces
the names of the participants: “X vs. Y. Please, come forward.” The Judge begins
interacting with the plaintiff, in Spanish, and asks him or her to present their case. When
they are ready to go to commercials Greek columns are seen moving across the screen,
then outdoor images of a city in blue emerge, extra-diegetic music in the background and
a voice-over announcing: “cuando regresemos…” [“when we come back…”]. Now we
see the judge framed within a frame with a city as a background. Back from commercials,
the voice-over announces: “seguimos en La Corte del Pueblo” [“we continue with La
Corte del Pueblo”]; footage of the judge supposedly working in his office, he’s dressed in
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shirt and tie [no coat], a bookshelf behind him, he looks at the camera, he looks at us for
the only time. Cut. The judge is in the courtroom, the case is on.
Does it sound familiar? How many times have we seen similar images? Do not
most of us who grew up watching fictional law programs like Perry Mason, L.A. Law, or
Law and Order, despite coming from different countries, and having never even been in a
court, immediately picture it as an American court house? Don’t we see that in
innumerable movies and current TV shows? And do not images from the news or trials
that have been broadcast and have caught our attention resemble such description?
B. The Making of Reality
At the end of one Seinfeld episode he is asked by someone in the audience
whether he enjoys watching reality TV; he laughs and says: “What’s reality TV?
Someone jumping off a cliff? What’s real about it? That’s not real?! Who does that in
real life?” How many times do we hear, while watching a reality show or after, people
commenting How can anyone in his/her right mind go on a TV program and expose
his/her life in front of millions? Or sometimes simply ask: Can it be true? Therefore
questioning, based on some sort of disbelief, the show's authenticity. And how many
times do people wonder, during or after watching a fictional show, whether it might have
been based on a true story, expecting in this case some truth behind the overt fiction. In
both circumstances audiences deal with a sense of reality lying underneath the
representation. More and more, the fine line between fiction and reality is hard to draw in
the televisual discourse.
Gerard Imbert (2003), for example, has pointed out that television constructs its
own reality which differs from the imaginary reality of fiction, or what we could expect
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from the “objective” reality of documentaries anchored in an identified referent. From his
perspective, then, we are dealing with a reality that tends to free itself from its models; in
other words, through its process of enunciation television produces what we could call
reality effects. It is because of this separation from the referent that Imbert will argue that
television loses its representational character thus becoming pure entertainment,
notwithstanding the fact that such a notion does not imply that it is distancing itself from
the world but rather a way of carrying the power of the code. In a similar way, Fiske
(1987) addresses the notion of realism not in terms of “fidelity to an empirical reality, but
of the discursive conventions by which and for which a sense of reality is constructed” (p.
21). The author centers his attention on the encoding mechanisms through which we not
only perceive but also make sense of the world via cultural codes. In other words, what
we conceive of as reality is the result of codes put to work to produce certain meanings,
including the notion of (what counts as) reality. And when Patrick Imbert (1997)speaking
more generally, affirms that the invention of reality is denied by the media, he is
acknowledging both that reality is a construction and that such denial operates as a
mechanism of symbolic power.
Therefore, agreeing with and following these standpoints, it would be pointless to
focus on whether programs of this type (i.e., court shows) are authentic, true to a
preexisting referent that could be either reflected or distorted; or to wonder whether
reality has been manipulated. This is not to deny the existence of the material world, of
course, but it seems more productive, nevertheless, to center our attention on the
mechanisms through which the realism effect is constructed; trying to disentangle the
way in which the shows operate in the creation of what we could consider verisimilar,
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plausible, believable or realistic (in the meaning given by Fiske as a text that produces a
sense of reality).
In Estética del Cine, Aumont (1983) argues that the verisimilar -or what can be
considered plausible- refers to the relation of any given text to three main aspects: public
opinion, other texts, and its internal mechanisms. Within this context, the notion of
intertextuality plays a fundamental role. Discussing the verisimilar in films, the author
sees it depending a great deal on previous films; a number of conventions and rules
varying in different times and cultures resulting in realism effect. Thus, it will be argued
that it “constitutes a form of censoring since it restricts (…) the number of narrative
possibilities or imaginable diegetic situations” (p. 141) turning the verisimilar into
something predictable. Then, what might be considered verisimilar is more the result of
the interaction or interplay of texts than a reality that is being mirrored; or in Aumont’s
words: a “corpus effect” (p. 143) which becomes even stronger as texts are part of a same
genre (genre-effect). In the same way, then, we could think of types of television shows
reinforcing each other’s meanings; sharing a given number of discursive conventions,
narrative structures, and even a similar aesthetic.
C. On Genre
Genre is in itself a complex concept and it has been defined differently depending
on different epochs, fields, and theoretical approaches. Thus, for example, signaling the
term’s polyvalence and referring specifically to films, Altman (2000) mentions at least
four different meanings given to it: as a basic scheme or formula which precedes industry
production; as a formal structure within which films are produced; as a name for the
category within which distribution and exhibition decisions are made; and as a contract
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-or spectator position- which any film demands from its audience; that is, that reading
patterns depend on the expectations brought to bear by the audience in accordance with
the genre.
Although it is not my intention to delve into the theoretical discussion of the
concept of genre and bearing in mind that the main concern at this point is the
understanding of how the reality effect is constructed in what we know as court shows, I
shall address some perspectives that seem to throw some light on the matter. The
importance of the concept lies in the fact that, as Martin-Barbero (1987) puts it,
television’s cultural dynamic works through its genres, which embody the fundamental
mediation between the logic of the system of production and the system of consumption,
between formats and ways of reading/using media products. Distancing his position from
others that accentuate either a semantic (privileging a common set of features, attitudes,
characters, ground/distance, scenery, etc.) or a syntactic perspective (centering on
constituting relations, the structure of disposition of the elements), Martin-Barbero argues
for a pragmatic approach capable of accounting for that moment of negotiation between
production and consumption that the genre represents.
Genres are thought to have a relatively stable institutional character and could be
defined as “classes of texts or cultural objects, discernible in any language or media base
representing systematic differences among them and instituting conditions of
foresightedness in their historic recurrence in different areas of social exchange and
semiotic performance” (Steimberg, 1991, p. 37) [Author's translation]. They operate
imprinting thematic (in the case of court shows, one could consider the application of the
law as the main theme), rhetorical (the way in which cases are presented and organized,
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etc.) and enunciation (how the enunciator and the addressee are constructed in the text)
characteristics to texts; these aspects will be analyzed more specifically in the following
pages.
Genres are not fixed or invariable; we can see their changes not only regarding the
axis of time (consider, for example, the differences between comedies from the 50s and
today’s), but also in their (re)adaptation to different languages (in a broad sense). In other
words, genres have crossed from one medium to another influencing the modes of
production; for instance, we are familiar with how the rhetoric of novels has been adapted
to moving pictures; how soap operas, initially a radio genre were later adopted by
television, and more recently, how video clips (born as a genre in the music industry)
have had an enormous influence in television and movie making. Steimberg refers to it as
transposition, which happens when a genre or textual product changes its technical base
or language. This phenomenon accounts for both the survival of certain trans-media
genres as well as for the emergence of new and specific genres in each medium regarding
their own specific technological features.
One way of defining what counts as reality television is “a variety of ‘new’ or
more often hybrid genres (…) hold[ing] in common an emphasis on the representation of
ordinary people and allegedly unscripted or spontaneous moments that supposedly reveal
unmediated reality” (Biressi and Nunn, 2005, p. 10). Many authors have pointed out the
connection between this mega-reality-genre and documentaries (Caughie, 2000; Biressi
and Nunn, 2005; Ardevol Piera, 1996). As heir of the documentary, reality TV appeals to
“liveness,” giving a sense of reality evolving in front of our eyes, happening before us, or
as Caughie would put it, like a rush of the real. New technologies have favored this
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feeling of unmediated or less mediated reality. Hence, the appeal to home footage and
hand held camera images, which seem to erase the very existence of a mediating factor
between facts and us, the audiences. Or let us consider the strategy of integrating the
process of production that vicariously integrates us as part of the production crew. This
strategy has the power to reinforce a sense of beingness; i.e., of being there where the
action takes place, as remote witnesses/virtual actors of life. But these technologies are
not exclusive to television nor are its uses; according to Biressi and Nunn, shaky handheld cameras and tight framings have been adopted from both Direct Cinema and Cinéma
Vérité documentary movements.
Now, going back for a moment to the notion of transposition, Steimberg states
that the passing of genres from one language to another has been generally considered as
impoverishing, and refers to Adorno, who, for example, when analyzing the changes
faced by the 19th century popular novel in its passage to television, values it as a
reactionary simplification. In that same sense, reality TV is considered, by many critics,
to oppose the discourse of sobriety characteristic of documentaries. As part of nonfictional systems, which include -among others- education, science, politics, and
economics, documentaries have come to connote “seriousness, public responsibility and
truthful representation. …The perceived degradation of documentary and news tends to
occur when they … are incorporated into another domain, not of sobriety but of human
interest or light entertainment” (Nichols in Biressi and Nunn, 2005, p. 24). Such
connection is reinforced by television itself through its marketing strategies; for example,
when promoting court shows. Program promos and previews pick the most notorious
moments of the day or of some particular show in which the judge belittles one of the
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participants or engages in a dispute with one of them. Let us see two examples from two
different episodes of Judge Judy:
Episode A:
Music begins. A voice announces: “Judge
Judy will continue in a moment.” Footage
from the next block:
Judy: You won other cases when people
terminated you? Oh, I'd like to see it.
Why other people terminated you!
Plaintiff tries to interrupt and say something
Judy: I’M SPEAKING! [shouting]
Plaintiff: So?
[OOOOOOOH! Is heard from the gallery]
Episode B:
Music begins. A voice announces: “Judge Judy will continue in a moment.”
Footage from the next block:
Judy: RIGHT! (shouting) [camera shoots alternates between her and the
defendant, who smiles] So, the money was not so that, according to you,
it was Christmas time and you had to buy presents and that´s why you had
to go back to work. Stop shuffling, sir. I´m much smarter than you are. On
your BEST day you are not as smart as I am on my worst day!
[Says Judy rolling her eyes and raising her voice. We can hear people laughing in
the gallery and the Defendant smiles nervously]

Thus, while on the one hand we previously presented court shows’ main theme as
the application of the law, marketing strategies focus on rhetorical features which
emphasize a more ludicrous, less serious side of justice. During previews and teasers we
are at one and the same time invited to explicitly witness real justice -a supposedly
serious matter (“The cases are real, the rulings are final”)- and more implicitly to
entertain ourselves, when a silent voice guides us to laugh at participants who refuse to
accept the place they are given (in following chapters I analyze the ideological
implications of this). But whether we focus on justice or entertainment or both, in all
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cases a notion of immediacy, “liveness,” spontaneity of actions happening in front of us
is reinforced. The interplay between the seriousness of justice and television
entertainment may operate as a diversion; i.e., deviation from the construction of a more
concerned or politicized audience-citizen. In that sense, the articulation between justice
and entertainment would imply degradation in the passing from the form of documentary
to that of reality TV (which would reinforce Gerbner’s idea discussed in a previous
chapter). However, this would not imply a deviation or distancing from the world, just as
G. Imbert (2003) had suggested.
D. Metadiscourses and Reality Effect
As genres change through time and adapt to different languages and material
supports, they rely on other related and contemporary metadiscursive phenomena in order
to maintain their social existence. Titles, for example, are one of the most evident
metadiscursive elements (Steimberg, 1991); they offer the first indication of genre not
only conceptually but also rhetorically. In most cases, English language court shows are
named after the judge’s name (preceded by their status), Judge Judy, Judge Joe Brown,
Judge Mathis, Judge Hatchett, Curtis Court, Judge Mills Lane; in other cases, the name
gives some indication of the location, such as Texas Justice, or the particular types of
cases they deal with as in Divorce Court and Moral Court. Latino shows place the accent
on the type of court La Corte del Pueblo (The People’s Court), La Corte de la Familia
(Family Court), and Sala de Parejas (Couples Court). Thus, the title is the first sign of
what audiences are about to see; the most immediate, overt, direct guiding sign.
But there are also many intertextual marks that reinforce the notion of reality. For
one thing, as I have pointed out earlier, the sets resemble the images in our heads of what
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an American courtroom looks like. And in addition to the fact that Judy, Mathis,
Hatchett, Manuel Franco and the rest are (linguistically) introduced as Judges, they
present themselves (iconically) as judges do in the United States, i.e., they wear black
robes, they have their bench, they hold a gavel. Furthermore, we are provided with
information about the participants. In this sense, and although concerned with the news,
Park (in Alsina, 1990) already noted in the 1940s that the publication of news with
narratives including real names, dates and specific places gave the impression that they
could be verified by anyone interested in so doing, thus giving origin to an uncertified
supposition in favor of the truth, and one could add, reality. Or as Barthes (1972) notes,
there are certain types of unities in the narrative, which he refers to as informants, that
authenticate the reality of the referent; for example, the age of the characters and their
occupation. These types of informants operate fixing whatever could be otherwise
interpreted as fiction in reality, holding an indisputable functionality at the discursive
level. Thus, plaintiff and defendant not only have a face we can see, they have attached
an identifying name, a job, a location; they are not characters, not actors performing an
act in front of us. They are us. We could be them. Or so we are invited to believe.
There are yet other intra and extra media mechanisms through which the genre is
reinforced. For one thing, the commercials promoting the shows; take for example, Judge
Judy: we are reminded time and again that we are witnessing reality, that what goes on
before our eyes, mediated by the screen, is real. We are told that this is “a real court,” that
“the cases are real” and even more, we are invited to participate, bring our case and solve
our disputes: “Want justice? Call…” (and a real telephone number appears on the screen,
plus a web site to contact the producers). “You are about to enter the court of Judge Judy
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Sheindlin. The cases are real, the rulings are final. This is Judge Judy,” the formula is
repeated every day not only for this one particular show but for all those that circulate
and appear on our TV screens.
Judges from court shows take part in other television shows, such as
documentaries, interviews or even comedies. Searching on the Internet Movie Database
(IMDb), I found that in the last twenty years Judy Sheindlin has participated in
innumerable TV programs (always as herself), as varied as American Idol, The Search
for a Superstar, Entertainment Tonight, Larry King Live, Ellen: The Ellen DeGeneres
Show, Live with Regis and Kathie Lee, The Tony Danza Show, and Saturday Night Live,
to name only a few. Let us briefly consider two examples of those programs: An hour
long show televised on November 19th, 2001 and rerun the following year on February
26th, hosted by Meredith Vieira, named Lifetime’s Intimate Portrait of Judge Judy, and
Larry King Live, aired on October 4th, 2005.
Although both programs deal with her having formerly been a New York Judge,
the former focuses more closely on her personal life, her children, her decision to retire
from the Judicial System and to move on to the completely different world of television.
It is during this hour that we are allowed to see the making of her show, the set, the
cameras, and Judy getting ready. Three main things should be highlighted regarding this
program. The first is that this is a documentary about the person/persona, reality upon
reality during which Judy and the judge become indistinguishably one and the same. In
addition, so are the former New York Family Court judge and the current television
judge, one following the other in a sort of logical continuity, even in the way she dresses
for court: the typical black robe with the white lace collar that she wore in her judicial
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court (we have access to images of Judy presiding over the court during her years as a
judge in New York) and still does on her court show. Vieira’s closing statement: “she
[Judy Sheindlin] will be dispensing justice in one form or another for the rest of her life”
(my emphasis), does nothing but reinforce the connection and consequently underpins the
notion of the reality of Judy’s show as well as the notion that she is tirelessly “dispensing
justice,” sacrificing every ounce of herself to make the world a better place. The second
refers to Judy/the judge’s toughness and determination, and additionally to her nononsense personality, which affects not only her role as a Judge but also her personal life.
Judy, the ‘stay at home mom’ who decides to work as a lawyer against her husband's
wishes and struggles to make ends meet after her divorce, and Judy the “Nobody talks
when I talk” judge, as she remarks during the interview (something we hear repeatedly
during her court show and during Judge Judy’s previews on a daily basis, too). Thirdly,
friends, family members and television celebrities appear in the program talking about
Judy. We see, for example, Matt Lauer; she has been to his program, Today, several
times. On one occasion Al Gore -then Vice President of the country- is on the floor for an
interview; we see Judy talking with Matt Lauer and jokingly complaining that this time
she hasn’t been offered donuts “because Gore is there,” a few minutes later the Vice
President comes in with a tray full of donuts and kneeling before her offers her one.
Although presented as a funny anecdote we are invited to see it as an act of reverence
from a major political figure to this (now) television icon; but, would he have kneeled in
front of just anyone? And how are we to read it? In terms of Bourdieu (1980), social
capital refers to a whole set of actual or potential resources bound to the possession of a
more or less institutionalized long-lasting web of relations, i.e., group belonging (and in
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this case, it is not just any group since it is directly related to a major power structure).
This network is the product of strategies of conscious or unconscious social investment
oriented towards the institutionalization or reproduction of social relations to be used
either in a shorter or longer term. Now, symbolic investment strategies (Bourdieu, 1994)
are practices aimed at maintaining or increasing the recognition capital (in its multiple
senses) favoring the reproduction of schemes of perception and appreciation more
favorable to their qualities and producing actions that can be positively valued. In this
sense, Gore’s action cannot pass unnoticed; neither should the fact that a whole program
is dedicated to enhancing her public image. So probably we shouldn’t be asking whether
he would have kneeled in front of anyone, but we should take notice that it is the Vice
President who kneels in front of her, thus legitimizing the position she holds, and more
importantly, increasing her symbolic capital.
On October 4th 2005 Judy Sheindlin is Larry King’s guest. During the first part of
the interview they talk about the origins of her TV program and discuss the success of
legal shows in general. According to Sheindlin, people are so interested in this sort of
program because “in the lower trial courts you have cases that really touch people's life
[sic]…unfortunately there isn’t probably a family in this country that hasn’t been touched
by crime in one way or another … so people are interested in how it’s resolved.”
Consequently, television becomes central in the learning process about the law, the
courts, and justice in general. Contrary to the previous example, where Judy is asked
about personal matters besides her being a television judge and a former New York
judge, the interview with Larry King centers its attention on more judiciary-like subjects;
one could say, more serious matters. Again, three interrelated points stand out reinforcing
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the truthfulness/reality of court shows: The central importance of knowledge and
experience, the relation between judicial courts and television courts, and cameras in the
courtroom. The first point (experience and knowledge needed to become a judge) is
explicitly addressed; “Do you believe [asks King], there should be special training
required before people are even considered for a job on the bench?” “Absolutely!,” says
Judy, “…just as there are countries in Europe … where being a judge is a profession
where you go to school (…).” Bourdieu distinguishes three different ways of existence of
cultural capital: incorporated, objectified, and institutionalized; the first, bound to the
body, is a having become being, a habitus. The second presents a number of material
properties defined only in connection to the incorporated cultural capital. In the school
diploma we find the third; “with the diploma bestowing its bearer with conventional,
steady and judicially guaranteed value, the social alchemy produces a form of relatively
autonomous cultural capital in relation to its bearer and even in relation to the cultural
capital actually possessed: it institutes cultural capital through collective magic
(Bourdieu, 1994, p. 195).” The importance of the institutionalization lies in the fact that,
according to the author, it evidences the performative power of instituting, the power to
make see and make believe. Despite not having attended any “school for judges,” Judy is
able to compensate such lack through other equally important instituting instances: “I was
a lawyer in the Family Court for ten years. I worked for the Corporation Counsel’s Office
of the City of New York (…) So, I was in the trenches and even then, Larry, it took me
time.” In other words, Judy is both knowledgeable and experienced; she has all the
credentials to legitimate her position, i.e., academically trained, former New York judge,
and acting TV court show judge. And asking for her view on Supreme Court nominee
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Harriet Miers, as King does, is simply an example that places her as an expert. She’s
invited to give an informed and legitimate opinion on that particular matter (and others).
The connection between the knowledge and experience to take the bench and to
become a TV judge operates by equating both types of courts (i.e., judicial and television
courts); and it is established when referring, for example, to Ed Koch’s (former New
York Mayor) presiding over The People’s Court: “As brilliant as Ed Koch is, he wasn’t
comfortable in that chair and he will acknowledge it because he didn’t have judicial
experience. He didn’t know how to question somebody. He didn’t know how to gather
information,” asserts Judy. So both types of courts are somehow equated, they require the
same knowledge and expertise and are equally serious in dispensing justice: “in a court
like the Family Court or even a court like the Small Claims Court where I [Judy
Sheindlin] preside now…” [my emphasis].
Finally, the notion of reality is constructed through the idea of cameras in the
courtroom:
King: Now, there are cameras in your court every day. Should there be cameras in every
court?
Judy: There should be cameras in every court in the country.
King: Supreme Court, too?
Judy: Every single court in this country. (...) I want the cameras to be there to see good
lawyering and bad lawyering, good judging and bad judging. What legal aid people look
like, how legal aid lawyers are functioning in the family court, good or bad. How city
attorneys are functioning within the system, whether they are qualified or not.

Through the call for cameras in the courtroom we see once again the leveling of
both types of courts; although, one interesting thing stands out: in one case (the judicial
court), the trial takes place regardless of the cameras while in the other, it simply would
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not exist if it were not precisely for the cameras; the lawsuit can only take place in a
television studio, and yet, the distinction is ignored as if it did not exist.
Other TV shows play their part in reinforcing the reality status. Let us take for
example The JK Experiment, a program based on hidden cameras where Kennedy, an
actor transformed into television show host, in accordance with either a friend or family
member, “frames” a person. All episodes of the program frame people differently; in one,
a man is being sued by a friend and brought in front of a television judge (impersonated
by Jamie Kennedy). The unwary participant goes through a rather bizarre situation, where
the judge is constantly and persistently interrupting him and making out of place
comments. The camera centers on the participant’s reactions and close-up shots register
his emotions. Finally, when the person is about to “lose it,” the truth is unveiled: you’ve
been Xed, he is told. The fact that someone is being fooled, made to believe that she/he is
participating in a judge program reinforces the idea of authenticity of court shows in
general; otherwise, how could someone be “framed” or “xed”? As actress Florence
Henderson puts it (commenting on a Saturday Night Live sketch on Judy’s show during
the Lifetime’s Intimate Portrait of Judge Judy which was previously analyzed): “you
can’t parody something unless it’s truthful.” Therefore, the innocence of the participant is
the main witness to the “reality” of the shows, since only a preexistent belief can be
deceived and tricked. This artifice bolsters the belief in the reality of the court shows.
Articles in different newspapers are published about court shows or television
judges in general; some might be harsh in their critique, others may underline their
popularity, some can be pro and some against the shows, but the “reality” status seems to
go unquestioned. Searching the New York Times website one finds at least 40 articles
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that have been published about television judges since 1997. Let us see, for example, the
way in which some of those articles contribute to the notion of reality/truthfulness of the
shows. On July 8, 2007, Alessandra Stanley asserts: “The judges are real but retired. And
petitioners are recruited with television ads, as well as in small claims court (…). The
chosen sign a waiver agreeing that the television arbitration is final and cannot be
pursued elsewhere, though in some cases rulings have been overturned. It’s campy,
hammed up summary justice, but…” On July 2, 2006 Lola Ogunnnaike writes: “Judge
Milian had already presided over four cases in the morning and had five more to mediate
that afternoon. (…) [S]he hears approximately 20 cases in two days (…). Judge Milian
brings nearly two decades of legal experience to the show…” On October 9, 2005, in an
elaborate critique of Judy’s way of imparting justice -the article closes by stating that
Judge Judy is ‘blurring the line between justice and social bullying”- Adam Cohen says:
“In an interview, Professor Black could not recall having seen 'Judge Judy', which is a
shame, since it is the perfect text for his theories. He has written that judges are at their
most unforgiving when there is a large gap in social status between them and the parties
who appear before them.”
Last but not least, another interesting example of extra medium metadiscourse is
found on the Internet. Chat rooms have become very popular in the last few years. Fans
of different shows or actors/actresses meet on the internet to talk about the program, the
character, or the person, and to share their ideas. The same happens with court shows and
members of the chat rooms share their opinions about the rulings, the judges, and the
participants; they even exchange information about legal matters. In some cases, they
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have a way to reach the program producers and have the chance to pass along their
opinions and suggestions to those who create the show.
E. Of Emotions and Voyeurism
One could agree that when the term reality TV is mentioned people tend to think
of, or recall, certain kinds of shows that present some specific characteristics. Hand-held
cameras, odd (not to say bad) sound tracks, and obtrusive cameras stand out as main
identifying features. The television program Cops, cell phone images from Britain’s
subway catching the moment of a terrorist attack, policemen beating up an African
American man caught by an amateur camera are all undoubtedly real images that pass as
reality TV. But court shows’ rhetoric does not follow this pattern. The programs take
place in a television studio. Cameras are handled by experts and have a predetermined
position; usually we can identify two steady ones and a third moving around the floor;
however, none is ever seen on our screen; the process of production goes unnoticed
before our eyes. Programs are not presented raw to us; they go through a careful editing
process before they reach our television screens. And despite how artificial this might
seem, there are ways in which the sense of immediacy is reinforced. Andacht (2003)
establishes the distinction between the pro-filmic and the a-filmic. The former refers to
the intentional disposition of visual signs in front of the camera -a staging- meant to
signify actions, feelings, and/or telling stories. The latter reflects life accidentally
captured by the camera, such as is the case of the examples of amateur footage mentioned
above; this is what he refers to as index-appeal: “a brutal and irreversible irruption of
indexes of the real. (…) The index appeal is a sign which blindly and compulsively refers
to its object” (p. 43). And Biressi and Nunn (2005) suggest, “[t]he premium placed on
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emotion as a signifier of spontaneity and truth-telling has become part of the broader
grammar of reality programming” (p. 19) and there’s plenty of it on court shows. Closeup shots of the judges and participants, trembling voices, nervous laughter, tears, sighs,
unstoppable quivers of the lip in front of the camera magnify the emotions at stake during
the show and become an irrefutable mark of authenticity.
Along the length of the shows the cases simply unfold in front of us. We are
positioned as voyeurs who see but cannot be seen. It seems that the interaction between
the judge, the plaintiff, and the litigants could be happening regardless of the presence of
the camera. Different camera angles and shots alternate from close-ups (giving a stronger
sense of intimacy) to more distant, descriptive ones that exploit the objectivity of the
camera helping to construct the interaction we are witnessing as a document.
However, two distinct moments of the show make a substantial difference in the
involvement of the spectator and his/her relation to the enunciator. In the first case, I am
referring to the moment in which the judge simply “looks at us”. For example, at the
beginning of the program a close-up shot freezes on Judy’s face, and she looks at us
through the camera eye and smiles; she is looking into our eyes. Verón (1983) refers to
this as the eye-to-eye axis while analyzing the different role played by the gaze in
fictional and non-fictional programs. It is through this index (in Peirce’s sense) that a
connection between the enunciator and the addressee is established favoring or building
the notion of trust, since the gaze has the power to de-fictionalize the image. The second
has to do with the participants. The legacy of Cinéma Vérité’s overtly interventionist
approach, where film subjects were interrupted in order to interact with the producer, is
apparent in variants of reality shows, for example in the use of journalistic interview. At
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the end of some programs, such as Judge Judy or La Corte del Pueblo, claimants are
asked about their opinion of the judge, what they think about the case, their satisfaction
or dissatisfaction with the ruling, etc. The moment is so brief that their opinions and
statements can hardly be heard. However, that is beside the point. The situation acts
predominantly as a reinforcement of the veracity of what has just happened during the
show. Whether they are happy or not, whether they think justice was done, whether they
think the judge was fair or not, or has reached the right decision or not, does not really
matter. What really matters at this point is that they are real people, looking at us, talking
to us, and reinforcing our trust.
To sum up, despite the fact that the rhetoric of these types of programs isn’t what
most people think of as a reality show, in the narrow sense, there are different
mechanisms put to work to lead us to the idea that what we are witnessing is real. Inter
and extra textual mechanisms play an important part in the construction of the reality
effect of court shows. As I pointed out, some authors consider three distinct elements that
affect such construction: public opinion, other texts and internal mechanisms to the text
itself. During this chapter I have tried to address and account for each and every one of
them. I have shown the way in which what we could call a genre effect affects these
programs constantly and systematically reinforces each other. How, in their appeal to
liveness (or live appeal) and the use of different camera shots that underline and
emphasize both the nervous laughter and the uncontrollable quivers of the participants
testify to the spontaneity of actions and the veracity of facts that are laid before us, almost
as if there was no mediation. Not to mention the set where the action takes place which
resembles a real court, or the television version of a real court, which is, in fact, more
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familiar to viewers. Through multiple intertexts that not only belong to the field of
television but also to the press, the idea that in these trials ordinary people deal with and
solve real problems and conflicts is installed in public opinion. That is the idea with
which audiences are invited to watch the programs; the idea that appeals to the
spontaneity of the action and the veracity of the facts that are laid before us (as if there
was no mediation). In sum, all these are main aspects that play a major part in making us
believe in the truthfulness/reality of court shows that are on the screen on a daily basis. In
the following chapters I will continue presenting the analysis of the shows, comparing
them, analyzing their similarities and differences, focusing on the meanings they convey.
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CHAPTER VI
ORDER IN THE COURT
“While certainly there are other sources of information, research has
suggested that a majority of people in the United States receive much of
their impressions and knowledge of the [criminal] justice system through
the media, in particular through entertainment television viewing”
(McNeely, 1995, p. 2).

In the previous Chapter: Court Shows. An Invitation to Believe, I analyzed the
strategies that are used in the production of this type of program in order to create what I
would refer to as the effect of reality. In this chapter I will center my attention on the
analysis of Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo. My main focus will be the interaction
that takes place on the screen, the mechanisms through which the judges impart order, set
the boundaries, and establish hierarchies. Although there are many similarities between
the two shows (as can be expected after the descriptions and analysis I have offered so
far), there are, as well, some important differences, mainly regarding matters of gender
and ethnicity. Firstly, I will present a brief analysis of Judy Sheindlin's ideas that emerge
from her books, ideas that I believe permeate her show and have an influence on the rest
as well.
Judge Judy was launched in the mid 1990’s as the first court show after The
People’s Court. The producers were probably optimistic about the program’s outcome
and expected it to be a success; however, it would be hard to believe they could have
foreseen signing a 45 million dollar-a-year contract with Judy Sheindlin these many years
later. This is, after all, the most-watched court show in the United States.
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Ratings were good from the start. There seems to be a combination of several
reasons for its success; the most significant being media consolidation, the attaining of
the right time slot, and the broadcasting of real trials. The show was produced by Big
Ticket, which “was a division of Spelling Entertainment, which in turn was part of the
Paramount Television Group, which is owned by Viacom, which owns several dozen TV
stations” (Koener, 2005); this fact alone assured the distribution of the program
throughout the country. In addition, in the beginning, the program ran from 4 to 5 pm
(called early fringe), which holds the highest midday TV audience, mostly female; this
helped Judy surpass the numbers of other court shows that aired (and still do) earlier in
the afternoon (Bowles, 2010).
Regarding real trials, it has been alleged that there is a direct correlation between
court show viewership and the news coverage accorded a high-profile case. In that sense,
the initial success could be related to the fact that Judy’s program started only a few
months after the O.J. Simpson’s trial, which -as is well known- caught the attention of
millions of viewers nationwide. More so, and most significant to this argument is the fact
that whilst the Kobe Bryant20 and Scott Peterson21 cases were making the front pages and
national news coverage, Judge Judy’s ratings went up considerably (Koener, 2005).
In November 2008 “her ratings were 4.7, nearly double her closest competitor,
Judge Joe Brown, which had 2.4. In comparison, Oprah Winfrey’s show had a 5.6. (…)”
(Leroux, 2008). In the season of 2010 her show reached “6.6 million viewers a day (…)
up 7%, vs. Oprah’s 6.4 million, down 1%.” (Bowles, 2010); and in January 2015, she
reached 10 million viewers (as I have already mentioned in the Introduction).

20

NBA player accused of sexual assault in 2003
Sentenced to death for the murder of his pregnant wife.

21

135

By the time Telemundo launched La Corte del Pueblo, in 1999, court shows were
very much a part of the television world. La Corte del Pueblo, presided over by Manuel
Franco, was produced in association with Auckland Entertainment, which was in charge
of selecting the cases for the show around the country. This program could be considered
the closest Latino court show version of Judge Judy, and ran for several years from 3 to 4
pm Eastern Time. There were two other court shows at the time: La Corte de Familia and
Sala de Parejas, none of which is currently on the air. Later on, the time spot was filled
with Caso Cerrado, presided over by Ana María Polo.
Both judges presiding over these television courts, Judy Sheindlin and Manuel
Franco, have a background in law. Franco, who was born in Mexico and moved to
California with his family at the age of 11, received a Law Degree from the University of
California at Davis. After La Corte del Pueblo was cancelled in 2004, aside from the new
television show he conducted (El Juez Manuel Franco, on Televix) and his KTNQ Los
Angeles’ Saturday morning Radio program (La Hora de Manuel Franco), he was in
private practice, specializing in litigation and industrial injury cases22.
Sheindlin, born in Brooklyn, graduated in 1965 from New York Law School, and
soon after was hired as a corporate lawyer for a cosmetics firm. In 1976 New York
Mayor Ed Koch appointed her as a judge in Criminal Court and in 1980 she was
promoted to Supervising Judge in the Manhattan division of the Family Court from
which she took early retirement in order to conduct the Judge Judy show.

22

http://www.hispanicprofilesofsuccess.com/manuelfranco/
http://www.terra.com/telemundo/articulo/html/tmd343.htm
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A. “America Has Lost Its Way”
While discussing in the previous chapter how the reality effect is constructed by
this genre, I mentioned that Sheindlin has participated -as herself- in many television
shows, and that she has been interviewed by the media many times. She has also
expressed her views about society, and about the law in her books23: Don’t Pee on my
Leg And Tell Me It’s Raining: America’s Toughest Family Court Judge Speaks Out,
published the same year the court show started, and later Beauty Fades, Dumb is Forever
(1999); Keep It Simple, Stupid: You're Smarter Than You Look (2000); Win or Lose by
How You Choose (2000); You're Smarter Than You Look: Uncomplicating Relationships
in Complicated Times (2001); and What Would You Say. A Growing-up Guide to Living
Together with Benefits (2013).
As I have mentioned before, texts don't stand alone; they are part of an intricate
semiotic web. In the same way that programs and other metadiscourses reinforce the idea
of realism, so do they affect the meanings they convey in many complex ways. This is
why I believe it might be helpful to take a closer look at the points of view, particularly
those related to both the Judicial and the Television systems, that emerge from
Sheindlin's books24 before addressing the analysis of the programs.
Judy suggests a series of changes that are needed to get “back on track” since, as
she puts it: “America has lost its way.” Aiming first at the government, she directs her
critique at the State and the fact that, according to her, it has become a mild, bland one.

23

It seems interesting that she authors all her books as Judge Judy Sheindlin and not simply as Judy
Sheindlin.
24
Unfortunately there are no records of similar productions authored by Manuel Franco that could help get
a more thorough understanding of this matter.
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We could sum up Sheindlin’s ideas through a sequence of interconnected dyads
and reconstruct the series of replacements and articulations she suggests in the restoration
of American society as follows:

(People)

(Media repr.)

(Justice)

(Prison)

Impotent
Strong

Victims
Misfit

Inefficient
Efficient

Light
Harsh

= (-) Society Today
= (+) Society as it should be

(1) The People
Impotence prevails. Due to the State and government’s actions the population has
been infantilized, which affects their lives in different ways and has had a long list of
implications, all of which are considered negative. On one hand, there are those who take
no responsibility for their actions and always rely on the State to solve their problems,
take advantage of the welfare system, of the social security system, and of foster care
grants. In this case not only do they tend to “have too many children” but also cannot or
will not impose limits within the family. From Judy's perspective, public expenditure has
been misused, thus benefiting the “misfit,” “deadbeats,” and “chiselers” (as Judy most
commonly calls those who rely on State help). On this side of the road, according to
Sheindlin, unaccountability is the order of the day.
On the other hand, there are those “good citizens” who tend to be disregarded or
ignored, “decent citizens” whose rights and demands are constantly downgraded because
the State has other (distorted) priorities. But who are the good citizens according to Judy?
Tax payers. It seems that the line separating one from the other could be expressed
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(paraphrasing a conservative discourse) in terms of those defined as “makers” (+) vs.
those who are simply “takers” (-). Consequently, this system of classification brings us to
reconsider who the people are. In other words, who, from this particular ideology, are
those regarded as impotent and what it would mean to regain their strength.
If impotence is related to the presence of the State, strength would imply its
retreat. That is what assuming “individual responsibility and accountability” would mean.
However, put slightly differently or seen from a different perspective, what would the
withdrawal of State aid imply for millions of people who lack opportunities, and whose
chances of getting a good education are as limited as finding a job (let alone a well-paid
job)? These are questions that would not be posed by those who hold this type of
ideology; but one can imagine a possible response. Thus, from this line of thought a
particular notion of strength emerges, which differently affects those who hold different
places in the social structure; it implies a certain kind of power and certain type of order.
(2) Media (representations)
Regarding the media, Sheindlin's attack focuses mainly on what she believes to be
their lack of accuracy in the system of representation, mostly regarding portrayals of
lawbreakers. Those who have committed an offense are represented by the media, and
mostly by television, as Victims; that is to say, as disadvantaged people who deserve our
sympathy. Moreover, the media tend to present isolated successful stories of criminals
becoming decent citizens as if it were the rule. Since they are presented as society’s
responsibility, the media consequently generate a collective guilt amongst the viewers.
Instead of this, according to Judy, the media should free society from such an
unfair sense of remorse by representing the lawbreakers more realistically; i.e., as
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irresponsible people who deserve no compassion, simply as misfits; in other words,
society’s worst scourge, lazy chiselers taking advantage of the system (welfare, foster
homes, free transportation, etc.).
(3) The Judiciary System
According to Judy, the system is inefficient and incapable of solving real
problems. From her book the idea that mediocre lawyers and poor judges are partly
sheltered by the fact that they are not publicly exposed emerges. The system's priorities
are upside down and the demands of the misfit take more time than they merit,
postponing those of decent citizens. The exposure of the legal system to the public eye
through the media, and especially the televising of trials, would help modify and improve
this situation.
(4) The Prison System
Crime is another subject she addresses, and since society seems to be impotent to
deal with it, Judy suggests a number of courses of actions leading to a real and necessary
change: harsher punishment, more jails, equal treatment for juveniles and adults, no free
lawyers, etc. As Judy puts it, the prison system is currently light; for instance, there are
different jail alternatives, rehabilitation programs, and certain deference towards
criminals’ demands. She suggests that in its place, prisons should be harsh and represent
a real punishment, therefore setting an example to prevent or dissuade people from
misbehaving or committing crimes. The depiction she offers about the way in which
society actually functions (or dysfunctions) and the only accurate solutions presented in
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black and white, synthesize her ideology which finds its basis on false dichotomies
between right and wrong, good and evil.
Sheindlin is, without a doubt, tough; not so much (or not only) in the way she
applies the law, which she might when acting as a judge, but mostly in terms of her
notion of society. There is an absolute absence of historical, economic, and/or political
contextualization of the social structure; from her perspective, all responsibility simply
falls on the individual as if everyone had the same opportunities to begin with.
Her ideas resemble or echo the metaphor of the survival of the fittest, but what are
we to expect for the rest? Well, for those to whom, according to Sheindlin, we as a
society owe nothing and whose miserable existence we should not care about; there
should be more jails where they could be locked away. And probably the more
unbearable their existence the better; they shall become a persuasive example to prevent
people from committing crimes. The following are quotes from her book Don’t Pee on
My Leg…:
“We have to revise the way we punish young offenders in this country. (…) A period of
detention in a chilly upstate facility can be a great attitude adjuster” (p. 30)
“End parole and probation -not just for kids, for everyone. In NY, the recidivism rate for
juveniles is 75 %, and the adult rate is close to that. I’m calling for the total elimination of
probation as we know it. In their place, probationers and parolees would be required to
register at their local precinct and check in each week with a police officer. This would
free up billions, and that money could be used to build more jails…” (p. 54)
“We have our priorities backward -and it affects our prisons as well. The same folks
pushing for jail alternatives are selling the idea that if we must put criminals behind bars,
we owe them a full menu of rehabilitation programs. (…) Who cares if prison is a
miserable existence? Hopefully, if we make it so unpalatable, criminals will think twice
about returning (p. 215)” [My emphasis in all cases]
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As we can see, two major institutions are under attack: on one hand, the judicial
system, because of its inefficiency -she even goes as far as referring to due process as
‘doo-doo process’ and blind justice as ‘dumb justice-’; on the other hand, the media,
because of their misleading representations. The two institutions are connected and in a
sense, the first relies on the second. Having courts under scrutiny would help correct their
ineptitude, and for that she advocates open trials and the televising of court proceedings
(a subject that has been addressed in a previous chapter).
With regard specifically to the media, most of us would probably agree on the fact
that what they actually are is far from what they could potentially be. Nevertheless, the
problem lies in the possible alternative outcomes. In Judy's oversimplified perspective,
there is no room for different approaches or depictions. In that sense, her call for a change
of representation is far from what many scholars have been calling or fighting for over
the years (in other words, for representations to be more democratic, open, and diverse25).
There’s an interesting point to be noted, though: the persistent image of the media as
omnipotent. For Judy they are the “most powerful institution in the US, capable to
determine (my emphasis) the way people think,” and that is why they should be used as
“a force of good” (1996, p. 207).
Consequently, Judy sees herself playing an important role as a television Judge;
she is actually teaching Americans something. In one single act she is combining the two
institutions she has put under scrutiny and resignifying them (or using them “properly”).
She knows, says Judy in a TVWeek interview (2009), “that audiences will judge what
they choose to see, and what kind of justice they feel comfortable with…;” she knows
“that 10 million people get something out of tuning in for an hour a day, every day, and
25

For example, G. Gerbner’s and S. Hall’s views on the matter.
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seeing efficient, to-the-point, no-bull resolution of disputes that would otherwise gobble
up court time ad nauseam.” Hence the question arises: how is justice administered and
what lessons are being taught in TV court rooms?
B. From Small-Claims Courts to Television Shows
Television court shows are in many ways similar to what is known as SmallClaims Courts, which hear civil cases among private litigants and have a maximum
monetary limit (in most cases on TV, the limit is between three and five thousand
dollars). Some suggest that they could also be called Arbitrations since contrary to
Federal or State Courts; litigants come in front of the judge (or the arbitrator) to solve a
dispute without the presence of lawyers to represent them. In all cases the rulings on TV
are binding and, in order to participate, the parties agree to remove their case from the
judicial system; in other words, those who participate in court shows agree to accept the
verdict and waive their right to appeal the decision reached.
The cases make public different kinds of problems. They involve family
members, neighbors, roommates, and/or service providers and clients, to name only a
few. The following are examples of cases presented in front of Judy(during the period
when I recorded the programs for analysis):
1) Girlfriend, accountant analyst, vs. ex-boyfriend, former waiter (for unpaid loan)
2) Woman, daycare provider vs. child’s mother, working mother (for unpaid services
and for breaking the contract without notice)
3) Wife, homemaker, vs. ex-husband (for car damage)
4) Woman vs. ex-boyfriend’s ex-wife (for belongings taken from her house while
she was hospitalized)
5) Mother and daughter vs. son (for unpaid debt)
6) Woman and son vs. man and his sons (for vandalizing her car)
7) Sales woman vs. woman, ex-roommate (for unpaid rent)
8) Father, retired construction worker and ex-con vs. son, also ex- con and currently
working and back to school, and his girlfriend, who works in Wal-Mart (for cable
payments)
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And the following are examples of cases from La Corte del Pueblo:






Man vs. man (ex-friend) (for destroying his car seats)
Woman vs. niece (for traffic ticket and car damage)
Man vs. man (for medical bill)
Man vs. man (unpaid debt over a car sale)
Woman, client vs. woman, manicure/pedicure worker (for getting a fungus
infection)
 Man, agent vs. two women singers (for unpaid services)
 Woman vs. man (for damaging front door of her house)
 Woman vs. man (neighbors, for annoying noises)

Different strategies are used to recruit participants (litigants) for the shows. In
most cases there is an online application that can be filled out by interested parties; in the
case of Judge Judy, for example, the submission form26 gathers information about both
the plaintiff and the defendant and whether the case has already been filed in a Small
Claims Court. Another way is to call the production team, and for that, a telephone
number is provided during the televising of the shows. But there is also an alternative to
these more pro-active ways of making an appearance on the program: there are teams that
explore around the country in search of cases that have been filed in courts and that are
considered appealing to the audiences; in these cases people are approached and invited
to participate.
Those whose cases have been selected are paid their travel expenses to Los
Angeles, and their hotel stays by the producers. In addition, if the plaintiff wins the case,
the damages are paid through a fund reserved exclusively for this purpose. The same
applies if the defendant should win and had filed a counter-suit.

26

Available at http://www.judgejudy.com/submit_your_case
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C. The Lights are on: Face-To-Face Interaction is on the Screen
So the participants have been chosen to appear before the judge to resolve their
dispute. The mega genre that I refer to as “reality shows” includes, as we already know,
many different types of programs. In some cases one turns on the TV set and finds one
where there is a group of people on a stage sitting down side by side. It looks like a
theater. There is a person -the show’s host- walking around and holding a microphone in
his hand; he asks them questions about their personal lives and allows little time for them
to answer. He then turns around and starts interacting with the live audience who
participate in the show. They scream and shout out loud, in some cases in support of one
of the participants, but they mostly disapprove and yell nasty things. The situation seems
chaotic; everything seems to be out of control. Security people are asked to make some of
the participants calm down or they will be removed. Cameras alternate between the stage
and the audience, from close-ups to long shots, from high angles to low angles.
Everything happens very quickly.
Unlike other types of reality shows (as the one described above), the interaction in
court shows is very restricted. It is mainly restricted to the judge and the litigants.
Plaintiff and defendant are not allowed to speak among themselves; neither is the public
present on the floor permitted to participate (they are only allowed to express themselves
through laughter or whispering). The judge is the only one in charge of the situation,
allowing the litigants their chance to speak in the order in which he or she decides so that
they can present their case or make an effort to defend themselves.
We already know that both Judy Sheindlin and Manuel Franco (the individuals)
have a prestige that derives from legitimate and prestigious institutions: the academy
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(where they received their degree), and the justice system (where they have practiced law
for many years, in the case of Judy as a judge, and in the case of Franco as a lawyer). In
that sense, speaking as a judge, as Thompson (1990) would put it, “[they] will carry an
authority derived from the institution which [they] represent” (p.161). Even further, as
Bourdieu (1985) would affirm, there is no symbolic power without a symbolic of power.
Symbolic attributes are a public manifestation of a contract of delegation and at the same
time they make it official. In other words, the gown the judges wear and the gavel they
use on the programs are only two examples of the many symbols that give testimony of
who is to be recognized as a judge and therefore legitimize his or her role. Thus,
symbolic power is being reinforced and the litigants (as well as the audiences) are
reminded of it by the form (and a great deal of language and performance does nothing
more than remind the audiences, lest they forget, of the power invested in the judges).
The effectiveness of a discourse depends a great deal on the authority of the
speaker (Bernstein, 1966; Bourdieu, 1985; Foucault, 1969, 1970). In this way, the whole
social structure is present in the interaction (and therefore in the discourse); hence,
material conditions of existence determine not only the discourse but its degree of
legitimacy as well as its potential power.
Furthermore, what can be said and the way it can be said in a particular
circumstance depend on the structure of the objective relation between the positions held
by speaker and receiver in the social and linguistic distribution of capital. Any utterance
carries the mark, in both content and form, of the conditions that that particular field
holds for those who pronounce it regarding the position he/she occupies in that field
(Bourdieu, 1985). The interaction that takes place on the screen is pre-established and
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quite restricted, following a pattern that resembles what can be expected to happen in a
real court. A certain order is required, not only in terms of organization (who is to speak
and who is to listen and when), but also in terms of verbal and non-verbal
communication. As I have mentioned before, all episodes follow the same basic structure.
A long shot of the courtroom while a voice-over summarizes the case. The bailiff then
announces the entrance of Judy or Manuel Franco “Order! All rise” and informs him or
her of the case number and the names of the participants. Then it is the judge who offers
a brief summary of the case and begins asking the plaintiff for more details.
What happens next on the screen between the judge and those presenting their
case (or defending themselves) can be said to be, by definition, a type of complementary
relationship. A “complementary” relationship (in terms of Watzlawick, 1976), is one in
which there is an unequal distribution of power, such as parent-child, boss-employee or
leader-follower. If in a symmetrical relationship people treat each other as equals, then in
a complementary one, they do not. In this case the hierarchy is pre-determined in the
same way as it would be in a real (non-television) court. A systematic observation of the
programs allowed me to see that this rule is not to be broken and that a particular sort of
feedback (negative, in terms of Watzlawick) is expected from the participants in the
show. If the judge asks one of the litigants a question, it is expected that he or she will
answer and the other will remain silent:
Judy: What time did you arrive?
Plaintiff’s Witness: I’d say between 3 and 4.
Judy: Did you hear the child complain, Miss … ?
Plaintiff's Witness: Yes, I did.
Judy: Did you ask the plaintiff whether the child had been complaining
before?
Plaintiff’s Witness: No, your honor, I didn’t.
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Judy: Is that right?
Defendant: Yes
Judy: So, the child was there for approximately 2 and ½ hrs...
Plaintiff: Yes

When someone wants to intervene he or she must ask properly:
Plaintiff: May I say something?
Judy: Sure
And when someone is speaking the rest should remain silent:
Franco: Bueno, vamos a empezar con Ud. Sra. Villalobos [Ok, we will
begin with you, Mrs. Villalobos]
Plaintiff: Sr. Juez, yo vengo a demandar a esta señora que… [Your
honor, I'm here to sue this woman because…]
[Defendant interrupts while the plaintiff is presenting her case]
Franco: Sh, sh, señora, una por una, una por una [Shh, shh, ladies,
one at a time, one at a time]
And when someone performs well he or she can also be rewarded, as in the
following example from La Corte del Pueblo:
Judge: OK, perfectamente bien. Muchas gracias por haberme dado
toda la base de la demanda en la forma más apropiada que he
oído en el mes entero, fue un placer. A ver [dirigiéndose al
demandado] [Ok, perfectly fine. Thank you very much for
showing me the whole basis of your petition in the most
appropriate way I have heard this entire month; it’s been a
pleasure. Let’s see -addressing the defendant]
1. The Uses of Language
In this particular type of situation where there is a fixed and indisputable
asymmetric relationship, among the many rules implicit in the interaction are those rules
that limit the use of language. In other words, no one is allowed to say just anything at
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any time in any way. The seriousness in a court situation affects the selection of the
appropriate expressions, the use of specific jargon, the ways of addressing each one of the
participants, the tone of voice, etc. In sum, the occasion calls for formality, or does it not?
The answer is simply both, yes and no. Yes, when it comes to the litigants, no, when it
comes to the judges, who have the freedom to express their attitude towards the
participants on the show without restraint.
Whether the programs start in a tranquil manner depends on the case that will be
heard. The tone is set by the way the judges address the participants. For example, the
following quotes from Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo reflect the beginning of
different sessions that started quite calmly:
Judy: Miss … (plaintiff), you provided daycare services for the
defendant for approximately a week...
Judy: Miss... you and the defendant have a child together
Plaintiff: Yes
Judy: How old is that child? [in a mild tone]

Manuel Franco: Pasen, pasen, a ver, buenas tardes, detalladamente y
al grano, explíquenme qué pasó. [Come in, come in, let's see,
good afternoon, please, explain to me in detail what happened
in detail]
Manuel Franco: A ver, que pasó?[Let's see, what happened?]

However, the very first sentence can be an indicator of how the rest of the case
will evolve:
Judy: My reading of the complaint and the response in this case
indicates that this was a monumental example of bad judgment
on a lot of people’s parts.
Manuel Franco: Okay, Okay, Sr. Mercado, explíqueme esta demanda
porque después que leí esto pensé que era un chiste. [Okay,
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Okay, Mr. Mercado, explain this to me, because after reading
your case I thought it was a joke]
But the formality gets lost along the way when the judges have a rush of blood to
their heads. The following are quotes of Judy from different moments and from different
cases discussed in Judge Judy:
No,… get a life.
Baloney, I don’t believe you!
I’M SPEAKING! [shouting]
That was a stupid statement!
Are you kidding me, or what?! [she looks at him very seriously]
Judy: These two people are idiots [referring to the plaintiff's
witnesses], and those two are idiots [defendants]. We give them
the benefit of the doubt because they are young idiots.
Defendant 2: Yes, ma’am.
Judy: You are not a young idiot. Now, my question is, are you an old
idiot? [laughter from the gallery]
And from La Corte del Pueblo:
Manuel Franco: No se defiende porque no tiene argumentos, porque
no tiene la capacidad mental de hacerlo. [He can't defend
himself because he has no arguments, because he lacks the
mental capacity to do so]
Manuel Franco: Si se queda ahí, señorita, y pensaría [sic]con lo que
uno tiene acá arriba [se señala la cabeza con la mano]. [If you
had stayed there, miss, and used your grey matter [says the
Judge pointing to his head]
Manuel Franco: Y cuánto gana Ud. por día?[And how much do you
make per day?]
Defendant: Ten
Manuel Franco: Ya perdió Ud. 80 chuchos, más los 350 que le tiene
que pagar. Sabe qué? es Ud. un químico que puede tomar oro y
hacer popó de él? [You already lost 80 bucks, plus the 350 you
have to pay. You know what? are you a chemist? can you make
poop out of gold?]
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It is clear, of course, that the litigants lack such freedom, and part of the
amusement comes from them breaking the rules or crossing a line (which is not always
clear or neither is it always rigorously applied) which triggers the reaction of the judges
with a consequent reprimand. But there is one more difference that I would like to point
out, a difference that becomes evident during La Corte del Pueblo due to the rules of the
language itself. In Spanish the pronoun you allows for a distinction between Tú27 and
Usted. In general, the distinction implies a difference in the degree of formality (even if
the uses have changed through time and may vary from one country to another). Thus Tú
tends to be more informal and Usted, more formal. Depending on the context in which
the interaction takes place, the use of one term or the other may also imply different
levels of respect. However, there are situations and contexts in which the use of the
formal pronoun is expected; such is the case in a courtroom or to be more specific, during
a hearing. Here is another example of the different degree of freedom inside the court, in
this case, the Latino court.
Manuel Franco: no estoy de humor para eso. A ver, qué pasó, qué
hiciste?[I'm not in the mood for that. Let's see, what happened,
what did you do?]
What might have passed unnoticed in English does not in Spanish. Hiciste refers
to the second person singular, thus the tacit pronoun Tú. The expected use of Usted in a
legal situation is broken, but not by everyone. There is no single moment in which a
litigant would address the Judge other than by Usted (or Sr. Juez, Señoría, which would
be the equivalent to Your Honor). Such differential use of the language acts as another

27

In some countries the use of Vos instead of Tú is commonplace, but the distinction or specification does
not seem to offer any additional understanding to the current argument.
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explicit sign of hierarchy. A seemingly minor detail has a powerful effect by adding
another indicator to this complementary relationship.
2. Anything You Say Can and Will Be Used Against You
What is actually said is the result of a compromise between what one would want
to say and what can actually be said, a compromise which depends on what the speakers
have to say, how articulate they are, their assessment of the situation, as well as the
position they hold in the field in which they are expressing themselves (Bourdieu, 1985).
This is a critical point in terms of the interaction that takes place on the screen. A bad
assessment of the situation by one of the participants can have serious consequences for
his or her case. That might explain why most participants try to adapt to the situation.
We could say that there are two basic interactional rules that are to be followed,
and although they are inextricably linked, they can still be differentiated: showing respect
for the judge and showing respect for the situation. Regarding the first, most participants
address the judge as: “Your honor,” “Yes ma’am,” “Sr. Juez;” most of them know they
should not interrupt and therefore ask for permission to speak (in many cases even raising
their hand as if they were in a school class-room). Most of them use an appropriate tone
of voice and respond to the questions asked by the judge as directly as possible.
Regarding the latter (showing respect for the situation), it can manifests itself in various
ways, the following being only one of the many examples. In one of Judy’s cases a
witness is called to give his version of the incident:
Plaintiff's Witness: I’m a little nervous, your honor.
Judy: That’s very good.
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In this case the judge is reinforcing the seriousness of the situation; being nervous
implies that the situation should not be taken lightly, that being in a television court show
is not a moment of relaxation and enjoyment. This is a place where problems and
differences are settled, and those things matter to people. Yes, being nervous is an
appropriate feeling. And, being nervous is also an indication and confirmation of the
judge's power.
However, this is not the case all the time. The rules can be and are broken and
whenever that happens there are consequences. And the cost may depend on which of the
rules has been broken and how. For instance, it is one thing to talk as the other litigant is
speaking and a very different one to interrupt the judge. Irony or sarcasm is not to be
tolerated, except, of course, when it comes from the judge. Tone of voice and word
choice, going straight to the point or offering as many details as possible, or bringing
written proof or witnesses can all go one way or the other, depending on how the
situation is handled.
But following the rules is not always simple or easy, and there are, of course,
different ways in which the participants might fail. In some cases the judge seems
understanding and acts with indulgence and simply calls their attention to their failing.
The following is an example of how Judge Manuel Franco reacts to one of the
participants and draws the line:
Manuel Franco: Oiga, no sea sarcástica! El único que tiene esa
potestad es su seguro servidor, YO![Listen, don´t be sarcastic!
The only one who has that right is me!]
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And let us see two examples from Judge Judy. In the first, a mother (and her
daughter) is suing her son for an unpaid loan:
Defendant [son]: I don’t mind doing that at all. That’s part of life, you
know? But I mean, you shouldn’t work all week for just $50 a
week, when you give your whole check to your mom. I mean,
that’s supposed to be your mom, not your money taker.
Plaintiff[mother]: That’s right; I’m supposed to be your mom.
Judy: Shh, don’t talk to him. [says Judy to the plaintiff]
Plaintiff: Your honor, I keep a diary because he’s accused me several times of taking
away his money…

In the second case, a young woman is suing her ex-boyfriend for an unpaid loan
and a personal video:
Defendant [ex-boyfriend]: The first check was a loan. [he goes on
explaining that later the plaintiff, his ex-girlfriend, had called
him and offered $200 more] It was more like a bribe to get
back with me.
Plaintiff: Your honor, he is lying
Judy: Shh, shh. [to the plaintiff]
Plaintiff: I never said that, your honor
Judy:[ignoring the interruption continues to address the Defendant]
Because you were fixing the porch?
Defendant: Yes.
Plaintiff: [raising her hand like a school girl] Can I say something?
Judy: Shh.
Plaintiff: Can I say something, your honor?
Judy: No, give me a second, I´m not finished with him yet. [close up of
the plaintiff, she smiles. The gallery is laughing at the back; the
camera alternates between the plaintiff and the defendant,
there’s a faint smile on the defendant’s face, he is certainly not
enjoying the moment]
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Nevertheless, there are boundaries that should not and cannot be crossed, and
probably defying authority is the one that receives the harshest punishment. However,
like in all cases, there are varying degrees of defiance and consequently varied outcomes.
One could classify them in two wide categories: the first one would be the type of veiled
challenge and the other, the blatant, evident manifestation of the rebellion against the
judge. The first is more commonly seen and it usually takes the shape of what could be
called playing smart.
Defendant: I still had that bank account open because I still owed
money to the Florida State Tax.
Judy: RIGHT! [shouting]
Defendant: Yes, that´s true
Judy: RIGHT! [Defendant smiles] So, the money was not so that,
according to you, it was Christmas time and you had to buy
presents and that´s why you had to go back to work. Stop it sir!
I´m much smarter than you are. On your BEST day you are not
as smart as I am on my worst day!

This particular example -and many more like it- shows us the moment in which
one of the litigants is trying to make his or her case and in that attempt is trying to put all
of his or her communication skills into play; in other words, they are being witty and
smart (and whether they are supposedly lying to the judge presenting false information or
mixing facts in order to benefit themselves is not the issue here; this subject will be
addressed later on in this chapter). The strategy fails since the judge obviously has the
power and the ability to prove them wrong and to put them in their place, a lower place in
all regards. If there was any attempt to revert the asymmetry via their skills in handling
the situation the judge proves them wrong (yet again). Indeed, to be clear, one can win a
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case but no one can beat the judge. Neither Judge Judy nor Judge Manuel Franco are shy
when it comes to reminding those involved in litigation (and therefore the audiences as
well) who holds which position and why. They keep reminding everyone that they have
the knowledge and the experience to be where they are, something the rest lack (“First of
all, I looked at your contract very carefully. Contract is something I know,” says Judy
during one of the cases).
But a very different matter is when it comes to overtly challenging the judge,
which is something that happens much less frequently, at least on the screen. In this case
one of the participants openly rejects the place assigned to him or her by the judge and
refuses the definition of the situation. For a moment, albeit a very brief one but one that is
exploited by the production team of the program, the well fixed complementary
relationship is threatened. Now and again during the airing of the show the moment in
which the participant answers back to the judge is shown, but not the outcome. Part of the
moment of tension is repeated during the breaks leaving the audience filled with
expectation as if this was a thriller.
Judy: You won other cases when people terminated you? Oh, I’d like
to see it. What other people terminated you for?!
[Plaintiff interrupts saying something]
Judy: I’M SPEAKING! [Shouting and clearly upset]
Let us now see the whole interaction:
Judy: Oh, I'd like to see it. What other people terminated you for. All
these people terminated you without giving you the two weeks’
notice. I want to understand it! [says Judy raising her voice]
Plaintiff: Oh, gee, thanks a lot [says very sarcastically and leaning
forward]. That’s all the same case. There is all one file for you
to see that in our State we are allowed our two weeks'
severance pay. Because if you’re fired from your job, would
you not expect them to…?
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Judy: I want to tell you something, madam. If I lived in your State, that
permitted a single person to have 10 children in their home
without any support services, without at least two other
providers…
Plaintiff: [interrupting] I only have 10 children at one time
Judy: I’M SPEAKING!! [shouting]
Plaintiff: So? [leaning forward and looking at Judy straight in her
eyes]
[OH! Is heard very loudly coming from the gallery]
Judy: Case dismissed!
This act of resistance is a clear example of a dire assessment of the situation and it
has analogous consequences. The situation is about to get out of hand when Judy abruptly
puts an end to it, dismissing the case. Whether the plaintiff was right regarding her claim
is no longer relevant or has lost its value; the very moment she openly confronts the judge
her weakness is exposed. As I mentioned before, what and how something can be said is
a very delicate matter and requires the participants in the interaction to be not only
sensible but also alert and conscious of the place they hold in that particular structure.
Otherwise, they will be disciplined and punished, and the audiences will be there to see it
and learn from it (although, what they actually make of this cannot be anticipated without
a proper analysis, which I will present in following chapters).
3. Other Interventions. The Bailiff, the Gallery
There are two other actors in the courtroom besides the judge and the litigants,
who also play a significant role. One is the bailiff and the other the people in the gallery.
The former can be easily identified, not only because he dresses as a court officer but also
because his name is on the screen and is usually the same person in every show year after
year. The latter is the group of people who remain anonymous and whose faces are rarely

157

seen; the camera offers long shots and a panorama of the gallery where they are located
but hardly ever focuses on one particular individual, on one particular face, on one
expression; they can be anybody, the same crowd or a different one each day.
There are many moments in which the bailiff and the judge directly interact but
they could be easily classified in two very distinctive types. One is the formal interaction
that resembles that of a real court in the sense that the bailiff acts by assisting the judge;
for instance, he offers information about the case number, the names of the litigants, the
cause of the litigation, tells the people to stand up and be silent, etc. The judge can ask
him to hand him or her some proof offered by one of the litigants, or to call in a witness,
or even give him the order to remove someone from the courtroom:
Manuel Franco: [addressing the bailiff in English] Michael, take them out of here…
However, there is a quite different type of exchange between them. There is a
closer, friendlier, and definitely complicit interaction between them during specific
moments of the show:
Defendant: That´s correct.
Judy: Ha ha. [Judy turns to the bailiff and says to him:] Do those two
stories sort of go like this to you? Like they don´t make sense?
[crossing her arms in the air in front of her and pointing her
fingers in opposite directions]
Bailiff: No… [Reinforcing Judy’s statement]
During these brief interactions it is made obvious that judge and bailiff have a
special bond, there is an underlying understanding, a kind of complicity that is only
possible when people share the same codes. But what caught my attention is the fact that
beyond that particular relationship lies something more interesting. In a way, the court
officer stands as a connection between the judge and the viewers; one could say that he is

158

like a bridge that brings the two parts closer. The program is staged in such a way that it
resembles the showing of something that is happening in front of us, and that something
is an interaction in which we would not be allowed to participate anyway, unless we were
one of the litigants. As I have indicated in a previous chapter, the judges don’t address the
viewers directly (except during the commercials when they look directly into the camera)
and therefore, at no point is it possible to redefine this mediated quasi-interaction into a
mediated interaction (Thompson's terms28), which could be expected to happen if the
judge spoke directly to the camera, therefore to us, the viewers. Thus, it is via the bailiff
that we can somehow be part of the conversation. Even if we cannot be him, there is a
side of his performance we can relate to as if he stood in our place, as if he somehow
represented us, and therefore opens a door for a closer connection of the viewer with the
judge and consequently with the show.
Something similar -and yet slightly different-happens with the live audience.
Anyone can actually be present at the taping of the shows; that is, if one can have access
to the free tickets that are offered via the Internet. There is only one condition: being over
28

Thompson (1990, 1998) distinguishes three types of interaction: face-to-face, mediated, and mediated
quasi-interaction. There does not seem to be a need to elaborate extensively on what face-to-face
interaction means and/or involves. Mediated interaction implies the use of some technical media, for
instance: letters, telephones, and obviously and very significantly, the Internet. But with the expansion of
the mass media we are witnesses of a new phenomenon, namely: mediated quasi-interaction. Mediated
quasi-interaction involves the sharing of information and symbolic content across time and space. Although
it can be considered a type of interaction because it involves individuals communicating with others who
may respond in varied ways, it is considered quasi-interaction “in so far as the flow of communication is
predominantly one-way and the modes of response through which recipients can communicate with the
principal communicator are strictly limited” (Thompson, 1990: 228). There is an essential structural
asymmetry between producers and receivers in this mode of interaction; however, the control over the
reactions of the other, characteristic of face-to-face communication, becomes unachievable. This is a
twofold aspect: it gives more freedom to the producers of symbolic products in so far as they don’t feel the
need to devote time or energy to determine whether recipients actually pay attention to their messages or
not. But as a counterpart, the lack of control over the audiences’ responses implies a certain degree of
uncertainty.
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18 years of age. Although people attending the program have a rather limited role (their
performance on the set is restricted to, on one hand, being there to be seen, and the other,
reacting to what is happening in the room), their presence does not go unnoticed. Their
murmuring and laughter can be heard during key moments of the shows, mostly when the
judge is reprimanding one of the participants due to their inappropriate behavior (for
example, talking when the other litigant is explaining something to the judge or
interrupting the judge when he or she is speaking) and more importantly, when the judge
is revealing the truth and making it evident that none of the participants can fool her or
him:
Judy: Have you ever seen Bruce Willis? He carries it in his shoes…
Defendant 1: He had on shorts, it was summer
[Judy smiles sarcastically and looks at the bailiff -people in the gallery
are laughing]
Judy: You were just going to ask him, you were going to say “did you
try to break into my house?” [laughter can be heard coming
from the gallery] And you thought he was going to answer you.
Is that what you thought?!
But the intensity or magnitude of the performance of the people in the gallery
cannot be said to be random or excessive. Unlike other types of reality shows, the judge
sets the limits, as it occurs in the following circumstance:
Judy: No, tell me…. Shh, don´t laugh, please. [says Judy addressing
the public in the gallery]
The people in the gallery are the necessary backdrop that guides the expected
response from the audiences to what is happening in the court. Their behavior, their
contagious laughter is an invitation for the audience to go along with their evaluation of
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the situation. It is more than just an enjoyable moment; it is an indication of how the
viewers are to interpret the events.
In sum, one could say that Judy and Manuel Franco rely on both the bailiff’s
complicity (with whom they share the view of the situation) and the live audience, whose
laughter and murmuring can be easily heard. Thus, the judges´ performances take a
different dimension, a thicker density due to the reinforcement they get from these two
actors that take part in the interaction.
D. Performing for the Litigants/Performing for the Audiences
There are two sets of devices that are needed and which define what Goffman
calls personal front; i.e., appearance (which gives information regarding the individual´s
temporal social status) and manner (which refers to the way the individual plays the role
during a particular interaction). Although coherence between these two aspects can be
expected, frequently and for different reasons there can be inconsistencies. A very small
portion of the population has had a direct experience with the Justice System; but most
have been exposed over the years and on regular bases to fictional trials through the
many television programs that have been on the screen from the early stages of the
medium. And they have witnessed real trials that have reached national broadcasting as
well.
As I mentioned before, mediated quasi-interaction has an effect on the way
people act for others. Drawing after Goffman (1955, 1959) I would also suggest that
social interactions can be thought of as a play that takes place on a stage, as in a theater.
Little of what we do can be really considered an act of absolute free will since we follow
rules, whether consciously or unconsciously (an idea that is not strange to Bourdieu´s line
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of thought either). Since the way we act in front of others is crucial in helping determine
how we are to be treated, we need to be in control of the way we express ourselves. In the
previous pages we have seen how delicate it is for participants to have a proper control of
the situation; how important it is to behave according to the rules and what the
consequences may be when breaking them. But if maintaining the balance is usually a
delicate matter during any of our daily interactions it is even more so in court shows.
So far I have analyzed some basic interactional rules that guide what happens on
the stage (courtroom). And I have done so mostly in regards to the relation between the
litigants and the judge. But grant me, dear reader, the liberty to be reiterative and insist on
the idea that this is not just any interaction, this is not a spontaneous moment that was
fortuitously or accidentally recorded and broadcast. Neither is this a trial that is taking
place and is being televised for some singular or unique raison d'être. These court
sessions, as I have stated before, would not exist if it were not for the cameras. What
happens on the screen happens for the screen and therefore one can infer that the judges
are not only performing for the participants, they are performing for the viewers. And
viewers need to be attracted, need to be drawn to watch the show.
1. The Privilege of Consecration
Goffman (1959) uses the term performance to refer to all the activity carried on
by an individual before an audience. During this performance, the individual (or actor)
gives meaning to him or herself, to others, and to the situation. In other words, these
performances convey impressions to others. In addition, the parties exchange information
which helps them confirm their identity.
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There are varying degrees of formality according to the context in which an
interaction is carried on and that has an influence on the individual’s performance. In
some cases minor incidents can disrupt the whole situation and threaten to destroy the
credibility of the totality of the performance of one of the actors. Nevertheless, under
normal circumstances -and by normal I mean everyday life, usual communicative
exchanges among ordinary people in quotidian contexts- people either consciously
knowingly or not, tend to accept the impressions given by the other in order to maintain
the balance of the situation. In general, people are likely to avoid pointing out every
mistake or faux pas that occurs during the interaction. Furthermore, there are common
processes that are set to work in order to protect the image projected by the other or in
order to defend one’s own, ranging from pretending nothing happened to acknowledging
the disruption and dismissing its importance (Goffman, 1959, 1967). But of course court
shows don’t fit this description and they are far from a relaxed and comfortable
environment and not simply because they are a place where people go to solve their
disputes (which by definition implies an inherent tension). Therefore, the maintenance of
the expressive control here is more important than is usually the case.
Our capacity to express ourselves derives from two distinctive sets of signs; on
the one hand there are those signs we give and on the other, those we give off (Goffman,
1959). We usually refer to the former as verbal communication, which is considered to be
intentional and therefore controllable. The latter involves non-verbal communication and
is supposedly and presumably unintentional. Therefore, if anything you say can be used
against you, any gesture, any mannerism, or tone of voice can be as well. That is
something that applies particularly to those who act as claimants in the show, however
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when it comes to the judges, those who hold the power, everything changes. This is not
exclusive to courtroom shows, though, since, as Bourdieu suggests (1984, 1985), one of
the privileges of being consecrated is the fact that the individual is granted an
indisputable essence, which authorizes transgressions that are otherwise forbidden.
We could ask ourselves how court show judges have reached that point. One
could think, initially, that this is the result of the combination of these two major social
institutions: the judiciary and the media. I would state, nevertheless, that that happens
particularly via the latter (the media) since it is a system powerful enough to reach
massive audiences and has the necessary resources and the capacity to spread a wide set
of strategies to put someone or something in the center of public life. And, of course, we
cannot avoid mentioning the audiences that watch the shows on a daily basis. There is
little doubt as to the fact that some television judges -such the case of Judy Sheindlinhave been enshrined by the media and the viewers, and others have benefited from the
images that those have gained in the world of television.
But why are we referring to transgressions? What types of transgressions are we
alluding to? Why would judges commit any transgressions if they have already been
bestowed the power to exert justice? And where is the line that separates authority from
authoritarianism?
2. How Do Judges Impart Justice?
We cannot lose track of what is supposed to be the essence of court shows. As I
have mentioned time and again, apparently these are programs people attend to settle
personal disputes. After all, if there were any doubts, Judy makes it explicit to us: “10
million people get something out of tuning in for an hour a day, every day, and seeing
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efficient, to-the-point, no-bull resolution of disputes.” And the promotions and teasers of
the programs reiterate the same idea: “Want justice? Call... ” Then it is legitimate to
wonder what it takes in order to achieve such a goal, and to impart justice.
Three things seem to be needed to succeed in such a task: to be respected, to be
heard, and to be obeyed. But they need to be forged, they require the investing in some
sort of social practice. And in this singular situation knowledge becomes central; a
particular and very specific type of knowledge that defines the specific field we are
dealing with. Therefore, at least in part, the legitimacy derives from the mastery of the
law. The question arises, then, whether that is enough, whether that is a necessary and
sufficient condition in the world of “television-law.”
At this point it seems necessary to distinguish different kinds of knowledge and
for that I will borrow Bourdieu's classification. As noted in Chapter 4, he differentiates
between academic, everyday, and social knowledge. Academic knowledge is factual, it
relates to laws, codes, etc. Everyday knowledge is also factual; but social knowledge
refers to either people in general or a specific individual’s ability to “see into people.”
And there is plenty of evidence of all these three types of knowledge playing an
important part in the shows under analysis.
Judy: Then, can you explain to me why, sir, the check that she wrote
on December 17th is made out to the same corporation that the
check of November 12 was made out to … [name of business]
[camera shot is on Judy holding some papers the defendant has
brought as proof; then there is a close-up shot of a check where
the date, amount and signature can be read]
Judy: LET'S GO BACK! You faced a term of imprisonment on deferred
adjudication.
Judy: What’s the name of your probation officer?
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Defendant: Dolores… [blank]
Judy: What’s her phone number?
Defendant: I have no idea
Judy: Oh, sure you do! You have to call in, check in with your
probation officer, sir.
These are very brief examples of how specific/academic knowledge is present in
the shows. The judges use terms and expressions that are specific to the field of the law;
explanations are given so participants and spectators can understand what they mean, for
instance, when Judy explains in two different cases:
Case 1:
Judy: Deferred adjudication, which means if you pay back money you
wouldn’t go to jail.
Case 2:
Judy: Now, that fact that you were found not guilty after the trial does
not necessarily mean that you didn’t do it.
Defendant: Right.
Judy: It just means that the District Attorney was not able to prove that
beyond reasonable doubt. You understand.
Defendant: Correct.
Next is a dialog that takes place during a case in which a daycare provider is suing
a former client for unpaid services:
Judy: Do you have a copy of your contract?
Plaintiff: Yes, ma’am.
Judy: May I see it, please
Plaintiff: [delivers the contract to the bailiff] She came in on a
Monday, told me she was going to start working on Tuesday. I
told her, you know, I understand that it’s tight, you’re starting
a new job, if you want I’ll let you pay me the next Monday.
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Judy: This is not a contract [says Judy, referring to the papers the
bailiff just handed over to her]. This is that she understands the
terms and conditions of child care policy.
Plaintiff: I don’t do a month…
Judy: You have a contract that provides for termination, illness,
emergency, and there is a place for her to sign here, which I
don’t see signed.
Or when Judge Manuel Franco says: Sr. le acabo de dar a conocer la ley, que es
negligencia, no fue a propósito. [I have just explained the law to you, what negligence
means is that it was not done on purpose]
And in another situation he asserts:

Manuel Franco: [Veredicto] Si Ud. entabla demanda, la ley requiere
que todo sea por escrito … que tiene que comprobar. Ud. no
tiene nada. A favor de las demandadas.[If you sue someone the
law requires that everything is written… and there has to be
proof. You have nothing. In favor of the defendants.]

Besides, the performance and the knowledge offered by the judges is
supplemented by the cameras, which alternate different angles and offer close-ups of
different papers (contracts, checks, judicial presentations, etc.) that are under the judges’
scrutiny. In addition, personal information is blurred, such as names or any other
information in order to protect the privacy and identity of real people involved in the
cases (which is another way of reinforcing the idea of the reality of what is taking place
before the audiences). Specific knowledge is delivered, albeit not always or not in every
case. The judges interrogate each of the litigants searching for facts, no hear-say is
accepted, and witnesses are called and dismissed according to the situation.
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However, even if there is some evidence of their academic background and
knowledge, their life experience, their personal life, and what the judges consider to be
common sense play a major part as well; and that sometimes seems more important than
anything else. The three types of knowledge Bourdieu refers to are combined and
intertwined in these programs and used in a discretionary way according to the situation.
Court shows are an exhibition of “common places” (Angenot, 1982): Once a liar always
a liar, one can hear the judges say. Parents are to be a role model, they don´t sue their
children (states Judy in one of the cases brought before her when a father sues his son for
an unpaid debt; however, this rule is not always followed, for example in the case of a
woman suing her son). And one too many times we hear Judy tell women not to be stupid
when it comes to men:
Judy: I don´t like stupid women. Stupid women give money away
Plaintiff: Your honor, I´ve learned.
Judy: O.K. [Judy is looking at the Plaintiff, she looks angry]You know
... if you´re married to somebody it´s one thing... Even if you´re
married you don´t give money away... But if you got a
boyfriend who can´t keep a business straight, straight enough
to pay taxes from the business, YOU DON´T GIVE HIM
MONEY! [Shouting]

Judy presents herself as someone who can see through things, perceptive, smart,
quick, witty… She is, after all a no-nonsense judge. And in many regards, the same
applies to Judge Manuel Franco. Irony and sarcasm are not alien to the daily
performances of the judges. And being ironic and sarcastic is obviously part of the show
and is celebrated by the people in the gallery. Of the many ways they have to express the
distance that separates them from the participants this is, simply, too habitual. Day in and
day out the shows present viewers with situations like the following:
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Judy: Is that fair?
Defendant Witness: I mean, he…
Judy: No. Is that fair?
Defendant Witness: I… I… I can’t, I don’t know what you’re talking
about…
Judy: Well, if you weigh 300Lbs [gallery laughs]. If you weigh 300Lbs
and he weighs 135 lbs and his friend looks like he weighs 135
lbs -after a good shower-, does that sound fair to you?!
[laughter can still be heard from the gallery, close shot of the
witness who is also laughing]

And later on, during the same show:
Judy: So, let’s say he didn’t have a gun; but say he had a knife or a
screw driver, or a lug wrench. Instead of throwing the lug
wrench and hitting the car, one of your team threw it and went
through the wind shield and it hit somebody on the head and
they may have been killed. “Well, we didn’t mean for that to
happen! [Judy gradually raises her voice and ends up shouting
and mocking them:] … “All we meant was to go there and
have a fair fight.” Now, that doesn’t excuse you two, idiots
[says Judy now addressing the plaintiff and his witness]

There are many moments in which the judges expose and unmask publicly those
who participate in the program. If, as Goffman suggests, we tend to protect each other’s
face in order to maintain the balance of the situation, court shows are full of counter
examples. People who attend are subject to losing face at any time, so playing the game
becomes a matter of overcoming and dodging any possible obstacle. And the road to
winning the case is built upon them. The judges, on the other hand, are protected by an
invisible shell; a shell made of an amalgamation of the power they receive from the
position they hold in that particular situation, the place they occupy in the social structure
(compared to the participants), and the place they have in the process of production and
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in the world of television. In sum, they are in a win-win situation. Even if their authority i.e., their face- can sometimes be challenged by one of the litigants as we have seen
before, the potentially negative effect is not simply neutralized by the process of
production; as a matter of fact, it is capitalized on and shown over and over for no one to
miss. Why, then, the need to resort to ridicule? Take, for example, a few quotes from
different episodes of La Corte del Pueblo:
Manuel Franco: Si el otro actúa como un idiota, Ud. también va a
actuar como un idiota?[If the other person behaves like an
imbecile, would you act like an imbecile?]
Defendant: Si. [Yes]
Manuel Franco: No. Le pregunto nuevamente: si el otro actúa como un
idiota, Ud. también va a actuar como un idiota?[No, I’ll ask
you again, if the other behaves like an imbecile would that
mean you would as well?]
Defendant: No.
Manuel Franco: Así se dice en inglés: “manicure”. [This is how you
say it in English: manicure]
Manuel Franco: [addressing the Plaintiff] Sr., le voy a entender diez
veces mejor si no me habla como Cantinflas. [Sir, I’ll
understand you a whole lot better if you don´t talk to me like
Cantinflas29]
Manuel Franco: [addressing the Plaintiff] Ud. tiene que ir al
oftalmólogo. ¿Sabe lo que es eso? Es el médico de la vista, Sra.
[Lady, you need to see an ophthalmologist. Do you know what
that is? It´s an eye doctor]
And others from Judy´s programs:
Judy: So, what did you go there for?

29

Cantinflas: film character interpreted by Mexican actor, Mariano Moreno in the 1940s and 50s. The
character represented a lower class man who was a bit of a clown and was very popular particularly among
the lower classes.
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Defendant Witness: Truthfully?
Judy: That’s right, truthfully! Well, of course, don’t you see how
foolish I’m making you look?
Defendant's Witness: No.
Judy: Well, I’m making you look foolish, Sir, because I want you to tell
me the truth!
Judy: Did you live there at all?
Defendant: I would stay there. I did not technically...
Judy: I did not ask you what technically... technically, technically, that
has to do with the IRS! I´m asking you whether you lived there!
Judy: Just a minute, wouldn´t? [camera focuses on the plaintiff, she
makes a gesture, smiles like saying: that´s not true] … wouldn´t
let you?
Defendant: She wouldn´t let me.
Judy: Wouldn´t let you… What did she threaten to do if you went to
work ?[loud laughter is heard from the gallery. Camera
alternates between Judy (front shot) the defendant and the
plaintiff -a side angle includes them both and the gallery at the
back, they are smiling/laughing too. Plaintiff looks up to the
ceiling shaking her head and smiling). No, tell me, I care….
Shh, don´t laugh, please [says Judy addressing the gallery] I
want to know what she threatened to do if you got a job [raising
her voice and her eyebrows]

And of course, all these exchanges are accompanied by faces the judges make
while the participants are responding to their questions or giving their version of the
events; by the way they interact with the bailiff, by their tone of voice. In other words,
with the totality of what constitutes their non-verbal communication, by everything they
give off.
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The fine line that separates authority from authoritarianism is crossed rather easily
during the shows; the many ways the judges have to guide the interaction and reach a
verdict resorting to ridicule and belittling the participants is an integral part of the
programs/court sessions. However, a distinction should be made between Judge Judy and
Judge Manuel Franco in regards to two very sensitive matters: gender and ethnicity.
3. Until Gender Do Them Part
As has become clear from the previous pages, Judy frequently makes comments
about women; in her own words, she doesn’t like stupid women. But how is such a
statement to be understood? How far can the assumption take us? The first thing that
should be noted is the fact that the adjective does not apply to women in general; being
stupid is a condition only some fulfill. In other words, it is a category within a category
and it can be changed; it is not part of nature. “Stupid women give money away,” is a
common expression that can be heard in Judy's programs over and over. So what lies
behind that statement? Stupid woman, an obviously negative category, is the result of
multiple characteristics; it is the articulation of certain features (some of which are not
necessarily carriers of negative connotations when standing on their own) such as:
weakness + naïveté + trustfulness (and, why not + ignorance). In that sense, Judy presents
herself as the counterexample: a strong, independent woman capable of holding an
important position in the social structure. After all, she is not only a successful
lawyer/judge and TV star; she is a successful and independent woman who has managed
to have both a career and a family. There is probably no need to mention the fact that
Judy does not introduce any relevant structural variables in her views about society in
general, which consequently reflects on her views about gender, as I have pointed out
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before when analyzing Judy’s conceptions of society. From her laissez-faire/neo-liberal
ideology there is no need for the State to intervene in any way and there is no
consideration of history and social context. Since anything that should be done in terms
of legislation that could benefit certain portions of the population would be interpreted as
interference, therefore we could assume that the same applies to women, regardless of
their social and/or economic condition. In that sense, Judy lectures women to be
suspicious of men who can (and will) take advantage of them. In sum, being independent
is equivalent to being mistrustful; this is not a problem of rights, this is a matter of choice
(the right choice, Judy's choices). But regardless of her ideology, regardless of the fact
that, according to her anyone can achieve any goal, she is careful when it comes to other
aspects of women. Whenever Judy makes a remark about women she does so in terms of
the individual and focusing specifically on the acts that that particular individual
performs; there is never a comment about the person itself, never in relation to what
Goffman refers to as the personal front and more specifically to their appearance.
People who attend Judge Judy are rather varied. Persons from different
backgrounds and members of different communities come in front of the Judge to solve
their disputes: Moon vs. Sanchez; Gertzberger vs. Wilson; Pettitt vs. Ryan; and so on.
Some are white, some African American, some are Latino and others, Asian; some may
have a foreign accent, some do not. And even if Judy can make them look foolish and her
verdicts are both legal and moral, again, she is careful when crossing the racial/ethnic
line. In sum, Judy systematically reinforces personal choice over structural conditions
and by focusing on the individual she manages to avoid getting caught in an overt
racial/ethnic/gendered discourse. In other words, her neo-liberal ideology reaches not
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only the poor (or the misfit, as she likes to call them), but (stupid) women of all races and
ethnicities.
Judge Manuel Franco, on the other hand, goes much further than Judge Judy, to
put it mildly. His comments and remarks are anything but politically correct. The
programs constituted a daily display of misogyny, male chauvinism, and bigotry. And his
belittling would start with the very nature of the cases brought to the show: “las
demandas que la gente mete son las estupideces más grandes del mundo [The cases that
people bring before me are the most ridiculous in the world]." In the same way he would
tell a man not to speak as Cantinflas, or to dress properly and make fun of how he looks,
he would not deprive the audience from hearing insulting observations about women. The
following are quotes from the judge in different episodes of La Corte del Pueblo:
Manuel Franco: Cloro? Eso no es sexual, viejo... No he conocido
nunca a una mujer en mi vida que apeste a cloro ahí. A otras
cosas sí, pero no a cloro… [Chlorine? That’s not sexual,
buddy. I have never met a woman in my entire life that would
stink like chlorine there; like other things, yes, but not
chlorine…]

Manuel Franco: He salido con varias mujeres en mi vida. Estuve
casado por… 25 años y a mi ex mujer a cada rato le dolían las
orejas y se quitaba los aretes. (…) es una cosa viejísima que se
tienen que perforar una parte del cuerpo para que nos agrade
a los hombres con cosas colgando de las orejas como si fuesen
vacas, verdad?[I have dated many women in my life. I was
married for … 25 years and my ex-wife would often take off
her earrings because they would hurt (…) it’s a very old habit
… that they have to pierce a part of their body to please men…
to have things hanging from their ears like as if they were
cows, right?]
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The way he refers to women has nothing to do with what they do or the cases that
are brought in front of him. The remarks about appearance and mannerisms are not only
offensive to one particular individual but are extended to the whole category; put
differently, Manuel Franco directs his comments not simply to a singular woman who
may or may not be standing in front of him, but generalizes about all of them. Therefore,
women can be said to be cows, to stink, to… His life experience (he makes clear that he
has been married and that he has dated many women), his personal life experience, is
brought into play when making such comments. And machismo is made evident time and
again during the show: Es el hombre el que tiene que pagar por esas cosas! [it’s the man
who has to pay for those things!],says Franco after asking the woman why she would
want to go out with a man who looks like a gang member. Or, for instance, when at the
end of one of the cases an off camera voice says: con la liberación femenina las chicas
no eligen caballeros [with women's liberation girls no longer choose gentlemen].
4. The Rules of Becoming
There is a distinction separating Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo, a
particularity that does not go unnoticed and shouldn't be ignored. Judy is well established
in her own country; this is her territory. It is unnecessary to devote any time to that. Why
would she? She, the program, the TV station, the setting, everything speaks America. It is
an American program, produced in America, led by an American woman judge, presided
over by the American flag. Who could or would dispute its naturalness? But that is not
the case with La Corte del Pueblo. On the contrary, everything there feels Latino
(regardless of the flag, the setting, and the robe the judge wears...). And this, obviously is
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a mark that has its consequences; one would think that this would affect the outcome of
the program in more than one way. The question is how, how does the Judge deal with it?
Manuel Franco moves between the English and the Spanish worlds comfortably
and with confidence, which constitutes yet another distinction between him and those
who participate in the show. He interacts in English with the bailiff, who obviously
represents the American world, who is part of the American Justice System; and all
indications are that that person does not speak Spanish (nor should he). Here is an
important mark of transition between these two worlds that are so close and yet so far
apart at the same time, and Manuel Franco comes and goes from one to the other showing
the litigants, the people on the floor, and consequently, the audiences, how it should be
done, and how it should not. He not only teaches how the law works, he teaches English,
he tells participants how something is said and whenever one dares to speak in English he
corrects them “para que no arruine el idioma…” [so you don’t ruin the language]. But
the language itself is not the issue, behind it lies the whole concept of what it means to be
Latino, and what it should mean to be a Latino living in the U.S.
Says Franco in many different shows:
“Yo tengo que ir con la ley, no donde mi corazón me dice.” “Estoy
tratando de educar al pueblo.” [I have to go with the law, not with
where my heart tells me. I am trying to educate the people]

“Siendo latinos somos cochinos porque comemos comida que nadie
comería en el mundo.” [We Latinos are like pigs, because we eat food
that no one in the rest of the world would eat]

Nosotros, como latinos, tenemos la mala costumbre que no podemos
llegar al grano. Que pasa que pa pa pa pa pa; no quiero escuchar el
que pa pa pa pa hoy, no estoy de humor para eso. A ver, qué pasó, qué
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hiciste?[We, Latinos, have the bad habit of not going straight to the
point. What happens is blah blah blah; I don’t want to hear the blah
blah blah blah today, I’m not in the mood for that. Let’s see, what
happened, what did you do?]

La realidad es que si vamos en estos caminos, nosotros no tenemos
que dejar que nuestros hijos dejen todos los lugares públicos como
cuchitriles de puercos; un pueblo latino somos tan audaces y capaces
como los mejores blancos que existen en este país y nosotros como
latinos cuando nos vamos de un lugar público lo tenemos que dejar
tan limpio como cuando llegamos! (...) Somos todos humanos, no
sucede eso, si a alguien se le cae en un lugar público eso, que es lo
que debe hacer, parar a recogerlo y llevárselo, está de acuerdo? [The
truth is that if we go somewhere we cannot let our children leave a
public space looking like a pigsty; we, Latinos are as able and capable
as the best whites in this country and we, as Latinos, must leave a
public space as clean as we found it! (...) We are all human, that
shouldn’t happen, and if we throw something on the ground we have to
pick it up and take it with us, that’s what we are supposed to do, is that
clear?]
If his words were not clear enough, at the end of the shows there is a regular
interviewer who asks the litigants about the case and about the verdict. The moment is
always very brief; in the case of Judge Judy usually both litigants are given the
opportunity to offer their own view of the situation, and although they might have made a
long statement, the editing process reduces it to just an alternate camera shot of each of
them highlighting some specific aspect while the credits run across the screen. But in La
Corte del Pueblo the interviewer has a more noticeable role. He does not restrict himself
to asking the opinion of the litigants about the verdict. His questions are there to elicit
certain answers and when that does not happen he is the one closing with a statement that
reinforces the moral of the program. For example: “the experience is that you become
familiar with the system in this country, so one day you will better yourself as many
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other Latinos have, OK? ” [la experiencia es que se vaya familiarizando con el sistema
de aquí, en este país, para que un día llegue a superarse como lo han hecho muchos
latinos, de acuerdo?]. And, on other occasions, there is even a follow-up of the case and
the off camera voice of the interviewer informs us that one of the litigants: “went back to
Mexico, life in the USA was too hard for him”[Regresó a México, la vida en USA fue
muy dura para él].
“Become who you are,” suggests Bourdieu (1985, p. 82). Such is the formula
contained in the performative magic of the act of institution. All social destinies, positive
or negative, consecrating or stigmatizing are equally fatal, suggests the author. And
avoiding the temptation of crossing the separating line, the transgression, the desertion
also constitutes one of the functions of the act of institution. Is not Manuel Franco
performing such acts of institution? Is he not drawing the line of separation between what
is appropriate and what is not, and is he not telling us what it means to become?
Ethnic identity struggles with stigmas and emblematic properties related to the
origin of a group. It is a struggle over the power to make it seen and make it believed,
make it known and make it recognized, and to impose a definition of the legitimate
division of the social world. A vision of the social world through principles of division
which, when imposed on the whole group, constitute the sense of identity and unity
which makes effective the reality of the unity and identity of such a group. So, how are
we to interpret Manuel Franco? Members of a group can either show their solidarity with
or distance themselves from the group that stigmatizes them. Can we assume that Manuel
Franco is distancing himself from the group? It seems like he is in the position in which
he actually enjoys jumping from one side of the bridge that connects Americanism and
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Latinism to the other. For him, being a Latino can be seen as a choice, and in the process
he picks and chooses what seems suitable for him. The problem lies exactly in what he
leaves aside. Let us for a moment assume that he is actually free to choose; he might be
seen as someone capable of crossing from one side to the other, that is, from being
American to being Mexican (or Latino, depending on the circumstances). He switches
naturally from English to Spanish, he is a successful professional (or so it seems, since he
is playing the role of a judge and ruling over people’s disputes), he presents himself as
someone who has been able to succeed in America and therefore, he is, in his own words,
“educating the people.” But the lessons he teaches are more than law related; he is also
educating the people to blend into American culture and for that, the cost is high. And the
cost is so high because Manuel Franco resorts to transforming ethnic markers into
negative images of the Latino community. He re-signifies common practices as
unacceptable, and he wants Latinos to emulate whites’ practices in order to "belong."
E. When Did Blind Justice Go Dumb?
There is one last thing I would like to address. Often, when we think about
Justice, the icon of the blindfolded woman with a scale in one hand and a sword in the
other comes to mind. However, this is not a spontaneous thought. The idea of blind
justice does not emerge simply as part of some sort of natural collective imagery. Today,
it is reinforced, among other means, by many television shows, fictional or not. The
symbol of the blindfolded woman stands for fairness and equity. It implies that the
imposition of justice will not be affected by demographic characteristics such as race,
social class, or gender (Kappeler et al., 2000). In essence, it means that everyone
deserves equal justice: “Justitia is blindfolded so that she may be impartial” (Curtis and
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Resnick, 1987, p. 1727). Hansen (1999) explains that she is a symbol of “the fair and
equal administration of the law, without corruption, avarice, prejudice, or favor” (p. 1).
The scale represents the weighing and pondering of the claims while the sword stands for
the judgment and punishment. What is to be expected from Justitia, then? Ideally, it is the
resolution of a dispute regardless of who the litigants are, where they come from, what
they look like, or how well they can express themselves; regardless of their status. One
might expect that the judge would see through the details and determine what is fair,
based on proof, based on the law (with the use of the scale). For that to happen certain
rules should be followed. Television court programs reinforce the notion that we are
witnessing justice in progress. One can see the judges demanding proof of the facts, be it
written documents and/or witnesses. As we have already mentioned, camera shots and
angles are an important part in the construction of this reality effect: close-ups of
documents, litigants swearing to tell the truth, the flags, the bailiff... Like a soccer
referee, the decision is made on the spot, right or wrong, yet always seemingly right (or at
least presented as such by definition in the context of the show).
Although that might be the case, although some of the time the law is probably
applied, what happens in the process is not to be disregarded. And even if the decisions
are made according to the law, there are too many exceptions. As I have mentioned
above, the most obvious one is when the judge is challenged, which results in the
harshest punishment since it leads to the dismissal of the case, even if the litigant has all
the proof in his or her favor. And that has nothing to do with fairness, at least not in terms
of Justice.
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As I mentioned before, court shows are a particular or specific type of interaction,
and the analysis of social interaction cannot be separated from the study of the
individuals who act and interact and the context in which it takes place. To explain the
typical characteristics of social contexts, we could appeal to Bourdieu’s concept of fields
of interaction. From this perspective, cultural capital is the result of incorporating
knowledge, skills, and differing types of educational qualifications while “symbolic
capital includes the accumulated praise, prestige and recognition associated with a person
or position” (Thompson, 1990, p.148). I have mentioned already that the judges have the
power to rule over the disputes brought before them by the litigants. It goes without
saying that the same way that power is not equally distributed within society, nor is it in
any particular field, let alone the justice system. Power “is a capacity which enables or
empowers some individuals to make decisions; it empowers them in such a way that,
without the capacity endowed by their position within a field or institution, they would
not have been able to carry out the relevant course” (Thompson, 1990, p. 151). So it
follows that while there are few who hold power there are many who are in a subordinate
position. Those in dominant positions can resort to different strategies in their interaction
with their subordinates, such as “Distinction,” “Derision,” and “Condescension.” And the
judges resort to all three of them. Both Judy and Manuel Franco set themselves apart
from the individuals or groups who occupy positions subordinate to them (and even if
this applies to both judges it does more clearly and intensely to Manuel Franco and the
way he distances himself from other Latinos). And they also resort to mockery, disdain,
and ridicule by regarding symbolic forms (of all kinds) produced by those below them as
brash, gauche, or simply, unrefined; I believe I have presented plenty of examples during
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this chapter that illustrate this strategy of derision. Finally, the strategy of condescension,
very much employed by the judges, putting down the participants and reminding them of
their subordinate position. This strategy, which translates into arrogance and aloofness,
enables those in dominant positions to reaffirm their dominance without openly declaring
it. Is it necessary to bring back some of the examples presented above to illustrate this
strategy? Let us simply remember Judy saying
“I´m much smarter than you are. On your BEST day you are not as
smart as I am on my worst day! ”

But even if these are common strategies which dominants apply one can still
wonder why. Why the need, for example, to resort to Derision and Condescension when
the judges are already endowed with the power to judge, when the Distinction comes
with the territory? If the law is what really matters, if justice really is what people who
participate in the program are looking for, then there must be some other reason, there
must be something else. What happens to justice when these strategies take precedence
over Justitia? As I have mentioned before, there is a lot of character reading (which
comes from social knowledge) in the shows. Both Judy and Manuel Franco can see
through things, and they can do so because they are not blindfolded. But also, they can do
so because Judy is not just Judy and Manuel Franco is not simply Manuel Franco. They
are part of a production process which endows them with extra power: the power to cut
and edit and make things look as they want them to be seen. So the participants in the
show are actually defenseless. As I will present in the following chapters, the groups I
interviewed point to the fact that the litigants are on their own, not having anyone to
represent and defend them. But that is only one way of seeing it. Because they are
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vulnerable regardless. Because the illusion of "liveness" hides the process by which
things take their "real" shape, the shape of the court.
What then? What kind of reaction and what kind of meanings do these particular
strategies elicit from the public in the gallery and by extension in the audiences watching
the shows? There is a connection between the judges and the reactions that arise from the
public present on the set, a sort of symbiosis: the people in the gallery always approve /
consent to what the judges have to say to the litigants. Their faces may hardly be seen,
but their celebratory laughter, their murmuring, their oohing and ahhing are a real entity.
Not to speak of the complicity between the judge and the bailiff and the comments made
by the interviewer at the end of the shows. But is that the celebration of justice? Or is it
the celebration of the legitimization of the imposition of power no matter what? Is it a
validation of the means? Is this the case when the end justifies the means? And we
celebrate it?
In the previous pages I have pointed out the fine line separating authority from
authoritarianism, a line that both judges (each one in their own style) cross too easily, too
comfortably, and too often. They are the tough hand that bangs the gavel and teaches
them (the claimants and the gallery) to behave, to look down, to accept. Yes, anything
they say or do will be (and is) used against them (and against us as well?). Maybe Justitia
has been stripped of the blindfold and the scale and has just been left with the sword, the
same sword of justice we see pointing to the sky in children's shows, in fictional
programs and games of all sorts. I cannot avoid thinking of Foucault; is this not a
disciplining power?
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All this brings me to my initial question, which is the basis of this research: does
all the aforementioned have the power to guide and determine the readings on the other
side of the screen? What happens when people actually sit in front of the TV set and turn
it on to watch these shows?
In her critique of the justice system, which I addressed at the beginning of this
chapter, Judy asserts that Justice has gone from blind to dumb… is that a fair statement?
Or is it the case that court shows have contributed to that depiction more than one could
expect and that court shows have taken the next step and we can now say that justice has
gone from dumb to dumber? In the following chapters I center the analysis on how actual
people read Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo.
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CHAPTER VII
PEOPLE WATCHING JUDGE JUDY

In the last two chapters (Court shows: An Invitation to Believe, and Order in the
Court), I centered my attention on Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo. I first looked into
the mechanisms that the shows use in order to shape and reinforce the idea of reality, and
afterwards I offered a more detailed analysis centered on the structure and the content of
the programs, which enabled me to grasp not only their similarities but also the
differences that set them apart. In the next chapters I will center the analysis on how
audiences (diverse groups from the Springfield area) read those shows, first regarding
Judge Judy and later, La Corte del Pueblo.
In this Chapter, then, I focus the analysis on how three different groups interpret
Judge Judy. Some of the issues that I will address in the following pages emerged from
broad and very open questions that I asked during the interviews, others were brought up
spontaneously by the interviewees during the discussion of the program they had just
seen. Briefly, the main topics that I will present and analyze refer to Judy the judge, the
participants, the interaction that takes place in the courtroom, and the notion of reality of
the program and the relationship the groups establish between this show and other
television programs. Finally, I will direct my attention to the meaning of entertainment
and how that relates to or affects the overall meaning assigned to the Judge Judy show.
As I have pointed out before, in Chapter IV (Methodology), I worked with groups
of people who already knew each other and conducted the interviews in places that were
familiar to them. Group 1 (or G. 1) was made up of three women and two men, aged 20
to 22, all Communication Majors from the University of Massachusetts; the interview
185

was held in a conference room in Machmer Hall. All seven members of Group 2 (G. 2),
aged 25 to 45, worked together in a business in Springfield, MA, with varied levels of
hierarchy and holding different positions: some worked in administration, others were
technicians, and others operated machinery. The interview took place on the company
grounds during their lunch hour. Group 3 (G. 3)was meant to be integrated by two
married couples but one could not attend and therefore the interview was held just with
Linda (51) and Daniel (54) in their home after dinner; Linda and Daniel run a small
family business.
The groups were exposed to two different Judge Judy episodes; in one (G. 1), a
young woman is suing her ex-boyfriend for an unpaid loan and a personal video, and in
that episode Judge Judy rules in favor of the plaintiff. In the second, a daycare provider is
suing a former client for abruptly terminating the contract and for the unpaid two week
notice (G. 2 and 3); the case is dismissed after the plaintiff openly challenges Judy (an
unusual event that happens sporadically).
A. What Have We Just Seen?
Once I met with the groups we watched one of Judge Judy’s episodes together
and then I posed a very open question. I asked them what they would tell someone who
asked them what they had just seen. The opening statements given by G. 1 and G. 2 have
a critical perspective of the show in common. In the first case it is seen not only as
something that cannot be trusted as real but also as ridiculous:

[Silence… laughter… silence…]
Ben: It’s a dramatized court- like setting
[…Silence…]
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Evan: Sort of, I don’t know, like a mock version, like… less serious than what you
actually see in a, like, court, like, setting …. ´Cause some of the expressions that
the judge has on her face and some things she says are kind of… like, not
something, like, a real judge would say [he laughs] in a court. And she’s kind of,
like, she looks like she’s gonna laugh or sometimes she’ll be like dead serious or
something like that, you know…
Jennifer: And she turns and talks to the officer [she laughs], no judge would turn and
talk to and… I think it’s really a mockery.
Michelle: I think it’s kind of a mockery of what a court is actually like.
Patrick takes the lead in opening the discussion in Group 2, and he does so with a
rather dry (almost as if disappointed) statement which right away divides their arguments
into two lines of thought, as we can see in their initial dialogue:
Patrick:…Of our public system today. Unfortunately they work like that sometimes.
David: It's a confrontational system, it's all about confrontation. Who's bigger and
badder on the day. Judge Judy's always winning -she likes it that way.
John: Yeah but I think it goes back to, you know, if it was your boss, now, would you
talk to your wife the same as your boss, would you talk to me the same as, you
know, as Ron? Would you talk to, I mean, you know what I’m saying? I mean it's
the same thing with Judge Judy. This woman [the plaintiff] is getting kinda
bitchy, she wants her...
Dan: It's a professional atmosphere...
John: Yes but, it's always a professional atmosphere, no? But that wasn't professional! I
mean, look at that woman [he refers to the plaintiff]. She's going off on it.
Dan: Yeah, but it doesn't matter, because she's supposed to be judging the law, not the
person's personality. It shouldn't matter what...
Susan: Yeah that's true, that's true.
From the very beginning in G. 2 we can observe two distinct positions about the
program. The two lines of argument could be summarized around the opposition between
Content over Form vs. Form over Content; in the former, facts prevail over how they are
presented and in the latter, behavior logically precedes the facts. We can see how Susan
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and Dan both defend the idea that what really matters when it comes to cases presented
before a judge should be something different than the way people act:
Dan: So no matter what, she [Judy] is supposed to...
Susan: Only because she [Judy] was mad at her[the plaintiff].
Dan: That's why she [the plaintiff] lost the case. That's why she lost the case.
Susan: She [Judy] was mad at the woman because the woman was standing up for
herself.
Dan: But still, the law is the law.
From a quite different point of view, there are those who take sides with Judy; in
addition to John’s remarks presented above, Mike and David reinforce the same idea:
Mike: But the woman brought it on herself with her attitude.
David: Yeah, because her presentation of her point of view was what screwed her,
because it pissed the judge off.
Susan: Because she's pissed off it means they can dismiss the case? They're there to be...
they're there for the law, they're not there...
David: But the law is something that can be interpreted, it's not something set in stone,
you can interpret it, that's why the laws always change. There's two points of
view, this one presented it badly this one presented it good, this one's going to
win.
In brief, on one side there is Susan (and Patrick, and Dan -although he alternates
between these two points of view during the interview) who argues that Judy is not
judging participants according to the law but on their personality; on the other we have
John (and in a more timid, less clear cut way David and Dan) who maintains Judy’s
ruling is acceptable; for John in particular there are norms that dictate our behavior in
specific circumstances and contexts, and those norms need to be followed and respected.
Linda and Daniel (G. 3) also consider the program to be Bona Fide, but they have
the closest or more accurate description of them all. This is their response to my initial
question:
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Linda: I would say it's a televised Small-Claims Court.
Daniel: I would talk about a particular case; the show's about a woman in child care, had
her kid there and then left, and they had a dispute.
Of the three groups this is the one with the most positive first impression of the
program, which can be interpreted not only by what they say but also by the way they say
it, by their tone of voice. To begin with, this is not just any type of court, this is a SmallClaims Court. But more interestingly, though, notice that in Linda’s account the word
televised is key; and televised can be taken as leaving aside or excluding the intervention
of a process of media production. Although it would be fair to say that she is drawing
attention to that fact, I would classify her expression within its denotative meaning: to
televise = to transmit (although I did not follow the idea during the interview and did not
ask her to elaborate further on that expression). And transmitting something is different
than producing something. Thus, I would suggest that to televise a court session is not the
same as to make a program about courts. And Daniel, even if he is referring to it as a
show, complements Linda’s idea by going straight to the facts.
As we can see there are varying perspectives regarding the program; not only in
terms of how to define what goes on behind the screen but also in terms of Judy’s
performance. Groups 1 and 2 present a more critical perspective, while G. 3 is more
neutral (and a bit more positive, too). The students in G. 1 could be said to take more
distance from the show and have a rather cynical attitude towards it; while G. 2 presents
two clearly distinguishable lines of argument (which will become more evident in the
following pages). These different starting points lead and influence, though do not
completely determine, how members of the groups position themselves regarding the
case and therefore, the way they interpret and value Judge Judy (the program). So I
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suggest we take a closer look at the reading the groups do on Judy, and on the shape of
the interaction in the court between Judge Judy and the litigants, the bailiff, and the
people in the gallery.
B. It Is All About Me… Is it Really?

Although reading Judy -the judge- may seem a very easy task at first sight, a
whole range of interpretations open up once we pay close attention to what people have
to say about her. There is nothing simple about her image; members of all three groups
agree on some aspects and differ on others; and even if they seem to agree on the way
they see her, the resulting meaning that emerges can be different due to varying
underlying lines of argument. In other words they can disagree even while agreeing or the
other way around, agree while disagreeing.
1. Judy: From the Bench to the Dock(Character Assessment is now on Judy)
Commentaries, observations, and remarks about Judy are scattered about all over
the interviews, at times people take her very seriously, other times they let themselves go
and laugh with her; her actions and her attitude sometimes trigger very opposite reactions
in the groups allowing some members to laugh at her while others might get very irritated
and annoyed. One thing is true, though, no one would describe her as a nice, considerate
or understanding judge.
Judy can be conceived as belligerent; tough and violent or hostile and comical;
snooty and aggressive; rude and disrespectful, a thunderous woman who can cut through
the BS (as some of them will put it); she is the kind of judge she claims to be, or is she
not? If we take Linda’s (G. 3) words, for example, Judy “is snooty, she can be aggressive,
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a little condescending, she goes a little overboard, but that’s her personality, what she’s
known for.” Notice that Linda’s but and little temper her characterization. The but sounds
almost as a justification; she is a little bit this and a little bit that, Judy is Judy, Judy is as
she is said to be, Judy is authentic. The description fits the slogan of the program “Judge
Judy, the no-nonsense judge.” Even if Linda will be more critical of Judy a moment later
(asserting “I’m not sure it’s so great for the legal process”), her husband, Daniel, will
erase any doubt: “in a fairly small amount of time she has to solve the problem, she has to
get to the point, and she does.” Their conversation smoothly moves on and Daniel is not
contradicted.
Group 1’s dynamic leads to different standpoints; Judy’s belligerence (in their
own words) sets off critical and yet diverse evaluations of the judge. Let’s see how the
dialogue evolves while they discuss the turn of events in the case they have just seen:
Ben: (…) I don’t think that Judy’s treatment was really that much effective. Because,
people don’t like that, I mean, I’m sorry, I don’t like that. It’s upsetting, but, when
she does that, she is making herself look tough but also, you know, violent. She is
a mean-spirited character right there. I mean, that sort of thing, I wouldn’t
encourage people to watch that … you know, for that reason, you know… and I
don’t watch shows like that because they are that … violent. I watch shows that
are tame.
Evan: Do you think that show is violent?
Ben: Yeah.
Evan: Do you guys think the show is violent?
Jennifer: It’s hostile. [Michelle nods]
Evan: It’s hostile, but I think it’s also comical too. I don’t think it’s violent. I don’t see it
as violent.
Jennifer: It’s hostile, because you can’t see her, like, being an actual mean, violent
person. She looks like this little … old woman, you know, and to have this
attitude come out of her is funny.
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So we have Judy as tough and violent on one side, and hostile but comical on the
other. The difference in perspective may be explained by where the arguments stand. The
first case, in which we can connect toughness + violence + mean-spiritedness, emerges
from reading Judy in relation to others (the litigants), something I will analyze in the next
section regarding the interaction that takes place during the court session. The second one
focuses more on Judy herself; it centers on the disparity between appearance and being.
Here we are in front of this woman, a little old woman, with all the meanings that can be
attached to it: sweet, defenseless, even vulnerable. And she is a woman who proves to be
the exact opposite: strong, tough, rude, with an attitude, and in charge. The two don’t
quite fit, the incongruity is fun.
The readings on Judy emerging from G. 2 are centered on her role as a judge. On
one hand, those who hold a more critical stand on Judy find her to be partial and
opinionated:
Susan: Because she's pissed off it means they can dismiss the case? They're there to be they're there for the law, they're not there...
Patrick: But Judge Judy had to throw in her opinion on everything, on how she, you
know...
And Judy is egocentric, and confrontational, and being a TV star plays a major
part in such a definition:
Patrick: That does pertain but the way she was pestering, she was definitely pressing
buttons to fire reactions, I mean it's on TV, so they're after ratings. (...) Well,
Judge Judy wasn't letting her finish and Judge Judy was pressing her buttons.
Roxanne: She pushed...
Dan: That's her job...
David: She's a TV star.
Dan: yeah, you know her ego's bigger.
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On the other hand, we have John taking Judy’s side; even if he does not reach the
point of holding a completely opposite reading to his fellow coworkers, he tends to focus
on the fact that one must know how to behave in particular circumstances. He is the one
consistently defending the idea that there are rules that govern our interactions and those
rules need to be respected. I wonder if the fact that he is the boss himself influenced his
position. That fact is that for him people must know where they stand, people should be
aware of their position and respect authority. John says at the very beginning of the
interview:
John: Yeah but I think it goes back to, you know, if it was your boss, now would you
talk to your wife the same as your boss, would you talk to me the same as, you
know, as Ron? Would you talk to, I mean, you know what I’m saying? I mean it's
the same thing with Judge Judy. This woman is getting kinda bitchy, she wants
her…”
And later on:
John: Would you yell at Judge Judy? You would have been very nice… Yeah, but the
whole time when she was asking the questions, you wouldn't have been rude.

Summing up, we have an array of partial readings regarding Judy: Judy the
person, Judy the character, Judy the TV star, Judy the authority. For instance, placing her
both as a judge and a TV star (in G. 2) in search of ratings alters the balance from other
accounts, like Linda and Daniel’s. In one case (G. 3) her job is being a judge, and she is
genuinely how she comes out from the screen; that’s her. In other cases, the conflict
between justice and television affects the outcome. Judy is provocative, disrespectful; she
pushes the responses, harasses, but is it just in order to get ratings? And to these two
versions we can add a third one, emerging from G. 1, which does not match either one
completely. The group is more cynical, and resolves the tension between the law and the
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show rather differently. But as I said, these are only partial readings. We need to move
along to get a better picture of what we could construe as Judy’s puzzle.
2. Judy: From the Law to Character Assessment. On Knowledge
Judge Judy is a court show. Such denomination (the genre's) directs our attention
to its two constituent terms: we have the court on one end and the show on the other. If
we follow this thread we can relate each one to different areas or domains which
consequently open new doors to analyze the phenomenon, like, for example, the types of
knowledge that are characteristic to one or the other, valuable sets of experience proper to
each one, different types of expectations they elicit, and so on. I would say that the
combination of these factors (knowledge, experience, and expectations) is another
important piece of Judy’s riddle. During the conversation with the three groups this facet
came about; with some it may have been in a more detailed manner and with others, more
tangential. And one way or the other what is involved in the moment Judy makes a
decision is another clue that helps unravel the skein where the meaning of the program
lies.
Thus, back to the College students. I have already introduced them as the most
cynical of the three groups. From the very beginning they have put Judge Judy in a pretty
specific place: “this is a mockery of what a court is really like,” sentences Michelle.
There are two particular moments during the interview when the group discusses these
matters: when dealing with what is to be learned from the program and later on when I
redirected the conversation towards their opinion about Judy’s skills and knowledge.
Michelle: Like she is making the judgment of being smart on the character assessment
that she is making about the defendants or… so she is, she’ll come to some
rational, legitimate reason for casting her rule, but, like it’s not, it seems like she
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is, because we are gonna get a sense of the characteristics and personalities from
both parties… of course, the bad guy is gonna have to pay, like, the way they are
portraying these two characters, the girl looked more in the right and the guy just
kind of … to be an idiot, you know? And so, it was so clear how it was gonna
go…
Elizabeth: And they just jump right to it, too. You know, it was all of a sudden, you
know, oh, he lied about it being a Christmas present, he lied about… so, all of a
sudden she gets the money. She didn’t even explain why.
[The rest of the people are agreeing to what Elizabeth is saying]
Elizabeth: There is no reasoning.
Michelle: There is no way around.
Jennifer: That’s definitely the way it works.
Evan: (…) Like the judge would have to be represented in such a way that you would
take it more seriously than just… reading on their faces and stuff.
Me: Would you say that she is very knowledgeable?
Elizabeth: I think that she is quick-witted.
Michelle: She…caught everything going on… what he was saying about… first money
for … and then for…
Elizabeth: I don’t know how knowledgeable she is about the law, because … about the
video it was the only time she said “I can’t do this,” you know, because of
whatever reason. She never said "the law says ta tata. And that’s what I’m basing
my judgment on because that’s what my job is” … you know, it really felt like her
personal judgment, not anything that has to do with the law. So, I don’t feel that
she is very knowledgeable.
Jennifer: Yeah, I think she bases her decisions more on … like the people that, they
smile, how people are presenting themselves… rather than the actual information
that they are presenting.
Me: And what about you? Is there any particular kind of knowledge that you see in
her?
Evan: She seems like knowledgeable, but at the same time it seems like rehearsed if
you’re watching. Everything seems to be supposed to come out in a certain way…
the questions are supposed to be like, blah, blah, and blah and they are supposed
to respond in a certain way.
Michelle: I think the point is that, like she’s supposed to come across as smart, that’s
their goal. And so, by being like Liz said, she’s quick-witted and she’s … that
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type of sharpness and keenness that we would observe as being somebody bright,
you know, smart. They can do that, you know, they can respond like that… you
can pass judgments on the situation, and she’s supposed to come across like that,
whether she is or not is completely… dependent on who’s answering that
question, you know? ´Cause we don’t even know whether this is real or not, so…
Group 2 focuses much of the discussion about the case they have been exposed to
in comparison to the other two groups. They discuss it in depth and the level of detail
they reach is surprising, not only in terms of remembering the dialogue, but also
remembering and bringing into consideration non-verbal aspects of the situation. As I
have pointed out before, there are two lines of thought in the group, one expresses a
negative view of Judy by pointing to the lack of reliance on facts and the law (Susan,
Roxanne, and Patrick), the other more centered on the situation in a more abstract way; in
other words, the expected respect for the rules that govern any interaction (John). And in
between there are those (David, Dan, and Mike) who go back and forth from one to the
other, at times supporting one of the perspectives and at times the other. Let me present
two very brief moments in which I redirected their conversation and they explicitly dealt
with the subject of knowledge:
Me: and what do you think about the way that Judy explains things?
Susan: Horrible.
Roxanne: She doesn't.
Dan: Because she wasn't even right, but she tried to explain it like she was, those
contracts you know, and even if the kids out they have to pay, and they haven't
had the two weeks’ notice, so technically that's in the contract, and it's just worded
differently, and Judge Judy was so determined to get this, she lied to say this, and
she probably knew it was a legal contract, you know, because the woman's
already.... You know it's in plain English right there, but she was just out to get
this woman.
And later on I intervened once again:
Me: So, do you think that she knows a lot about the law?
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Patrick: No.
David: Yes.
Dan: I think she knows about the law because she knows how to manipulate it.
Patrick: Well, she had to be educated, but she obviously doesn't know that much because
she just missed that and like any person watching it, if they thought about it,
caught it. You know, it's like...
Dan: Well she didn't really miss it, she just, was set in...
They all know Judy is a retired judge and they refer to her as Judge Judy most of
the time, there is, therefore, and implicit admission of her knowing the law (she had to be
educated, affirms Patrick); they also recognize she has been doing this job for a long time
and is experienced. The fact that she may be seen as biased does not mean she is not
considered knowledgeable. However, the problem lies in the fact that they perceive that
she does not rule according to the law; the problem, from their perspective, resides in the
fact that Judy is biased and judges more based on how the litigant presents herself than on
the facts that are brought before her and her putting up an act for the cameras (and the
ratings).
It is hard to find an explicit, direct comment from John about this particular
matter. It’s almost as if by taking Judy’s side he places his attention on the plaintiff, her
lack of ability to deal with the situation, her lack of control over her actions. And when
the other members of the group address the subject he simply remains quiet.
It wouldn’t be fair to say that the couple in G. 3 completely disregards the fact
that Judge Judy is a TV show. But when it comes to discussing the knowledge that is
present in the program they give her more credit than the rest of the groups.
Daniel: I don't think she explains that well. Um, I don't think that's her intent - her intent
is more to make a judgment, and I think that in many cases when people were
done probably, even if they lose, still feel like, you know, `I'm still right.' So
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you know, she's not a therapist, otherwise it could take years. Yeah, I don't
think she's into explaining too much, but I don't think that's a judge's job.
Linda: I think in this show, um, it sort of got carried away with all these interpersonal
things, so I don't think she explained that much, but, she explained to the
defendant, that uh, why it wasn't, she wasn't personal towards her and that she
was mandated, and so I thought that was, you know really important and she did
explain that, and I think the few other times I've seen it, I do think I remember
her explaining things, and that's sort of where you're learning stuff. And so I
feel like she does explain.

The previous dialogue works as a good example of how two people can reach
the same conclusion even when their underlying arguments can be almost contradictory.
What would the same conclusion be? Well, neither one is manifesting disconformities; on
the contrary, Daniel justifies Judy’s lack of explanations in terms of the expected role a
judge is supposed to play: to rule and solve a problem, not to explain. And Linda justifies
it as unusual.
At one point, we (G. 3 and I) talk about the way Judy sometimes deals with
people and some remarks she makes about her being smarter than they will ever be. This
is what Daniel has to say about it:
Daniel: I'm not surprised, I mean, I suspect that she probably is a retired judge, a real
judge, so she's probably pretty well educated, she's seen a lot, done a lot, and a
lot of these cases, the people, they're representing themselves, and they don't
know about the law, I mean it's kind of strange that she would say things like
that, but I can understand, in terms of the law, people don't know, and don't
have a broad perspective, and she does, but I think that's kind of unnecessary to
make statements like that. Antagonistic.
And during another moment of the conversation:
Daniel: She probably knows a lot about the law.
Linda: I would add human behavior. Just from dealing with the public. I'm not saying
she's empathetic or compassionate, but I think she knows a lot about human
reaction.
Me: Do you think she uses that knowledge in a particular way?
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Linda: Ummm, well I would suspect that she uses it, sort of, in her own decision-making
process about the cases, sort of you know, sizes people up, maybe gets a sense
of how they operate, and that's how she uses, but I don't think she uses it in
terms of sort of like good communication skills.
And a bit after:
Linda: I would just like to add... I have a feeling that if I watched this show regularly, I
might appreciate her a little more, because there's probably so much BS that she
has to, that she's faced with all the time, and there's something, although it can
get obnoxious, there is something refreshing about someone sort of cutting
through it all, and you know, cutting to the quick. She does it in a little bit of an
intense way, but getting rid of all the...
Daniel: It's hard, you really have to deal with a lot of he said she said.
In sum, even if there is a negative side they see in Judy that can be synthesized as
a combination of her having bad communication skills, and being condescending, and
intimidating, and even rude, that limitation is surpassed by the positive side they see in
her: she is knowledgeable about the law, plus she is knowledgeable about human
behavior, and she is experienced, and she can size people up, and she is credible, and she
has to deal with so much crap. And in the end she is “obnoxious yet refreshing.”
C. Inside the Courtroom. All Rise
We have finally made it to court. Judy comes in and the bailiff tells people to rise
and be quiet. Everyone is there, the plaintiff and the defendant, the people in the gallery,
the judge and the bailiff. The session begins. As I have mentioned before, each one of
these actors has a different degree of participation; for example, Judy interacts with the
litigants one at a time, and plaintiff and defendant are not to speak to each other. The
formal interplay between Judy and the bailiff is steady, they exchange greetings, he hands
her the file and informs her of the names of those involved; nevertheless, I have also
pointed out that there is an informal side of the relationship between them, a more
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complicit one: Judy sometimes asks him rhetorical questions regarding the case, or makes
remarks about the participants or their sayings, or simply makes faces and then the
camera pans to him answering her, and so on. The gallery at the back participates through
murmuring and laughter, one can sometimes see the expressions in their faces but they
never have a voice.
The fact is that there is a lot going on during the case; we have all sorts of stimuli
coming from the screen and not all viewers pay the same level of attention to them. One
aspect might trigger a whole set of comments in some while be completely ignored by
others. So let us take a look at what the groups have to say about the interaction in the
court.
1. On the Interaction
We are back in Machmer Hall. As I suggested before, there are two sides of the
genre's denomination: court and show, and our group of students (G. 1) manifests a
tendency towards the last part; i.e., the emphasis is apparently on the "show." If we could
take that as a given then it would be easier to understand the fact that they read, or take
the interaction more lightly than, for instance, G. 2. And in the process they laugh more,
they enjoy themselves more.
Evan: It’s like, …you can tell it looks kind of comical…even at the beginning, I don’t
know if anyone was paying attention, but like, I think it was the cop that handed
the judge the, the file, you could see like a smirk on his face.
Jennifer: I saw that!
Evan: It was like, goes after, like, he does, like here or whatever, and like, he turned
away and smiled and whatever, so that kind of gave it away, you know?
Elizabeth: Yes, it’s like he expects it to be funny, and he expects...
[Evan laughs]
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Elizabeth: And he expects to laugh at them.
Jennifer: [laughing] And she turns and talks to the officer! No judge would turn and talk
to and…
[All laugh]…
Later:
Ben: I thought it was … enjoyable and I know that I definitely smiled [the others
laugh]I think that it was just great, you know? The abuse in that… [they keep
laughing] ah… the tension, that she is reading people’s body motion so you think
you are learning something by watching it. You know, ah… she takes you through
the story, Judy, and she forces them to tell the story, you know. Like, ah, whether
they really want to or not.
[Brief silence…]
Jennifer: I think it’s crude, I think [Jennifer laughs and Evan laughs out loud] it
makes people look really bad and I mean, not only do they have to deal with …
the pressure of being in front of the judge but they also have to deal with the
pressure of… and it’s basically an audience there, laughing at you. I mean, that’s
a lot of pressure. I think that’s what they want…
And finally:
Elizabeth: (…) And I think that the way she talks to people is pretty self-serving for
herself, I mean (…) she also, saying "you are not as smart as I am on your best
day as I am on my worst day" she is making herself look very good to them, she is
intimidating them and I don’t think …
Michelle: I agree, she is putting them down… you know, and making them look bad…
[They laugh].
In the end it all seems to be about her, Judy, of course. The stage is set for Judy to
always be in the right, no matter what the participants have to say. The interaction they
witness would be inadmissible in a real court: no judge in a court would express him or
herself the way Judy does; no judge would talk, laugh, gesture, or make the faces she
makes. They are reading all the signs that lead to reinforcing their initial idea of a staged
court: “the smirk on his face,” “he turned away and smiled… he expects to laugh at

201

them,” “the audience there, laughing at them,” et cetera. The students decipher and
catalogue Judge Judy as a television show more than anything else. And they seem to
enjoy that sort of power game in which Judy is able to have them confess “she takes you
through the story, Judy, and she forces them to tell the story, you know. Like, ah, whether
they really want to or not,” even while acknowledging the abuse.
Group 2 shows a tendency to scrutinize; they seem to get more involved in the
situation. The case sets in motion all sorts of discourses that refer to their own personal
experiences in court, or at home, or at work. As I mentioned before, the group discusses
the case at length making it difficult to pick a specific moment in which they talk and
analyze the interaction that takes place between Judy and the claimants, without having to
reproduce very long dialogues. They go back to the details; they talk about the contract
that has brought plaintiff and defendant to court. They talk about the way Judy handled
the case and how she should have. The following are only a few bits and pieces of long
conversations, the back and forth about the case in particular and the program in general.
David: It's a confrontational system, it's all about confrontation. Who's bigger and badder
on the day. Judge Judy's always winning, she likes it that way.
Later:
Dan: Yeah I think that no matter what she says, you have to sit there and take it. Even
though, she will come after you and she'll say things that are meant to upset you,
get you going; make the show keep on going. I don't think she should be doing
that.
In another moment:
Roxanne: Yeah, you don't have to be demeaning to anybody.
Patrick: You're not out to make someone feel bad or anything, you're out to find the
facts, and the truth, and you're not supposed to fire people up like you want to.
Susan: How often do you go to court and the judge is rude? Like Judge Judy is? How
often? Really, how often does the judge use his power to…
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John: Three out of four times. I'm telling you I went three times, it was a divorce thing,
and then there was child custody. What happens is: somebody starts going off,
and it's like wait a second and that's what ended up happening, the judge said:
“Look, shut up, I've heard enough from you, shut up.”
Susan: Well, Judge Judy should have told her that, but she didn't, she kept arguing back
with her. She had told her, shut up or I'm going…
Roxanne: She said don't talk while I'm talking.
David: The next one was: "So?"
Susan: Like I said before, I think Judge Judy should have handled the case the way it was
supposed to be handled and then held her in contempt of court and fined her
however it goes. She could have fined her the same amount she got.
Dan: I think any judge would do that, what she did.
Roxanne: You think they would do that?

As I said, there are many moments when the group exchanges ideas about the
situation, for example, referring specifically to power and the excess of power, Susan
says: “It's ok for the judge to throw digs at her opinion but it's not ok for the client to do
it? “And John replies: “Yes but it's the way she did it [the plaintiff] you could see she
was getting against her...” It’s very difficult for this group to find a balance, equilibrium
in their perspectives. The scale tips to one side or the other: the interaction between the
judge and the plaintiff resembles in this particular case, but potentially in any other, a
ring in which one of the fighters is allowed to make any moves she/he wants and the
other one is subjected to very specific rules. There is Judy, with the power to be just,
equitable, considered and at the same time: wicked, arbitrary, sharp, caustic, and
provocative; and in the other corner is the litigant: who is to be submissive, respectful,
and obedient, always.
Meanwhile, at Linda and Daniel’s house (G. 3) the subject is addressed with a lot
less intensity, in a more detached way, mostly if compared to G. 2, Linda points to a
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negative aspect of the show: its energy. When asked to elaborate on what she means by
that, Linda refers to the tension involved in the situation, “I don’t need to bring all the
lawsuits and fighting and all the crazy suing into my life” and Daniel intervenes:
Daniel: I can relate to what Linda said, that makes sense, but I don't feel that way. It
wouldn't be my favorite show, but I didn't see anything I disliked - I kinda
actually liked it. I like, you know, I'm attracted to sort of, facts, I find that this
has that element, that you see two people... I like the way two people both think
that they're right, and you kind of, it kind of evolves, it doesn't happen that often
in real life, I wish it would happen more often, but it's like, political things, two
people, we say this we say that, and it kinda evolves and then it's interesting
how the judge sort of steers it one way and then all of a sudden you're like
"wow!"
Daniel: But it was interesting that she dismissed it. The plaintiff was so aggressive, it
was a dysfunctional situation, but other than that, it would have been interesting
to find out, oh, you know, yeah, you win because of this or something.
Linda: I think also, it's, as a viewer, it's pretty black and white, then you start to listen to
the questions that the judge asks, and you realize that it's a lot of grey area, and
it's not just what it seems to be and it's important to sort of gather all that other
information to get a real picture of what's going on.
Linda: I think she [Judy] was threatened by a bitchy woman [Laughs].She didn't know
what to do when she was on TV, she was embarrassed and had to get rid of her,
I think.

And later:
Daniel:… That woman! I mean that woman [referring to the plaintiff] did not know how
to act.
Linda: I can't believe people leave their children with that woman, that's the scary thing.
Scary [she laughs]. I can't imagine. But yeah, I think she plays it up a little bit,
and she's condescending and... The only thing that concerns me is I feel like she
has a style that could be intimidating, and you know, when you get intimidated
you can get anxious and then it throws the people off course and they're trying
to present their case. So in that way in terms of being really, um, fair, I think it
could not work out that well, those qualities. First of all you're on TV, that
makes you nervous, and then you have this woman, this thunderous woman, so
I'm not sure it's so great for the legal aspect.
Daniel: The show I guess is not live. But it's probably, it's almost like it's real time. She
has to be directed, because really in fairly small amount of time she has to have
it resolved, so she says: You, what's this? You know, and she kind of I mean...
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She can't allow people to take their time, people carry on and so, she's got to cut
to the quick. I think that works, and it makes it a decent TV program. It's
entertaining, and I think it's kinda cool the way she can do, you know...
Basically, though Linda and Daniel may not be of the exact same opinion, they
tend to express their differences in a non-confrontational manner. Linda warily is willing
to see both sides of Judy, the intimidating, worrying, tough side of the “thunderous
woman,” and the smart, knowledgeable judge who can see through things and make us
see the complexity lying behind the apparent white and black situations. Daniel is more
definite in his perspective: he stresses the positive side or what he believes is right and
gives little relevance to the negative aspects that are offered to him by Linda’s comments.
It seems like there is a degree of certainty he gets from the show: “you kinda wish, when
you have like a discussion or something or a disagreement, that someone, like God could
come down and say: -this is the way it is-, and it’s a little like that what this show is.”
2. Following the Rules, Following the Law
Anyone could say that if you play by the rules you follow the law, and from that
perspective, one could say that the two are indissolubly connected; in other words, you
cannot have one without the other. However, there are situations in which the rules and
the law are like parallel lines that can run side by side endlessly, simply because they
pertain to two different domains (they could eventually either separate, because they open
in opposite directions, or join at one point as an effect of perspective). In this case, the
connection needs to be worked, established. It would be something like the train tracks, if
the analogy is admitted: one rail would represent the law (governing facts) and the other
would be the interaction (governed by its rules), and sleepers are needed to keep them
together. The situation is clearer when rules and the law are the two sides of a coin, but
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what happens when the connection between the rails is hardly established or even
broken? Well, it could be argued (if one believes in the reality and truthfulness of Judge
Judy, the program) that participants of court shows are there because some rule (an
agreement, a settlement, or a contract) has not been obeyed by one of the parties. They
stand before a judge who will hear them, weigh whatever proof they have brought along
and judge according to the law. Keeping with the analogy: we would be trying to find the
spot where the rail has been broken and decide the course of action in order to fix it. Or is
it not? Well… that is when (another) conflict arises. A conflict for the audiences, I mean.
And as any conflict it can be resolved in many ways. Although the matter has already
come up in previous pages it seems worthy to stop, even if briefly, and take a closer look
at this particular point. We have agreed, then, that in this case we are looking
simultaneously at the two lines that run side by side: one is the line of rules that govern
the interaction in the room; the other is the line of the law that interprets and judges facts
and events.
Those who take the program more seriously are the ones who will become more
disappointed. And by seriousness I mean, here, the expectation that facts are what the
program should be about. And that applies to some members of G. 2 in particular, like
Roxanne, Susan, and Patrick: “Judy is judging according to participants, not according to
the law,” “the law is the law,” “what Judy should have done is to rule by the law, give
each other what they deserved according to the law, like Law and Order.” So Judy is
acting according to the position of power held by her, but instead of acting according to
the law, as she should have: “she just wanted to show her who was boss.” Thus there
occurs an inappropriate displacement from the legitimacy of exerting power inherent in
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the position of authority a judge holds, to the flagrant abuse of power applied over a
powerless individual who is seeking to end a dispute. And that is what is happening
before their eyes. Keeping with our analogy, the sleeper is missing.
They are, indeed, taking it very seriously, because, for them, the law is a serious
matter. Their co-workers, without leaving the law aside, once again put the accent on the
situation itself and how the relation of forces is to be played. Yes, Judy is tough, yes,
Judy overreacts sometimes, yes… but. Let’s see John’s point of view: “if it was your boss
(…) would you talk to me the same as, you know, Ron? You know what I’m saying?
This woman is getting kinda bitchy…” “but it’s the way she [plaintiff] did it!” “What do
you mean, crack? She [plaintiff] cracked when she first started!!” “But when she [Judy]
started mentioning that, it was the woman getting on Judge Judy, you know, she made the
ruling right.” “But if she was being nice”… then Judy would have been able to do her
job: apply the law (or would she not?). As we can see, in one case Judy is taken as
abusive and in the other she is quite rightly putting this frantic woman in her place. In
both cases the problem is in the sleepers; they seem to have been lost along the tracks, but
who’s to blame? In the first case it is Judy: she should be the one who put the woman in
place and rule according to the law (after all, she is the one in power); in the second, the
plaintiff, who didn’t know (for whatever reason) how to keep the sleeper in place
(because, after all, she has to recognize the authority, be respectful, and obey).
Little is to be added to this discussion from G. 3’s perspective.
Daniel: I think it's one component that I can get out of life, is that it's really decided, it's
not just two people... A he said she said kind of thing, and then all of a sudden
there's a judge who really decides something so there's kind of a definitive
perspective.
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Theirs is a more matter-of-fact interpretation: “the plaintiff was so aggressive, it
was a dysfunctional situation…” and Judy put an end to it. Let’s move on. No regrets, no
complaints, only one question remains: who would have won the case? “Other than that,
it would have been interesting to find out, you know, yeah, you win because of this or
something” (Daniel).
Daniel: So you thought she was going to win?
Linda: No, I didn't think she was going to win, but, um, I didn't think she was going to
win if the case kept going, but I could see where she... I thought she should've, I
mean I'm not 100% sure, but I was leaning towards, aside from her [laughs], I
was leaning towards the situation being that I thought she should win.
“She never said the law says…” is heard during the interview with G. 1. It could
have been said but it is not. Judy may find the way to make it seem like she is ruling
according to the law, but they know she is using her personal judgment, her talent for
character assessment to rule for one of the claimants:
Elizabeth … About the video it was the only time she said “I can’t do this,” you know,
because of whatever reason. She never said “the law says ta ta ta. And that’s what
I’m basing my judgment on because that’s what my job is” … you know, it really
felt like her personal judgment, not anything that has to do with the law…
Jennifer: Yeah, I think she bases her decisions more on … like the people that, they
smile, how people are presenting themselves… rather than the actual information.
Michelle: Like she is making the judgment of being smart on the character assessment
that she is making about the defendants or … so she is, she’ll come to some
rational, legitimate reason for casting her rule, but, like it’s not, it seems like she
is, because we are gonna get a sense of the characteristics and personalities from
both parties… of course, the bad guy is gonna have to pay, like, the way they are
portraying these two characters, the girl looked more in the right and the guy just
kind of … to be an idiot, you know? And so, it was so clear how it was gonna go.
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D. Case Number 342. Miss Moon suing Mrs. Sanchez, for Unpaid Services.
(Reading the Litigants)
Some aspects of the litigants have been dealt with already. When we think of the
interaction in the court they are obviously implicated. And when we talk about the
grounds for the ruling, since the decision impacts them, we include them. So I’ll address
this point taking into consideration only a few dimensions -for example, how the groups
think that litigants are selected and why they are willing to participate in these shows, and
how they are regarded (sympathy, identification, indifference). And, would they
participate in the program as claimants?
Of all three groups, number 1 is by far the most detached regarding the litigants;
and also the harshest. And if we read the word buffoons then we can be sure it is this
group referring to the claimants. Their opinions are rather consistent throughout the
interview. I have selected the following quotes from the many different times they refer
to this matter. Notice that the initial opinion they give about the participants is construed
as the result of the process of producing a television program; in other words, it is the
show that makes them look like..., it is Judy who makes them look like… Put differently,
Judge Judy makes them look like idiots, buffoons,
Jennifer: Make people look like idiots.
[then, in a different moment: ] I think it’s crude, I think [she laughs and Evan laughs
out loud] it makes people look really bad and I mean.
Michelle: That is actually entertaining watching these people look like, being portrayed
like buffoons basically.

But one thing is how people are portrayed and another how they actually are, or
maybe not?
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Michelle: …You can’t help think that these people are so foolish. But they put
themselves in that situation.
So after having talked about the litigants in a rather indirect way I specifically
asked them why they thought people would attend. No single answer pointed to solving a
problem as the main reason; one of them incidentally mentioned an interest other than
media related (“Money sometimes is more important to people than themselves, you
know? ”). And the rest go along with Michelle: “For the experience to be on TV,” and
everything else linked to it.
Evan: The experience of it all.
Michelle: To get a free night, you know, some big city… [laughs], everything paid for
you… for some people that’s like, luxurious, you know? This is a way to get that,
so they don’t care about … themselves.
Jennifer: And some people just don’t care about their dignity enough to… you know? A
free night on a town…
Michelle: Hey, look at me… this is great [smiling]
Evan: I think, may be, in some way, it is like typecasting with those, the real world in
Judge Judy because certain people like shows in for certain rules… That they
want to be showed, like, on the shows if you want somebody to be bitch you have
to find somebody who’s gonna be a bitch and both in the real world and Judge
Judy if you want somebody to be like the one who is seeking defense you have to
find the person who is really defensive and get the person who is aggressive...
So, let’s rewind: here we are, in front of these people who look like buffoons, and
stupid, and mean, and bad, and they put themselves in this situation willingly, and they
don’t care enough about themselves, and have no dignity. The conclusion as to the way
they are regarded comes very easily. As a matter of fact, the group shows no sympathy
(nor empathy) towards the participants. They simply cannot identify with them; on the
contrary, the image reflected on the screen makes them feel better about themselves. So
what is fun about it? [I shall address this matter later on in this chapter.]
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Elizabeth: Like we said that they look buffoon or something early, and you automatically
feel better about yourself because you say, wow, I’m not that stupid and... and
then... And I wouldn’t talk back to the judge like that so obviously I’m better than
these people, and I think there is a sense to that in watching.
Michelle: I… I think maybe that’s partially why people watch these shows, cause you
don’t have to watch and then get this overwhelming feeling of, you know, despair,
or sadness for any of these people, you know. They are just kind of funny and you
don’t take it seriously at all, you just kind of laugh at them… and I think it’s been
already said, that they kind of boost your own self esteem …

At the workplace (G. 2) things don’t sound or look the same. They are set in a
completely different mood. As we have already seen, the group faces the program from
another standpoint. Their focus can be on the law or the interaction; but either way, the
screen offers them a different scenario. The idea that comes up from their dialogues
carries the indisputable notion of authenticity; even if the participants could be thought to
be in the show looking for their minute of fame:
Roxanne: She wanted to be on TV.
(…)
David: It depends how much you want to be abused on national TV.
John: Well some people want their minute of fame, right?
Nevertheless that does not seem to be the most important reason. Indeed, that is
the only time they mention it during the two hours we spent together discussing the
program. The main reason for people to attend the show is quite simple and David points
it out very clearly:
David: She [Judy] takes her position of authority and makes it a joke. People are
supposed to respect the judges and ask their opinion. That's the whole point of
going there, we have a problem we can't solve. Can you solve it for us? She takes
that power and…
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So why refer to authenticity? Well, it is because of the way they talk about the
plaintiff, and the case, and the contract, and the daycare center: “But she had a daycare
according to the rules of her State...;” “that woman had to do her job, that was part of her
job, because if that child was abused, and it bounced back to her, she could've lost her
job, her license, and she could have been sued with the State...”. And because Patrick
says it repeatedly: “Everyone handles stress differently. (…) but like I said, different
people handle stress differently, and Judge Judy was just pressing her buttons.”
And the fact that the cases are chosen following television criteria far from
contradicting the argument it actually reinforces it. So how are they chosen according to
the group?
John: Now do you think, now this is... this kind of a case, it's kinda like what we would
think is an open and shut: she didn't pay, she was supposed to pay. Do you think
that they interviewed this woman to see if she was hostile? I mean, I don't know,
it's...
Patrick: What's the point of putting dull people on TV?
John: ´Cause that other woman was pretty dull to a point, she just sat there.
Patrick: I know, but they do psychological profiles to find people to be on these shows.
The whole truth, nothing but the truth… Hence, when it’s time to weigh up the
participants and judge them the definition of the situation puts the group in another
position compared to G. 1. Yes, they are willing to participate on the program; yes, they
waive their right to go to a court (“The legality doesn't mean anything, she signed off... It
says it right there that they'll take whatever she says, you know,” asserts John). But they
are there seeking justice, not to be belittled (not even in exchange for fame or money);
and that prevents them (the members of the group) from laughing really out loud at them,
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although a laugh is allowed: “David: Would you really want to be remembered as that
stupid bitch who pissed off Judge Judy, got her thing thrown out? [laughter]”
E. From the Justice System to Television.
1. So, is it True?
In previous chapters I addressed the notion of reality and analyzed the way in
which the reality effect is created by the producers of the program. Other than the specific
language that refers to verbal expressions characteristic of a court setting (“All rise,”
“case xxx, X suing Y for xxx,” etc.), the information about the opponents (their name,
age, profession), and the proof offered which we access through close camera shooting, I
referred to the many signs and symbols that add to the construction of the reality effect;
e.g., the bench, the gallery, the flags on each side of the bench, the gavel, the gown, the
bailiff. In short, I have pointed to the resemblance between the set and other courtrooms
we all may have access to, either real life courts or through the media, be it, the news,
fictional television programs or other similar shows, etc.
During the interview with the groups their own experience in court was brought
up. In G. 1, Jennifer and Ben had been in court for some class assignment; in addition,
another member of the group claimed to have had an experience in court but didn’t offer
any further details about the situation. The same thing happened with group 2, and 3. In
the former, three of the men commented on their personal experience while discussing
the program and comparing it with real court: John, who attended divorce court; Patrick
who claimed to have been wrongly arrested and having had to go to court (his case was
dismissed), and Mike, for contesting traffic tickets. And last, Linda and Daniel seem to
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have been to Small-Claims Court many years ago, when they were younger, but have no
clear recollection about that moment.
Most members of the groups would agree on the fact that the place where the
show is recorded very much resembles a real court; except for one college student who
says “I feel like I could have pushed over just about everything in that room with, like, a
touch of my finger. I mean, it looked like a set… you know? [laughs].” But as I said, she
is the exception.
Let’s begin with Linda and Daniel. Bear in mind they were the only ones to define
Judge Judy as a televised Small-Claims Court right from the start; however, neither of
them refers to any specific formal aspect of the program that could lead them to such a
definition. Yet watching the show triggers Daniel’s memory of an experience he had in
Small Claims Court a long time ago, when he was still a College student; and then Linda
tells another experience of hers. So when I ask them explicitly whether they believe it to
be authentic they say:
Linda: Well I feel like, the cases are real, and I feel that... I guess I don't feel that um, the
decisions are really necessarily real, I don't know, but I guess they are. (…) I
mean the decisions do hold up, right?
Daniel: Yeah, I think it's real, but I guess I base that on, sort of, just general knowledge,
I've never read it was not real, like professional wrestling. I haven't heard to the
contrary, so I assume it's real, I guess. You know at one time, that, my nephew
was on a show, this show or a similar show, someone presented a case and
someone won, and he got a modest amount of money
So there was the answer! They have direct knowledge of someone(none other
than a family member!) having attended a show and solved a real problem. So, let’s
recapitulate: they have both had an experience in court; they have never read any
information that would cast a shadow of doubt about the authenticity of the program, and
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know of someone who has been on a similar show… there is no need to go back to many
details to justify what they know for sure and thus can take for granted. So it is real and:
Linda: It's not that big a deal.
Daniel: Yeah, it's kind… it’s not a murder trial or a big money thing, it's just two people,
you know (…) like it's not a real big legal type show. It's kinda… silly. Like
traffic court, I guess. And again, it's like I haven't been to traffic court.
[Laughs].
Linda: [Laughs]

I have mentioned once too many times perhaps that G.2 is the one that talks
more, and more seriously about the case brought before Judy than the other two groups
do. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid too much repetition I will be brief regarding this
point. The group takes Judge Judy to be true. For them the set looks like a real court and
they acknowledge the fact that Judy is a retired judge. They compare the show with their
experiences in court and with other television programs. Thus the notion or reality of the
program can be thought to be the result of the amalgamation between the scenario, the
participants (whose situation and personality they discuss), their knowledge of Judy, and
their previous experience in court which they openly share with the rest in an attempt to
strengthen their arguments. And almost at the end of the interview Dan offers extra
information adding credibility to the show:
Dan: My sister was actually asked to go on Judge Judy. She was suing her ex-boyfriend,
because they were living together. I'll make this quick, they were living together
at his house and she bought probably like $5000 worth of plants, shrubs, …
David: That sounds like a Judge Judy case, totally pointless and stupid - they're freakin´
plants!
[Laughter]
Dan: That's just something, a crazy kind of situation, she wants her plants.
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They seem to be are aware of the editing process and how that may affect what
they watch:
Mike: That case could be a lot longer, and they could just bleep out the good parts and
just left the remainder to look that way.
Nevertheless, the awareness doesn’t override their belief. And neither do their
unfulfilled expectations; for instance, the lack of lawyers in the court representing the
litigants (and the difference that would make), or the lack of seriousness coming from
Judy with her remarks and gesturing.
On university grounds we have another picture. For them too, the setting looks
like a real court (with the exception mentioned above):
Evan: Yeah, actually, on the show that … totally agree with what the courtroom looks
like, for what I saw, from going there. It looks like a courtroom, yeah; it looks like
in real life!

But allow me to present a set of oppositions that account for the main differences
the group observes between a real court in contrast to Judge Judy. The first term refers to
the real court; the slash (/) marks the boundary, the opposition, and the second term, what
they see in the program:
Formal / Unconventional
Raw / Edited
Defended / Alone
Authentic/ Reenactment
The first pair affects the interaction as a whole. In this case, I point to the level of
seriousness perceived in both situations; while in Real Court the judge’s standard
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behavior is strict and ceremonial, as is everyone else’s, Judy is rather loose, making
remarks, chatting with the bailiff, yelling at participants, laughing at them.
Jennifer: And the way she talks, I mean, in a real courtroom, there would be absolutely
no laughing going on, and you cannot speak. Once the judge, like comes in and is
sitting and… you know, you are not allowed to speak unless you are being called
up to the stand. So, if there was laughter going on, I mean, they have people, like,
walking around telling, in the real courtroom, telling people to be quiet if they are
actually talking.
The second pair (Raw/Edited) points to the spontaneity of the situation. In one
case things happen in real time, directly; one can have a real sense of what is happening
in front of us. In the other the editing process affects what we see; it’s a shoot, cut and
paste situation, things may or may not have happened the way they seem.
Jennifer: There are certain parts… where you will see his face [the defendant’s] and he’s
like almost smiling. But he could have been almost smiling or laughing at
something totally different, not what the judge just said or what she was about to
say or what the girl said…
Defended/Alone: In a real court litigants are represented by lawyers (according to
our students even often in Small-Claims Courts) thus ensuring the legal process; in Judge
Judy participants are on their own and frequently helpless and defenseless in the face of
Judy’s aggressiveness.
Evan: Because they are both being represented by no one, there is no lawyer up there
representing either one of them, you are watching, you know, this is like… a
mock version.

The dyad Authentic / Reenactment alludes to the cases and how they are
presented. The facts presented before a judge in a real court refer to real circumstances
(past or present) and plaintiff and defendant are who they claim to be. In Judy’s court, on
the other hand, cases may be made up, or set up to fit the show, or have happened but are
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reenacted for the audiences (and even participants, who are not believed to be actors, may
well be people willing to present someone else’s case).
Ben: Cases are manufactured.
Evan: I think it was, there was a screen play, I think they have set up cases to like be on
the show, like…
Jennifer: Or maybe they … may be they did happen, but they happened beforehand and
it’s just a reenactment of something that had already occurred.

These are, from my point of view, the salient differences this group finds between
a Real Court and Judge Judy; nevertheless, the list could continue including details that
would add little to our focus of attention.
2. So, What Have We Learned?
Well, it doesn’t look like G. 1 has learned much about the law. As could be
expected, from the explicit question posed during the interview, the answer can be
summed up shortly and directly: nothing. And not because they have failed to learn but
because nothing has been taught.
Ben: Money, money… Not to shuffle [alluding to what Judy has said to the
defendant…they laugh]
Michelle: Of course, the bad guy is gonna have to pay, like, the way they are portraying
these two characters, the girl looked more in the right and the guy just kind of …
to be an idiot, you know? And so, it was so clear how it was gonna go.
Elizabeth: And they just jump right to it, too. You know, it was all of a sudden, you
know, oh, he lied about it being a Christmas present, he lied about… so, all of a
sudden she gets the money. She didn’t even explain why.
Elizabeth: There is no reasoning.
Michelle: There is no way around.
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In the end, for them, it all comes down to entertainment (and behind mere
entertainment lies the common idea of emptiness, meaninglessness.) Their only concern,
though, is what we could refer to as: the third person effect (nothing unusual when people
are talking about television, even if they are communication students):
Jennifer: And I wonder if people who watch the show and who’ve never been in court
before, and then who go into court if they expect it to be, you know, like less
serious than what it really is…

Group 2 was torn between the law and the rules of interaction. And it has been
made clear already that those who weigh up the program in terms of what it should be
(i.e., facts and the law) disapprove of Judy’s ruling. Does it mean that nothing can be
learned or nothing has been taught? Well, no. Here is the moment in which the other side
of the scale plays a major role.
Patrick: It's like speeding tickets, you know? They don't even have me on radar, and
they're still determined to give me a ticket.
John: Are you yelling at the guy?
Patrick: No.
John: Well… you learned that, didn't you?
Patrick: Yeah, when I was sixteen.
John: Would you yell at Judge Judy?!
The lesson may have been taught but not necessarily learned! We can say that
after taking a look at Patrick’s resistance to accept John’s point.
Patrick: Yeah, but if she started!
Roxanne: She pushed...
So later on I asked them directly: Do you think that people learn something from
this program? And again they went back to the rules:
Dan: Not to go on Judge Judy!! [laugh]
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John: It's like Pat, you know we're talking about this, if somebody watched the show,
you know, this woman should've watched some of these shows, and said look, be
nice to this woman, tell her what she wants to hear and have our information here,
not that she'd have that information.... But you know, she would have gotten her
point across, you could see that there was that hostility between them.

I’ll close this section with Linda and Daniel purposely because their view is
different than the other two. Yes, says Daniel to my question. The couple discusses the
case and goes on to elaborate on whether there should be a 3rd party included, among
other things. The program facilitates their exchange of ideas and Linda remarks that Judy
is able to show the complexity of a situation that first comes to them (viewers) as simple,
like a “black and white” situation. Judy disentangles the problem and finds what lies
behind appearances.
Daniel: …But you look into it, you see different perspectives, and if you do your
research you can reveal things that are in your favor, and that's kinda the way you
know [laughs], that's kinda the way the world works. You may not be right, but
you reveal things that are in your favor you may get a good judgment.
So he feels that he is learning a bit more about how the system works and
therefore how to take advantage of it. Then they continue to discuss how the case might
have ended if Judy hadn’t dismissed it. Linda argues for the plaintiff; if Judy hadn’t
dismissed the case she is pretty sure the plaintiff had a good case and concludes:
Linda: I think in this show, um, it sort of got carried away with all these interpersonal
things, so I don't think she explained that much, but, she explained to the
defendant, that uh, why it wasn't, she wasn't personal towards her and that she
was mandated, and so I thought that was, you know, really important and she
did explain that. And I think, the few other times I've seen it, I do think I
remember her explaining things, and that's sort of where you're learning stuff.
And so I feel like she does explain.
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F. It’s Show Time
No matter how the groups read the program, regardless of where they put the
accent, one thing is common to all: Judge Judy can be fun; it can be entertaining; it can
make you laugh. But we know that language can be tricky and words have more than one
meaning, so our next task -and the last one for this chapter- will be to try to disentangle
what hides behind their smiles. For that purpose I will take into consideration two issues;
in the first I analyze the way in which the groups connect Judge Judy to other television
programs, and from that point I proceed to examine the source of entertainment the
interviewees find in the show.
1. If I Say Court Show, What Comes to Mind?
One door that can lead us to understand this last point is the connections that our
interviewees make between Judge Judy and other television programs. I have already
analyzed the importance of genre in a previous chapter. Following different semiotic
perspectives I have pointed to the fact that genre plays a significant role in helping
audiences position themselves regarding any given program; it somehow molds their
expectations, gives the first indication to set the process of meaning-making in motion.
And these groups, these audiences, spontaneously and voluntarily actualize the
connection to familiar programs in order to respond to my questions or to explain
themselves while discussing the show and trying to make a point. They offer analogies;
make associations; give examples from other programs that help express their ideas. The
same way they brought their life experiences to interpret the program they brought what
they choose to watch or avoid, as well as what they like and dislike from the television
world.
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During the discussion held with G. 2, spontaneous references to other television
programs were made twice. In both cases the allusion had to do with the process of
justice. First, when they were discussing in particular how Judy had managed the
situation with the plaintiff, a young woman who obviously could not or would not act
according to the situation and ended up challenging overtly Judy’s authority.
Susan: I think Judge Judy fined her for flapping her mouth, and took care of the case,
and if that woman deserved her two weeks’ severance pay, she gets her two
weeks’ severance pay and her sick time and she also gets fined for flapping her
mouth.
Roxanne: Law & Order, when they yell at the judge, the judge bangs his hammer, and
boom, that lawyer there, the public defender whatever he's called, he's in the
slammer there. Contempt of court, and that's what that woman should have gotten.

However, that specific aspect was immediately rearranged in light of a problem
they perceive to be bigger and more serious: the media's (or more precisely television's)
representation of justice.
David: It's not a professional representation of the court system.
Patrick: No, but this is what everybody sees of court systems, because it's all over TV.
David: Every time the court's on TV it's made out to be huge.

And that is when the O. J. Simpson trial comes to the fore:
David: Well look at the O.J. Simpson trial, it's the same thing, just on a bigger scale.
They made this stupid little trial that should've been small and short, into this huge
saga.
Patrick: They spent a year proving the DNA, they had to give a college course to the ...
Roxanne: No matter if it was a short trial or a long trial, he would've been found
innocent... he had the lawyers to pay for it.
Patrick: Well if you look at the information he was guilty, but they just spent so much
time educating the jury.
Mike: There was a lot of things that the jury didn't hear, that we heard, it's the same thing
they said after the trial - if we knew what you knew, we would have said guilty.
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David: But, what we knew wasn't admissible in court, because of the way they got it.
Two rather different sets of references, on one side we have fictional television
(Law & Order) providing knowledge about legal procedures and offering the required
tools to pass judgment on Judy’s rulings (or on any legal related matter). On the other
hand, Judge Judy is matched with the O.J. Simpson trial: television subdues the Legal
System to its own laws and voids it of its real purpose, roots out its essence and makes it
into yet another television show. And nonetheless, look at all they’ve learned from it, it
was television that made all that saga but it was television that allowed them to know
more about the case than the jury itself; it may sound contradictory, and it may well be. A
moment later I went back to the subject and asked them if they perceived any relations or
similarities between Judge Judy and other TV programs. Susan turns again to Law &
Order; the contrast between the police drama and Judge Judy is made evident. Her
fictional show is more to be trusted than the reality show. It may be fiction but it is
accurate. Others include Judy in another paradigm, the realm of reality television. Direct
TV, Reality TV, Judge Judy or Jerry Springer, or Jack Ass, they all have one thing in
common: human stupidity, always building on it and making one wonder what they are
going to do next; and even if the comments are acid and sarcastic there is a smirk on their
faces. Because, as Mike suggests: “I watched a show like this in Texas, but it was in real
court, they had different judges every day, and it was like, very boring, it was like the real
court system, so nobody wants to watch that.”
The students in G.1consistentlyrefer to reality shows; Ben specifically compares
Judge Judy with Judge Wapner, a program he vaguely remembers seeing when he was a
child, “but he was serious”; that he remembers. In comparison, for Ben, Judy is punchy,
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and jokey. And she has this unexpected and fresh side to her: she breaks some
stereotypes, like having a woman in charge of a court, and a woman who can be tough
and aggressive.
The women in the group manifested a connection with other reality shows that are
on the air. I have to say, it surprised me, it hadn’t occurred to me, all the time that I had
been watching Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo, and all the other court shows, that
these other shows could play a part in the discussion. These programs share in common
with Judge Judy not the legal side of things, but the exposing of private matters to the
public eye. The Baby Story, the Wedding Story, Trading Places… The analogy offered by
Elizabeth as a critique of reality shows is taken and contradicted by the other two women.
While Liz unsuccessfully tries to make sense of why people would want to open up their
lives for everyone to see, Jennifer and Michelle cling to a very conservative romantic
discourse:
Michelle: But I think the Wedding Story and the Babies are more accurate because they
are choosing to do it, because they want to show, you know, the emotion behind
it, and the love in it… while this [Judge Judy] is just like distasteful…
Jennifer: I think that another thing… they get, this is something that they get. I think
they feel like this is also kind of for... educational purposes… those programs are
kind of more educational, in a way,… and these people get to hold on to these
videos for ever. They get their Wedding or their Babies’ birth, you know, it’s kind
of, a very precious moment in people’s lives … and this is something people will
always have… so it’s, it’s not tasteless.

It all ends up being a matter of taste?! What interests me here is the discursive
resources, the intertextual reserve they resort to when in need to argue an idea. Elizabeth
relies on her academic knowledge, on what she knows about the process of making
television:
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Elizabeth: I think the motives are kind of the same, though. Like, it’s more tasteful but
people at T.L.C can edit a Baby story or a Wedding story in the same way that
these people edit a court case…
And her perspective is finally backed up by Ben, who near the end expresses [note
aside, the two men didn’t intervene in this conversation until the subject was reaching the
end]:
Ben: It’s like a fairytale, right? It’s realistic but it’s not real, it’s entirely constructed, you
think it’s a documentary, but the only reason you think it’s a documentary is
because they don’t have any writers, they have producers, but they don’t have,
you know, somebody going … oh look, she says blah blahblah…
One last comparison was made between Judge Judy and other television shows:
the relation with mystery programs. In both cases there is the solving of a problem (a
crime in one, and a minor conflict in the other); in just one episode one has access to the
complete plot: the beginning, the problem, and the solution. The relation with fictional
shows (such as the case of Law and Order in G. 1) was not made by them. When I asked
their opinion they suggested that they could actually learn about the law from a serious
drama. “I just don´t ever associate, you know,” utters one of them while the others agree.
Linda (G. 3) goes back and forth between a wary positive image of the program
and an intermittent slightly negative side to it. There is too much drama and a lot of
energy in the program; “Umm, just kind of a tense, uh, you know, sort of the good and
evil of the world, and the tension, and you know.” However, she is also able to see
another side of the program: “I would almost describe it as a cross between a soap opera
and a sporting event. It's got teams, who you're rooting for, if your team wins you're
happy, you know, you kind of get into that [laughs].” And a moment later she and Daniel
chat about other shows:
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Daniel: I don't see a strong relationship with anything, but at one point I thought of game
shows.
Linda: Actually I did too. I like game shows.
Daniel: The people are contestants, Judge Judy is the host. And then the people do the
things they're supposed to do and Judge Judy.... And then someone wins and
someone loses, and someone gets money.
Linda: Well, before I was saying, it's a cross between game show, sporting event and a
soap opera. The drama, which side are you on, who you're for, you get kinda in
that same state. And then the game show aspect...
Daniel: I find this was so hokey, that it seems to me that no other show could get away
with this...
Thus, lay back and relax; it’s time to pick our team and enjoy the game.
2. The Game is on. It’s Time to Have Fun
(The Law vs. Entertainment)

In the previous section I analyzed how each group classifies Judge Judy, and the
differences that emerge between and within the groups. I will now focus on the moments
of laughter, on what is considered funny, on what seems to be enjoyable (or not).
Machmer Hall on a cold sunny Friday afternoon; walking down the hallway
people can hear the laughing coming from the conference room. The interview is over
and the students are chatting and getting ready to go back to their dorms; the day is over.
I have transcribed the interview and am reliving the moment. Their voices, their tones,
their smiles are now captured in black and white. I read over and over again, go back to
the details; I don’t want to miss anything (even knowing that that is impossible).I take
notes, scratch the interview, write in the margins, and write again. I have classified the
group as the most cynical of the three; these communication majors bring their academic
knowledge to decipher the show: they are aware of the editing process and point it out;
they elaborate theories around the participants and how they make it to the show; they
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know how producers work, they know (“because we are comm. majors”) that things can
be interpreted differently. And now it’s my time to decipher them, decipher their
laughter, their sense of entertainment, and it is not all that simple. For a moment I feel
trapped in this long chain of meanings: Judy reading characters, groups reading Judy, me
reading groups… the endless semiotic process crystallized in front of me.
Judge Judy is funny, let’s also remember, distasteful (compared to Baby or
Wedding shows). Ok, so Judy makes faces, and talks with the bailiff, and the bailiff
laughs, and Judy laughs and she overreacts. And people stand there, and they are being
serious (Jennifer: “And the little snippets she comes up with, you know, like… the girl
asks if she can speak and then the judge says no, and then the girl says thanks to the judge
for not letting her speak! [Laughs]”) and all that gives the show away; come on, you
can’t take this seriously! They are laughing, why not me? Ok, argument accepted, so let’s
take a look and see who the students in G.1 laugh with and who they laugh at; because,
after all, it does make a difference.
Evan: I think it’s like, more entertainment value than anything else (…) You know, this
is like, comical, (…) like some of the topics, like, they were discussing, you, like,
you wouldn’t have anything like that in a real courtroom.(…) the faces, when she
talks… you ah, this can’t be taken seriously. Just by looking at her [Judy].
Michelle: That is actually entertaining watching these people look like, being portrayed
like buffoons basically, and you know, it just hooks you. (…) you can’t help think
that these people are so foolish.
Jennifer: Right
Michelle: So it’s funny in that sense.

I would argue that their tendency, odd as it might seem, is to band together with
Judy. In the battle between Judy and the claimants they choose sides with the powerful
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one; i.e., Judy. The participants in the show, as we can see from the quotes above, are
buffoons, stupid, shallow, care little about themselves, and have no dignity. And
ultimately, as Elizabeth would say while the others laugh: “You feel like, automatically,
like we said that they look buffoons or something, early, and you automatically feel better
about yourself because you say, wow, I’m not that stupid…”
Even though people in Group 2 laughed during the interview and also with the
program, their standpoint regarding entertainment is rather different, perhaps because in
this case entertainment acts as opposed to justice (or the law). All along the interview
situation, members of the group reinforced the idea of people attending this kind of
program in search of a solution to a problem. That is, according to them, what Judge Judy
and such programs should be about. So reaching the conclusion that the program is
nothing but entertainment is a disappointing conclusion. Of course there are
contradictions in their arguments; if the program got really serious and looked like the
show in Texas that Mike narrated during the group discussion it would be boring and
nobody (including them) would watch. But, is it intrinsically impossible to be
entertaining and serious at the same time? It all depends what it is that entertains us and
what is it that it is entertaining us from. In other words, entertainment can make us laugh
and forget or make us think (a point that I will address in the conclusions of this work).
For the time being, I will present the set of oppositions that synthesize this group’s
perspective on the difference between the law and entertainment. The law is the result of
the coupling of impartiality + facts + search for justice + boredom; while entertainment
entails: arbitrariness + behavior + character assessment + (not always) amusement.
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(Notice that such a distinction is appropriate for this particular context and is not intended
to mean a steady and fixed sense of the terms.)
Linda and Daniel are relaxed; the program we have watched together has felt
amusing to them. It’s the real life emotion, the real life situation, the very assertive
woman that entertains them. It's been like watching a sporting event or a game show and
Judy has been a good referee making the right calls; one of the players made a bad move
and lost, what a shame, it was their favorite. A real shame, they were almost certain she
had all that it takes to win the match. I leave the house, they turn off the lights. The show
is over, it’s time to go to bed.
In the next Chapter I will present the analysis on how Latino groups read La Corte
del Pueblo. I will follow a similar structure as I have in this chapter; however, and
because there are some peculiarities, as you will see, I am obliged to take some different
paths.
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CHAPTER VIII
DON MANUEL. AUDIENCES READING LA CORTE DEL PUEBLO

In the previous chapter I analyzed the way Judge Judy is interpreted by audiences.
In the present chapter I will address how Latino audiences read La Corte del Pueblo. I
interviewed three groups of people30. The first, known from now on as Group 4 (or G. 4
following the sequence of the previous chapter) was comprised of ten women and one
man, aged 22 to 58. All members of the group worked for a Non-Profit Organization
based in Springfield, Massachusetts (New North Citizen’s Council). The interview was
held at their workplace. I met with three graduate students from Colombia (Group 5) at
the University of Massachusetts campus: Erika (female, 28) and Farid (male, 34), who
had a background in law, and Yamile (female, 26). The last group (G. 6) was made up of
four women aged 36 to 41 who knew each other from Casa Latina in Northampton, MA.
I met with them at Urdaliz’s house on a weekday evening (for a full description of the
groups see Chapter IV, Methodology).
Following the same structure I used when discussing Judge Judy with the groups,
I showed two different episodes of the program, La Corte del Pueblo, to trigger the
discussion with the interviewees. In one, a father of eight children is being sued by a
younger man for a medical bill; the plaintiff argues that one of the defendant’s children
had dropped garbage on a beach road and had made him fall while roller skating. In the
other case, a man is suing a former friend for ruining the back seat of his car while having
sex with his girlfriend.

30

All three interviews were in Spanish. I have translated the quotes; since members of the groups
sometimes relied on English expressions I will show them in Italics.
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In the next pages I will follow a similar structure to Chapter VII. I will address
how the program is characterized at the very beginning of the groups’ discussion. Then I
will present the way in which Judge Manuel Franco is seen and evaluated by the
members of the groups; how they see and interpret the interaction that evolves during the
case they are shown, their view of the participants, the comparison between the program
and real courts, and the connection they establish between La Corte del Pueblo and
different television programs. Finally, I will address the subject of laughter and
entertainment. There is, though, an underlying identity matter that runs through the
interviews and which, with hardly any doubt, affects each one of the aspects that were
discussed with the groups and the reading of the program as a whole; and this topic, too,
will be addressed in the present chapter.
A. What Would You Say?
After I met with the groups and set the connection to the television set we
watched one episode of La Corte del Pueblo. As I did with the people who were exposed
to Judge Judy, I asked members of these groups to tell me how they would describe what
they had just seen to other people. The following are the first quick responses given by
some members of Group 4:
“About disputes.”
“For solving problems.”
“As a last alternative people find to try to resolve something, and sometimes it gets even
more complicated… but they try to settle it there. ”

As can be seen, they point to the subject matter; the initial description given by
this group refers specifically to the necessity of resolving a dispute.
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Even if members of Group 5stress the genre, their first definition is not far from
the one offered by G. 4:
Farid: It’s a Reality show about… in which there is a judge deciding cases.
Yamile: They are people who are not capable of making a decision and have problems
and that’s why they need to rely on a third party.
Erika: It’s a talk-show… one of the many court programs there are in the United States
and this one in particular is one in which people speak Spanish, and they present
some problem they have had, and then this man, a judge, solves their problem in a
court.

Group 6 puts things slightly differently; these women emphasize their view of the
judge and of the program instead of providing a description of the show, like the other
groups have initially done. Take for example the first intervention of the group, by
Urdaliz and then what Nanette has to say:
Urdaliz: That I don’t like this man, that he is a very strong judge and that, at the same
time, he is not very coherent. And he says things that… he criticizes people
because they come up with statements that have nothing to do with the case and
yet many of his own statements have nothing to do with the case. And that he
denigrates people too often.
Nanette: (…) So, if somebody asked me what the program is about, it’s supposed to be
for… I mean, to present a case and try to solve it, but I don’t think that’s really the
case, I don’t think that’s the goal. I think his [the judge’s] goal is simply to
aggrandize himself, for publicity.

As we can see, despite their differences and their selection of some aspects over
others (the motive in G. 4; the motive and the genre, in G. 5; and the motive and their
valuation of the judge-program, in G. 6), there is a basic agreement on how the groups
define La Corte del Pueblo: it is an instance in which people come in front of a judge to
sort out a dispute. Whether the litigants are actually able to solve their disagreements is a
different matter, or is it not? The following pages will help answer the question.
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B. It’s Really All About Him: On Judge Manuel Franco
As I have mentioned before, Manuel Franco is a Mexican-born lawyer who came
to the United States as a young boy. He worked for a number of years as an attorney and
has hosted not only La Corte del Pueblo but also other television and radio programs,
always related to legal issues. In an attempt to better understand how these groups read
this judge I will present two different yet related dimensions: the first alludes to the
person himself; it centers on how the groups evaluate his personal and professional side,
the way he presents himself before the litigants, his temperament, and his reactions. The
second points out the knowledge that the judge brings into play during the court sessions:
i.e., which one prevails, the legal (or academic), the everyday life, or the social31? Or is it
that the groups see there is a balance between the three? And what do the groups make of
it?
1. Judging the Judge
In the previous chapter, when analyzing the way audiences interpret Judy, the
judge, I argued that we were faced with a character that could be said to be anything but
simple. Judge Manuel Franco, or “Don Manuel,” as Group 5 jokingly comes to rename
him during the interview, is the opposite. That is, he can be thought to be simple if we
(understand or) measure his simplicity by the common underlying negative image that the
interviewees from all three groups hold of him. The arguments point to the lack of
professionalism in his court, the judge’s arbitrariness, lack of respect towards the
litigants, his vulgar and insulting expressions, and his rudeness.

31

I am using the same categories presented in Chapter V, Order in the court following Bourdieu.
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The following are quotes from different moments of the discussions in the groups.
Let us first see how members of Group 4 present their views of Manuel Franco:
Flora: The judge wasn’t professional. So, the way he was addressing that person wasn’t
professional.
Rosa: It’s like, the way he talks to them, the judge, it’s like he is belittling the person, the
image of the court system.
Elía: It seems to me that by the way he speaks he shows no respect for the public, I think
his vocabulary is quite vulgar and he humiliates people a lot, and I think that if he
expects to be respected well... then, he must respect the rest!
Carmen R.: The mere fact that he is a judge doesn’t give him the right to talk to me that
way. [The other people agree]
Their words clearly express their overt dissent with the judge; Manuel Franco’s
animosity, arrogance and scorn towards the litigants cannot be regarded lightly. There is
certainly nothing funny about it. He cannot be seen as someone using his power correctly
to rule but as someone abusing the power invested upon him.
Although Group 5 also manifests disapproval of the judge, they do so in a
different way.
Farid: No, as a viewer I don’t like this program, I think it’s really bad and what is more I
don’t like the guy, he is too rude to people.
Erika: The judge is terrible, he´s terrible! [they laugh]
Yamile: I would say that if he were intelligent he wouldn’t have to insult them [litigants]
so much.
Contrary to G. 4, while distancing themselves from and being critical of the judge,
this group is able to laugh and make fun of him; one of them is heard saying: “it’s the
judge who speaks like Cantinflas!” turning around an observation made by the judge to
one man presenting a case. And pretending to be Manuel Franco, Farid humorously adds:
“but don’t you speak like me!”And they all laugh.
The mood is different in Urdaliz’s living room (Group 6):
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Nanette: He doesn’t show any kind of ethics, professional ethics…
Daysy: This man has aggrandized himself over time, like those people who think they
have the power, the authority to humiliate the clients [referring to the litigants
who appear in his court].
Urdaliz: What bothers me the most about this person [the judge] is the way he even
makes fun of people’s physical appearance, he calls women fat or this or that. Oh
my! That makes me so uncomfortable! One thing is to be sarcastic or ironic, but
to criticize people’s looks…!
The women chat and discuss the Judge and the sarcasm he expresses one too
many times; this triggers an interesting conversation between them:
Nanette: And sarcasm.
Daysy: Sarcasm
Nanette: And sarcasm is, I read once and it’s quite true, that sarcasm is a sign of
weakness. A sarcastic person reflects what he wants to see in others… yeah, I
think it’s weakness. He pretends to be big but he is really not.
Nanette: It’s like a shell: I’m defending me[she says, as if it was the judge talking]
Antonia: It’s like a Tupper[Tupperware]
[and then they laugh]

The dialogue represents a good example of how these women reinforce their view
of Manuel Franco; a comment made by one of them activates a line of thought that turns
the meaning first given to his behavior upside down. In other words, although they
initially describe the judge as very strong (and aggrandized), as a person in power, it is
through their understanding of sarcasm that they are able to modify such an image. The
argument allows them to place the judge in a quite different light. Somehow, in this brief
moment these women are able to divest him of his (apparent) power. His behavior is now
reinterpreted from a whole different standpoint and his sarcasm cannot be seen as an
indication of power but of weakness.
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These impressions about the judge that emerge from the groups change little
during the discussions; they are consistently critical about Manuel Franco´s demeaning
behavior in court, and of his unnecessary rudeness.
2. Judging the Knowledge
I am addressing this point separately from the previous one only for analytical
purposes. Approaching the type of knowledge mostly used by the judge to decide the
cases is sometimes difficult to set apart from what can be seen as his temperament,
personality, and/or professional performance, as will become clear in some of the quotes
I present below. However, whether the groups recognize Manuel Franco as a
knowledgeable person, thus influencing their perception of him as a real judge, and the
way they interpret the arguments he provides to decide a dispute, is another perspective
that can help us understand their view of the program; hence the attempt to address the
matter separately. As expected, though, not all of the groups paid the same level of
attention to this particular point (or to the rest of the aspects I am considering in this
chapter).
There are two apparently opposite aspects from which Group 4 begins to discuss
this particular topic: the procedure and the outcome; i.e., the steps that the judge takes
and the conclusion he reaches. See, for example, the following exchange:
Carmen R.: This judge makes the right decisions almost all of the time. It is the way he
reaches the conclusions and the way he acts in front of people …
Sylkia: He has the bad habit of giving examples and using words that are absolutely
irrelevant to the case; because he talks about a girlfriend (…), who cares?! You
know? His examples and the way he uses them are completely irrelevant.[And a
bit later she adds:] He thinks he knows a lot, and maybe he does, but his
vocabulary lowers his level because he uses such inadequate language just like
someone who never attended school… [the rest agree]
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Carmen's assessment of the judge usually reaching the right decisions is not
contradicted by the rest of the group, and neither is Sylkia when she points to the wrong
line of reasoning he follows during the court session. But in Carmen’s discourse we can
also appreciate the mixing of the two aspects; in other words, his personality, on the one
hand, and the steps he takes to arrive at his conclusions (which obviously entail a
particular type of knowledge), on the other. And in the same way, we can observe how,
while accepting Carmen’s statement, Sylkia takes a few more steps towards a more
detailed explanation. From her words one can see the emergence of two contrasting types
of knowledge: everyday vs. academic. The first one is discredited as irrelevant to the
cases, and the second (academic /legal in this particular case), very much needed but
doubted (he may know but he does not show it).
The group proceeds to discuss the case; they try to make sense of the dispute that
has been brought before the judge and try to fill the gaps left by a poor description of the
events. They make the effort to analyze the situation according to the law; they suggest
questions that should have been posed and proof that should have been demanded by the
judge and presented by the plaintiff:
Carmen O.: And if the orange fell out at the same time he was crossing the road, why is
he to blame? And if the road… if the law doesn’t ban bringing things with you,
you can bring anything you want: an orange, a pear… and you can skate at the
same time!
[Many of them agree and one of the voices, which can’t be identified, adds:] Yes, and
you don’t know… you don’t know whether there was a sign saying that food is
not allowed.
José: You have to ask where, if it’s L.A. …
Carmen R.: But that wasn’t asked! The case wasn’t discussed!
[Unidentified voice]: Never.
José: Exactly, how did it happen?
(…)
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Carmen O.: The judge didn’t really address the case, anyway, you see? He fell [the
plaintiff].At what point was the orange dropped? Were there signs that food was
not allowed? How did it happen? Give me the hospital bills, give me a picture,
give me some evidence! One piece of evidence! Something! Nothing! He took it
as a joke, as a prank, as an insult.
The absence of a complete description of the situation forces them to imagine how
it might have evolved, and from their point of view instead of analyzing the situation
from a legal perspective and trying to solve the problem between the litigants, the judge
resorts to his personal experience, offering unrelated examples that add little or nothing to
the case.
Group 5 centers their attention on the judge’s credentials; they focus on whether
he is an educated person (that is, whether he has had a formal education) and on whether
he is even a lawyer. Let us remember that unlike Yamile, both Erika and Farid have a
background in law. They converse about court shows in general and then about Manuel
Franco in particular:
Farid: They [judges on court shows] are real lawyers. The guy [Manuel Franco] is a real
lawyer and he actually sometimes uses legal terminology.
Erika: He is an educated person. He can follow logical thought processes such as a, and
b then c… and if he doesn’t follow that type of thought it is simply because he
doesn’t feel like it and because he wants to twist things around… (…)And he
moralizes all the time! This man is moralizing and giving his speech and telling
people… (…)You say he is a lawyer?
Farid: Yes, I know that from the program, an interview or something that I saw. And I
know he is an attorney. And indeed he looks like a lawyer, he speaks like one…
not like a good one, but like a lawyer. [They laugh]
So I ask them if they consider him to be a knowledgeable person:
Farid: No, I’d say… normal, just what a lawyer needs to know…
Yamile: Well, I don’t think he knows a lot, that’s why I doubt whether he is a real lawyer
or not…
Farid: We never said lawyers know a lot!
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[Laughter]
Yamile: I didn’t get the feeling he was using a very specific language, legal
terminology… He can express his ideas…
Farid: He uses the language of a person who’s been through College… that is to say, his
language is measured; he can express his ideas…
Erika: Coherently…
Farid: Right, he is educated.
Erika: And if he is being incoherent he is doing it on purpose too, so, he is capable of
doing it either way.
Farid: In any case I don’t think they [producers] would put an uneducated person on the
program, ‘cause they would lose credibility in front of the others…

The challenging of the judge’s status by one of the members of the group forces
the other two to present arguments backing their position. Farid is the first to postulate
that Manuel Franco is a lawyer and implicitly that he is a legitimate person to occupy the
bench. Although less certain, Erika first acknowledges that he is an educated person and
then goes along with Farid’s argument. But when that assertion is questioned by Yamile
they need to defend their standpoint, and thus offer various justifications, for instance his
use of legal terms; his (occasional) articulate discourse; and in the end, resorting to irony,
that it is one thing to be a lawyer and a different one to be a good one. It seems
interesting to note, though, that when they are trying to make sense of the judge, La Corte
del Pueblo does not stand on its own. The program is part of a totality constituted by all
court shows; when Farid is saying that “they are real lawyers,” the plural refers not just to
Manuel Franco but to all the judges on TV. The inclusion of this program under the
plural expression crystallizes, sums up, how programs reinforce each other; how, as I
have noted before, different intertextual relations contribute to making sense and help fix
certain meanings (even if never completely).
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In the meantime, Group 6 also questions the judge. The women go back and forth
from rejecting the idea of Manuel Franco being a real judge to disqualifying his
(assumed) credentials. He might have gone to University and received a Diploma, he may
be a real lawyer, but he shows neither experience nor aptitude to make an informed
judgment of the problems brought before him. The following are small portions of
dialogues that took place in different moments of the interview:
Nanette: (…) I don't think he’d be doing a program like this if he was a real judge. If he
knew about the law, I don’t think… (…) I didn’t hear him explaining the law. (…)
I don’t see him as someone who knows how to judge and if he was so real he
wouldn’t be… hum, on TV, he’d be in a real court.
Antonia: But there is a law, there are codes, he’s supposed to say this is the code, and
this is the code number, and you are supposed to…
To begin, as we can see, they point to an absence of an appropriate language that
can account for Manuel Franco’s real knowledge of the law. Both Nanette and Antonia
are expressing their unfulfilled expectations: to have a judge that will rule according to
the law. And later:
Daysy:[laughs]What he said was somewhat incoherent too! That he [the judge] was in
the car on his way to dancing with his friend and that the other (…) what is the
relation between what he is saying and what the Cuban [in the program] said to
him! You know, nothing, nothing. [She laughs]
Urdaliz: He seems to be smart, quick… like his brain is working fast looking for ideas
and examples, you can tell he is an intelligent, astute person but at the same time,
I don’t know, it’s not enough… why doesn’t he use the law?
Daysy: Exactly, he lacks legal vocabulary!(…) Right, he lowers his level to that of a
person who has no education; … many times people who participate in the
program express themselves much better than him. And the proverbs he uses all
the time, oh my God!!!
Once again, Manuel Franco is questioned. Contrary to most readings of Judy,
Manuel Franco is bereft of knowledge of everyday life; while the previous group defined
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his examples as irrelevant this one presents it as incoherent. From their perspective, the
judge lacks the ability to deliver examples that could shed light on the cases presented
before him. He introduces personal experiences considered void of any connection to the
problems that litigants intend to solve in his court. Their conversation continues:
Nanette: I don’t believe he is a judge, I don’t think he is experienced, I don’t see… I
think he covers up, he wants to cover up either because he doesn’t know the law
or he is not very intelligent, so he has to use other means, he goes off the topic to
be able to… so, I don’t see his intelligence, I see nothing in him…
[They laugh]
Daysy: He reminds me of those people, back in Puerto Rico… when you go to get your
driver's license sometimes you need a lawyer or you need to see a doctor…. So
they are outside the Registry [of Motor Vehicles]… and they practice there, that’s
all they do, they sign papers, they don’t even examine you, that’s their job as
doctors! What kind of a doctor is that?! That is a person who had no future in his
profession, who scraped through. So, what can they do? If they are not good
physicians… then they have to go there and sign forms. The same probably
happened to him [Manuel Franco], he wasn’t a good judge, he already had his
Diploma, he just scraped through, so let’s see, I know these four laws, put me on
TV and let’s see what I can do…[laughs]
Urdaliz: Maybe he is even paying to be on TV! The producers are his friends or
something like that… [They all laugh]
There is apparently a wide gap separating what could be expected to happen in a
courtroom to what actually does happen on his show. The quoting of code numbers, the
reference to the law, the reliance on legal experience (which account for a wisdom
befitting the vocation) have been replaced by irrelevant personal experiences, poorly
articulated language, and incoherence. There is no easy way out for Manuel Franco; he
seems to be trapped in a no-win situation. The perceived lack of strong knowledge, the
weakness of his arguments, and the irrelevance of his examples play against him. He may
be a real lawyer (i.e., have a Diploma) but he is poorly regarded by the group. No matter
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how clever he might believe himself to be they find him mediocre. The women laugh and
enjoy mocking the judge, they are in charge.
C. Inside the Courtroom
We have already seen how La Corte del Pueblo is initially defined, how the judge
is characterized by these three groups, and how they stand regarding knowledge. In this
section I will analyze the way the groups read the interaction inside the courtroom. At the
very beginning of this chapter I presented the initial definitions the groups gave of the
show, however as the conversation evolved such rather vague characterization started to
take a clearer shape, a more defined and precise form. So, in order to understand how the
interaction is perceived it seems relevant to start examining more closely the distinction
between what the main purpose of the program is thought to be and what it should be
from the interviewees’ point of view, a matter that I will present here briefly in order to
give context to the specific subject I am addressing, but that I will develop further during
the rest of the chapter.
In the case of Group 4, attending court, be it on TV or not, should be a way to
resolve some kind of disagreement, and in order to reach fairness, impartiality is required.
But the divide that separates what a court should be from the appearance of the program
does not seem to be bridged successfully. The following dialogue summarizes their
perspective:
Rosa: Because the very notion of a court is to try to solve a problem…
Carmen R.: For both sides to be heard…
Rosa: And the judge solved the problem; he said “you were guilty and now you have to
pay this much” and didn´t even give him the chance to say something…
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Let us bear in mind that due to their occupation, all the members of this group
have direct experience with courts. Through the Community Center where they work
they are exposed to the court system. However, it is also important to remember that
theirs is a professional experience; in other words, they help and advise people who have
some kind of trouble or have to face some sort of legal issue. It seems reasonable, then,
that from this standpoint it is expected that in a courtroom litigants will be granted the
opportunity to present their sides of the story and that the judge will rule after considering
the facts and according to the law. However, it seems quite clear that the conclusion that
Judge Manuel Franco arrived at proved disappointing for them.
Even if the postgraduate students in group 5cannot come to a complete agreement
over the show, the difference between a real court and a TV court is implicitly accepted.
While in both situations people seek to solve a dispute, the way (the how)it is done is
what sets their views apart:
Erika: Well and also the fact of saying: let´s go to court. Of course many times people
don´t do it because it is too expensive, having lawyers and stuff. And this way is
cheap, not only cheap but… well, supposedly, one would get paid or something…
Farid: (…) I believe everybody goes there because despite the scolding they get the
problem is solved very quickly, easily and without having to pay lawyers…
Erika: But, you see, I don´t think the real purpose of the program is to solve a dispute.
The aim is to solve it in the most sensationalist way possible, which doesn´t
necessarily imply doing justice…
Farid: But even so they solve it!

While Farid and Erika discuss the matter Yamile remains silent. Yes, it can be
said that they agree on the fact that a conflict has reached closure. But from their words it
can be inferred that what may seem sufficient from one perspective it is not from the
other. The difference is not subtle, though, since the line that separates them is nothing
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other than a notion of justice. If we think of the whole process as a complex articulation
of distinctive moments the distinction can be understood in terms of accentuation (or
emphasis); Farid and Yamile give predominance to different moments. In Farid´s case the
stress is put on the end; thus from his point of view the end seems to justify the means. In
consequence, the purpose of the program is apparently that people participating in the
show have the opportunity to put an end to an ongoing dispute and being insulted or
mistreated or belittled by the judge might be the price they have to pay. From Erika’s
point of view, on the contrary, it is exactly the means which is at stake on the show; that
is exactly what the program is about. For her the intention is exactly the sensationalism,
the extravaganza that takes place on the screen; in that sense, it could be argued that the
means of the process becomes the purpose of the program, and another chain of meanings
begins to take shape.
Group 6 is steadily homogenous; the women tend to follow the same line of
thought during their conversation. According to them, La Corte del Pueblo´s intention is
far from what could be defined as the pursuit of justice. People seek justice, the program
audiences.
Nanette: No, the producers will keep doing it the same way… sarcasm is what sells… it
boosts ratings. They don´t care whether they are harming people. I think they
cause emotional damage to those people and you… you actually go there to solve
your case and you are not going to succeed.

However, from these women´s perspective this is not a common problem to all
court shows; indeed, what makes it clearer is the counter example they find in Judge
Pérez, from La Corte de Familia, another television program:
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Urdaliz: Because, if you watch Judge Cristina Pérez, and you compare, they are totally
different, they are like opposite poles. She likes to go into the details and he
usually wants to go straight to the point. So…
Daysy: She [Judge Cristina Pérez] says “Let´s see, tell me how you met, how this affects
your children,” I like her a lot.

Thus, while Judge Manuel Franco is unwilling to hear people’s explanations and
tends to jump to a conclusion that does not necessarily make sense to this group, other
television courts offer them what could be considered a valid alternative for reaching a
fair solution to people’s conflicts.
To sum up, it seems that, according to the groups, conflicting parties do actually
resolve the disagreements they bring in front of the judge; however, different sorts of
problems emerge when they ponder the way in which decisions are made. In the previous
chapter the opposition between form and content gave shape to some of the readings of
the groups, and it could be said that the two opposing terms are found once again behind
some of the arguments offered by members of these groups. Nevertheless, since it
appears to be slightly different it deserves further explanation. To make sense of the
difference we need to disentangle the meaning given not so much to the content (I would
say that in both cases it refers to the same: the ruling over facts) but to the form. While
for the group that centered on the form in the previous chapter it meant following or
respecting the rules that govern the interaction between a judge and the litigants, in this
case the form is set in a different place. Form, here, has to do with the logic of television
making; in other words, the accent is put on the spectacle (thus the highlighting of the
flashy, the striking, even the bizarre) and that frustrates the need for impartial problemsolving that supposedly brings people to the program.
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Hence, bearing in mind such underlying arguments, beyond their particular
considerations I detect two interconnected sets of terms that establish the frame within
which La Corte del Pueblo works; the first two apply more specifically to the judge
(partiality +excess) and the others to the logic of producing television programs
(sensationalism + ratings).Their combination results in a condensed image of this
television court that prevails over what could be expected or desired and helps determine
the shape it gives the interaction inside the room.
1. The How. Interacting in the Court
I will now center the analysis on the interaction that takes place inside the room.
Judge Manuel Franco, the bailiff, the litigants and the gallery occupy the screen. In any
case, putting aside for a moment how the groups regard the program, this is supposed to
be a court; and like in any court, there is a pre-established hierarchy and there are distinct
behavioral expectations. Nevertheless, it is also true that like in any given situation, no
matter how structured it might be and how rigid its limits, there is a certain margin of
action; mostly considering that this is, after all, a television program. So what is peculiar
to this court show according to the interviewees? Which are the rules that govern
interaction in this court? What are the expectations, the rights and duties that apply to
everyone involved in it?
If there is a point in which it could be argued with little margin of error that the
groups present a constantly uniform reading this would be the one. All three groups share
a similar view of the interaction that takes place in the court. In its most general and
abstract form, from a theoretical point of view, this interaction can be defined as a typical
complementary relationship where the interchange is based on a power difference
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between the people involved in the situation. The position held by each participant is
clearly the opposite of the other, and it is, in this particular case, fixed and irreversible.
But of course such an abstract definition is subject to specifications and can adopt
different shapes according to the context within which the interaction takes place. A
complementary relationship, thus, can be established by the cultural context, for instance,
between doctor and patient, mother and child or, as in this situation, between judge and
litigants, and is mostly accepted as such by everyone. However, even if the how (and later
on I will show that the what as well) always matters it becomes particularly important, or
crucial, when dealing with Judge Manuel Franco.
The examples from all three groups I present below express a very clear idea of
these people’s feelings and thoughts about the interaction between the judge and the
litigants and what it represents to them. I need to say, though, that since the interviewees
express themselves at length it is sometimes hard to select small portions of their
dialogues. In this particular circumstance I have decided to let them speak for themselves
and will leave the synthesis of what I believe to be the most common and representative
ideas that emerge from their discourses for the end. For that matter, therefore, I will ask
my readers to have the patience to read their exchanges.
Let me first introduce some of the dialogues that took place in group 4. These are,
again, fragments from different moments of the discussion:
Sylkia: (…) Because since he is in charge he does as he pleases, he speaks the way he
wants because he is aware that the others can´t answer back because he will react
in a way that they will suffer the consequences.
Flora: But I also think that, ´cause the name of the program is The People´s Court, so,
well, he deals with ordinary people and he says… this is how I´m going to treat
you, very down to earth. Very, very degrading; listen, in Spanish, in English…
(…) You have to be respectful and that´s not the way he treats people in court!
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Carmen R.:(…) [She is discussing how events might have evolved and affirms:] He
wasn´t given the chance to explain himself!
Elía: I personally don´t feel any respect for this man [the judge], and probably neither do
people who go before him but they have to show him some respect at that moment
because they feel compelled to.
Rosa: He was sarcastic… when he [the judge] said that he had already made up his
mind: “I know you´re guilty but I will humiliate you anyway” and not only that,
not only will I humiliate you but you´ll have to pay too!
Olga: And to ask him how much he earns! [they all speak at once] and if he is working
under the table, as we say, that’s embarrassing!
Carmen R.: What I don’t get about this program is that… in any court you have rights,
and in this program you cast your fate to the wind, you have no lawyer to defend
you from your accuser, because the judge should see both sides, but there you are
on your own… to roll the dice… how he likes you or the other person better…
José: And he bangs … [and imitating the judge hitting the gavel on the bench José bangs
on the table with his hand]
Carmen R.: If I had been in that situation, if I had been that man with eight children I
would have gathered my things and would have said: “I’ll pay you the money"
and would have left, I would have left because I wouldn’t tolerate that, to stand
there and be insulted… the fact that he has the authority doesn’t mean that you
have to endure anyone’s insults.
And from the interview with group 5:
Yamile: Oh, his language! He insults them and they stay there! They don’t leave…
Farid: The thing is that those people... they have no education, that’s how uneducated
people are, they don’t know how to answer the judge and he takes advantage of
that. He takes advantage of the lack of education of the victims of…
Erika: But he also treats them dreadfully! Then first of all he said to the boy, the
plaintiff, don’t you talk to me like Cantinflas… Oh, well, he is first telling them
how they have to talk to him, what they have to think, what they have to say, but
really badly! It’s like a chain of insults and aggressions, but just on his part,
because people weren’t aggressive to each other. And in general it is as if the
problem wasn’t between them but between them and the judge…
Farid: (…) But then, after he said that the boy started bumbling and stumbling and it was
then that he started sounding like Cantinflas. It seems to me that he [the judge] is
the one provoking that…
Yamile: And he [the judge] says to the other one that he couldn’t defend himself because
he has…
Farid: Has no brain…
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Erika: Well, yes, obviously the judge is the one who is in command, and he does it in the
most violent way possible, but partly because everything is set up to be that
way…
And last, but not least, what the women from Group 6 have to say while talking
about different moments of the program:
Antonia: I don’t like the way he speaks (…) he won’t let people talk, he gives his
opinion, he is the one in charge, he is the one who says, it’s him and that’s it. (…)
He won’t let people talk and he attacks us, the way we are… resorting to very
vulgar language [laughs] that’s what I think.
Daysy: A lot of it is a matter of emotions. Anger, anger… him… I’m the one in charge, I
have the power. You are nothing, you come in front of me, I’m the one who has
grown the most. That’s what you see, a power struggle.
Antonia: (…) But… dear me! “How horrible, you are awful!” If I got that opinion back I
wouldn’t even speak, so you hold yourself back, then [laughs] you say: wow, I
came here to get help and look what they are doing, they are crushing me!
Daysy: (…) Oh my God. The other day he said, “Sir, you have animal legs? You have
paws?” So that person, it’s like, it’s like power, like if it was the power of the lion
over the deer, so yes, one obeys and “Aha, you understand, you are an animal”.
Those are very derogatory things and when I hear them I say to myself: Oh my
God!
Antonia: And in order to present your case you need to explain. You need to explain and
narrate what happened in detail so then, with all the details you can decide, but no
“go straight to the point” How can I go to the point if you don’t know what
happened!

So what is there to say about their perception of the how, i.e., the way that the
interaction between the judge and the litigants takes place? As I have mentioned before,
this is a relationship defined beforehand and based on an unalterably uneven distribution
of power; therefore, we could present interconnected dyads that synthesize the views
common to all three groups of the exchanges that take place on the screen. The first terms
affect one side of the power structure and the second the other pole:
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Whim + humiliation + abuse + coercion (Judge)
vs.
Impotence + weakness + helplessness + submission (Litigants)
As one of the interviewees manifested, since the judge consistently steps over an
invisible line that should never be crossed, at some point this looks like a dispute between
the judge and the participants, instead of the representation of mediation. The synthesis
presented above is the result of the slight variations in the perceptions offered by the
groups. For example, G.4´s appreciations could be summed up in terms of: whimsical +
degrading + sarcastic + abusive, which characterize the judge in relation to the litigants
who come up as powerless + compelled to respect; in the case of G. 5: mighty/
omnipotent + mistreating + rule setter+ insulting + aggressive + provocative + violent+
vulgar vs. powerless + uneducated + submissive, and finally G. 6: powerful + abusive +
vulgar + demeaning +derogatory vs. silenced + crushed + abused.
We could take a step further and present yet another image-synthesis emerging
from the groups, to wit: Rights/Fate, Omnipotence/Impotence; Success/Failure. The first
two allude to the groups´ views. The fact that the litigants have no one representing or
defending them in addition to the arbitrariness they are subject to gives room to the sense
that the Rights that should prevail in a courtroom have been substituted by Fate (or luck)
(paraphrasing Carmen R. from G.4). The second dyad is very much self-explanatory: the
almighty judge exerts his power over powerless and defenseless litigants. But the third
one points to another sphere; it refers to how they believe the judge positions himself, and
the people who come before him. And this is a critical point because it leads to an
argument that I will still postpone for later on in this chapter and which refers to the
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problem of identity; briefly described, though, Manuel Franco presents himself as a
Latino who successfully blended into the American culture while treating those in front
of him as inept or losers who still have to learn how to “become.”
2. The What
The How I have been referring to in the previous paragraphs leads us necessarily
to the, or rather a,What of the matter. But, why do we need to go back to it? Does not the
what refer to the specific content of the dispute that is brought in front of the judge by the
claimants? Yes, it could be said, if we focus on the most superficial and evident aspect of
the program. Yes, if we consider that the program itself would not exist without that preexisting conflict of interests between the litigants. But no, or not only once we perceive
that there are other facets that one way or another emanate from the discussions that took
place in the groups. No, or not only, once we listen carefully to their words, hear the tone
of their voices, and see the expressions on their faces. The fact that I am pointing at this
other What at this particular moment does not mean that this matter has the strength to
override or erase the content of the disputes and a particular meaning that emerges from
what can be seen (and evaluated) as a court; on the contrary, this matter adds a surplus of
meanings to the program and to the program in relation to its audiences and the audiences
in relation to the program.
If the judge is not granted the right to abuse the participants, if his almighty
posturing is condemned it is not only because of his deeds but also because of his
deprecating attitude towards matters that have nothing to do with the case. Manuel
Franco´s inflammatory comments regarding participants´ looks, gender, mannerisms, and
language are strongly disapproved of. And in spite of the smiles and the laughter the
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groups express and share, most of the interviewees most of the time read the judge´s
behavior very negatively and take sides with the litigants. From their point of view the
judge is not only quick to stress any mistake the participants might make but also causes
them; as the groups comment, people are mocked, ridiculed and made fun of by the
judge. The way litigants speak, the way they look or what they wear can and will be used
against them.
The court session is recreated during the meeting with the groups; the members
rephrase Manuel Franco´s sayings. For instance, a moment in which he is addressing a
man he says: “Do you think that that horrible tie you’re wearing is gonna make any
difference?” They remember moments in which the judge has referred to women looking
“like cows,” or commenting on their jewelry (earrings or such) as some sort of
“ridiculous” ornament and as if they belonged to some sort of “tribe” (needless to say, a
concept that is stripped of any romantic sense and that actualizes negative connotations
such as backwardness + ignorance + ugliness, etc.).Examples extracted from
conversations presented above such as “Sir, you have animal legs? You have paws?”
“Don’t you talk to me like Cantinflas,” etc. speak for themselves.
What follows is part of a dialogue that took place in G. 5:
Erika: Well, yes, basically what you [Farid] are saying. His manner and the language he
uses, which is very aggressive… but also (…) when he started saying “I have
been with many women, I have had many girlfriends… well, there he gave his
little speech, well misogynistic.
Yamile: Has no brain, but it seems to me that he is softer with them [men] than with
women.
Farid: I would say it´s the opposite. I´d say that he has a more paternalistic attitude
towards women, and that with men he has another attitude, he doesn´t treat them
well, but he is not paternalistic, it´s like: “You are an idiot, that´s what you are”.
But he is not paternalistic, and with women he´s more like: “sit down, you have
nothing to say, you don´t know anything, just go.” So, it is denigrating too, but
paternalistic, and he is not like that towards men.
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Erika: I don´t know what the regular structure of the program is like, but the thing was
between them, just them. [She means that it was between the men.]
Yamile: They were just there to accompany them, they didn´t participate in any way.
Of course there are differences between and within the groups and the dialogue
represents only one of many possible examples that illustrates such variety. Some people
perceive and define Manuel Franco as a misogynist and as attacking women more often
than men, while others remark upon his “fairness,” -ironically, of course- i.e., he is
equally tough and belittling towards men and women; yet no one reads the judge as
benefiting one or the other when ruling the case. There is an underlying agreement,
though; no one approves of these kinds of references he makes regarding personal
matters, mostly when people have no power to dispute his authority or to defend
themselves in front of him. So when it is time to judge the judge the groups turn their
thumbs down. They disapprove of his disapproving, they reject his rejection; one
negative annuls another. And as I have said, then, I could go on and outline some of those
differences present in their discourses, but on this particular subject I believe such
differences would introduce more confusion than clarity.
One thing adds to the other and they have a multiplying effect. Clearly, the
totality is more than the sum of its parts. The relation between the judge and the litigants
crystallizes around the authoritative figure of Manuel Franco. Power /subordination,
imposition/obedience, knowledge/ignorance, express the poles of this relationship
marked by the profusion of signs and a rhetoric of excess. Dictionaries define tyrannical
as arbitrary, unreasonable, or despotic behavior; as the abuse of authority. And a despot is
any person in power who acts tyrannically. Wouldn’t it be reasonable to reach the
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conclusion, after the interpretations that the groups have offered, that Manuel Franco fits
the profile? Is there anything left to be said? Yes, there is.
3. The Who. Why Are You There?
I have already introduced and discussed the perceptions these groups hold of the
judge and his responsibility for the nature of the interaction in his courtroom. It is now
time to address how the groups stand in reference to the participants/claimants, (which I
will do first), and another, albeit more marginal, but also significant character of the
program: the bailiff.
a. The Litigants
As the groups were discussing the show they made references regarding the
participants and expressed some sort of feelings towards them. At times they made brief
spontaneous comments and appreciations that account for their views, and at other times
they did so by answering direct questions that I posed during the interview. The
following extract of a dialogue that took place in G. 4 allows us to access their
perceptions and observations about one man presenting a case:
Juanita: The man came out very agitated, I mean, the judge was talking and the man was
getting very agitated…
Carmen R.: The poor man… it was even indecent… what else can I say.
Olga: And to ask him about his income! And whether he is working under the table, as
we say, it’s an embarrassment.
Even if other voices cannot be heard very clearly the whole group agrees with
these statements; and even if they smile and laugh they show sympathy for that person
who is undergoing a humiliating situation. So as the conversation continued I asked them
why they thought people participated in the show, what they thought might motivate
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them to accept and be willing to be exposed to such a situation. This is literally their
answer to my question:
Carmen R.: To be on TV maybe?
Rosa: I believe that if you have to go to court right now you have to pay, at least the
court fee; you need a lawyer… and even if you say that you’ll represent yourself
they will still bill you the court fee, ok? In this program you are signing a paper
which says that whatever they tell me I won’t have to pay, I’ll get justice for free,
so, whatever they are willing to give me I’ll get it because it’s free. There are
many people who can’t afford it, so they will go to this program because it’s the
only way they have to solve the problem… We have a client who went to Judge
Judy basically for that reason, didn’t need a lawyer, had nothing… and whatever
the judge said… well.
Those feelings of pity and sympathy that are expressed spontaneously find a
logical and rational response. The willingness to be on TV and thus to be seen is an idea
timidly posed and not completely ignored by the group, although they seem to find a
more practical (and justified) explanation. The group brings their experience and
knowledge to interpret the situation. Rosa takes the lead and does so very assertively. She
(they) knows how a court works and what it involves (“even if… they will still bill you
the court fee, ok?”), she (they) knows the rules of the program (“In this program you are
signing a paper…”), she (they) knows how people can benefit from it (“whatever they are
willing to give me I’ll get it because it’s free”).
The dialogue continues:
Sylkia: I know many people who went on a TV program too, as… as a means to obtain
what I need now because I went on TV, millions of people saw me, I will get what
I want. Because I also have a client who wanted to see the father of her children
whom she hadn´t seen since she had the children and she took them to the
program, I remember she went to Cristina, so they met their father through the
program. So they do it because Cristina also gets some benefit, they get some
benefit, and then everyone sees them in Puerto Rico, in the U. S. A., everyone
finds out…
Carmen R: The whole world sees it.
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Sylkia: Correct.
Actually, different worlds cross and interconnect: the real world, the legal world,
and the television world. The first is the world of actions, where people live, where things
happen, disputes arise. The second is the arena where those disputes or disagreements can
be resolved. And the third is this world (which now takes a new shape) which mediates
and establishes a new connection between the first two. This world of television acquires
new dimension and body: it is no longer (or not just) a world of representations, but a
sphere which is assigned a new role. On one hand, television is perceived as an amplifier
which opens new doors; it cannot be reduced to just “be there and be seen” since that
“being” (on TV) has an empowering effect. Quantity turns into quality: “millions will see
me” then, “I´ll get what I want.” But also and most relevant to this study, television takes
the place of Justice (even if only temporarily and in a restricted way). Television replaces
the court, and contrary to real courts it is fast and free, and furthermore, it sometimes
represents the only way they (those poor people who are perceived as not having access
to real courts) have to solve their disputes (in addition to even making some money or
getting extra benefits in the process). Even if all the members of this group manifest that
they would never take part in a TV court show, even if they explicitly reject the way the
judge treats people, probably because of their work in a community center that deals with
legal matters and knowing the type of problems and the difficulties some people have to
face, from their discourses one can observe that they see television as that world in which
sometimes some things are possible. In other words, people can satisfy their needs and do
so almost instantly and for free. Thus in this give-and-take kind of relationship the group
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sees a mutual benefit: people get what they need or want (resolving a complicated
situation) and the program gets what the producers want (ratings).
Group 5 has a slightly different perspective despite the fact that there are many
points in common with the previous group.
Yamile: To be on TV.
Farid: To be on TV and resolve their differences. And most probably they get paid
something, that’s why… I guess…
Erika: I believe they get paid to be there, right?!
Yamile: To accept public mockery!
(…)
Farid: What astonishes me is what people are willing to do to be in front of a camera!
People do all sorts of… in front of a camera.
So I ask them directly why they think people participate in the program; this is the
dialogue in response to my question:
Yamile: Because they get paid.
Farid: I’d say because they like it… there’s probably some economic reward, there’s got
to be. Otherwise I couldn’t understand why they would go. But also because
people like to exhibit their lives in public, they like it. It is like those who call a
radio program to participate, they like it. And I would even say that there is some
morbid interest, or rather exhibitionism, they like to exhibit their problems.
Erika: They are regular people, they are spontaneous (…) the truth is that many people
would like to go before Don Manuel and resolve the problem they have, because
it’s expensive going to court and also, because we trust this man, for better or for
worse he is there and resolves our cases…
Farid: And he speaks our language.

As can be seen, there is some correlation between the previous group and this one.
The same reasons arise when addressing the subject of why people would participate on
the show; i.e., to be on TV, to resolve some dispute, to get something out of participating
(some sort of reward). But that is only an apparent or superficial similarity since in group
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5 there is a twist which makes a real difference. Notice that it is Yamile, who is very
consistent in her view of the show throughout the interview (and is the most skeptical of
the three aside from being the only one who has no background in law), is the one
introducing a more detached and harsher evaluation of the participants. That kind of
instrumental (if we can accept the term) definition of why people are willing to
participate in the show and present their case-sometimes as the last or only means to
resolve a situation- takes a new and more negative shape. In this instance we can see a
conflict between that need to fix a problem and the willingness to appear on TV. Such
conflict reroutes the arguments and results in the replacement of terms which bring about
a different articulation of meanings that elicit another connotation assigned to the
participants-litigants. In that sense, rather neutral terms like presenting the case are
substituted (even if not necessarily definitely) by exposing their problems. Or getting paid
for resolving a problem is replaced by being paid for accepting ridicule, which can be
interpreted from the tone of voice Erika uses when she says: “I believe they get paid to be
there, right?!” and Yamile´s response which goes in the same direction and closes the
meaning very categorically. It´s like if this group (mostly Yamile and Farid, but in the
end also Erika) can detect a pleasure people seek in that exposure, but a type of pleasure
they themselves cannot relate to. Farid insists: “they like it…they like it,” he repeats.
Thus another tension, this time between exhibitionism and astonishment that run side by
side in the opposite poles of the process, one on the screen, the other in front of it.
The perceptions emerging from the dialogues that take place with the women in
G. 6are similar and closer to G.4. Daysy´s statement synthesizes their standpoint:
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Daysy: Those people arrive there with their problems -and for them their problems are
huge- respectfully, and behave the way you are supposed to in a courtroom, with
order and respect…

They understand those people, and can feel sympathy for them. The term “those
people,” echoes that other “poor man” from G. 4´s discourses. Their behavior is
considered adequate, correct for a courtroom; such submissiveness is taken for granted,
expected, and accepted by the interviewees. Furthermore, one could say that they
appreciate this in a way which the judge does not. So once again I feel the need to delve
into their readings of the participants-litigants; the following is the dialogue that takes
place in response to my direct question (why people participate in the program):
Nanette: Maybe it´s cheaper than getting a lawyer… or they even get paid to present
their case in court, so instead of having to pay a lawyer they pay you, I don´t
know if that´s true, but I believe it is.
Urdaliz: Or perhaps they think they are doing the right thing, to educate people, and
when they see themselves…
Antonia: When they do “oh, did I say that?!”Oh my god!”
Urdaliz: I think these people… because in order to find the cases when they advertise the
program… they must have the gift of the gab… they talk people into it.
Nanette: I believe there must be money involved…
Urdaliz: Many people, not everyone but many, may like the publicity too, and they tell
them:“you´re going be on TV,” and they say “oh, fantastic, I´ll be on TV”. It
doesn´t matter if it´s something that can harm them or their family, who will see
them on TV.

They elaborate and suggest different yet not mutually exclusive alternatives, none
of which involve a negative evaluation on their part. There can be a benefit involved in
participating in the program (receiving money instead of having to pay); there might be
an ulterior positive motive (to educate others). And even the willingness to appear on
television is construed differently than in the previous group. One thing is to be there for
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publicity, or for your family to see you on TV, and a very different one is to be there to
expose and exhibit your life and problems. Publicity and exhibitionism are quite distinct
ways of narrating the same event and they carry and draw out contrasting connotations.
In synthesis, in Group 4 we witness some sympathy for the participants-litigants. I
wonder if their experience in their workplace (Community Center) allows them to
establish a connection between the litigants and their “clients”. Furthermore, I believe it
would be accurate to interpret their view of the participants in the show as slightly
paternalistic since those people are seen as dispossessed, deprived, powerless, and in
need; in other words, deserving of protection and help from others, be it themselves in the
workplace, a judge in a court, and/ or on a television program. From this particular point
and even if they evaluate Judge Manuel Franco very negatively, the program stands as a
problem-solving device and thus, they hold no negative views when focusing specifically
on the participants. Group 5, on the other hand, stands apart; they are more judgmental.
They cannot relate to those who like to exhibit their lives and problems (not only on TV,
but in the media in general); the fact that they “must get paid” to appear on that show
("Why otherwise?" they would say) significantly debilitates the argument that people get
a benefit at the same time as they solve a problem. Exhibitionism and selfishness (which
express the way they interpret those people who are willing to participate, driven almost
exclusively by economic interest) merge, and conflict with what they would respect or
appreciate (the solving of a problem).Finally, the women in group 6 tend to show a more
understanding and at times even compassionate reading of the participants. In the end
they are seen as innocent people who may have been deceived or tricked by the producers
of the program who have the ability (the gift of the gab, in their own words) to persuade
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and encourage people to participate in the program, leaving them to their own fate at the
hands of an abusive judge.
b. The Bailiff: A Gate to the Other Side?
Judge Manuel Franco is assisted by a bailiff who only speaks English; this fact
that triggered a quite rich discussion in the groups brings to light a whole set of
interrelated matters. What does language represent in this case, both inside and outside
the courtroom? What sets of meanings are activated by bilingualism? How do they
interpret it: as a sign of an imposition, as a sign of adaptation or of submission? Does it
have anything to do with the way they perceive themselves and their place in this
country?
This particular issue emerged spontaneously in some of the groups and it was
brought up by me in others. In the case of Group 4 they were speaking about the language
and it seemed the appropriate moment to ask them what they thought of, and how they
interpreted, the fact that the judge and the bailiff spoke only English between them.
Carmen R.: He began, bring me the case, and it is a court in Spanish but he thinks the
bailiff doesn´t know Spanish, so he has someone who speaks English, so he says
to him: bring me the next case, and he says it in English… not in Spanish.
So I asked the rest what they made of it, because in the other Latino court shows
the bailiff speaks Spanish.
Sylkia: It would be very confusing for me if I didn´t know English. Because if they told
me: please come forward, I would remain like… what? What did he say?
(…)
Sylkia: But I say, the person who is waiting there, you are waiting there and the bailiff or
whatever he is called says to you, please come forward, you will stay there like,
what is that, what did he say? You would understand if someone pointed with the
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finger, but still you´d remain doubtful: I´m in a court, what do I do? Do I get up?
No, I better stay here, do I go? You know…
Does it bother you that they speak English among themselves? (I asked)

Sylkia: It doesn´t bother me, it worries me that maybe some people won´t understand.
José: What it teaches is a reality of a court. You go to court… they will do it in English.
Maybe… by chance there´s one who speaks Spanish, but if not, you´ll have to say
it in English, because you go… you go there, you have to do it in English because
it´s an American court.
The short answers to this matter are an indication that this is not a particularly
important issue for most members of this group, even though, as Sylkia points out,
language represents a possible barrier in the communication. While judge and bailiff
interact fluently in English, some of the participants may actually be excluded or feel
excluded, depending on their level of understanding of the language. It could be inferred
that it is implicitly assumed, though, that that would probably be the case for many of the
participants, mostly considering the view this group has of them (see The Who discussed
above). But on the other hand, English stands as an anchor; it defines the terrain, and
added to that it sets a standard, it makes clear the norm that rules, it normalizes in its own
way, and it is part of their expectations. Thus the norm is not disputed; on the contrary, it
is accepted as a legitimate limit. Concern is on one end of the cord and reality is on the
other, and even if one could say that it is stretched, the thread does not break. The bailiff
and the language are like a link which brings both worlds together.
In group 5 the bailiff is introduced into the conversation by one of the members of
the group:
Farid: In addition… the guy, the bailiff, speaks English, it seems curious that he would
speak English instead of Spanish…as if saying: this is an American Court.
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Erika: Yes, and the [U.S.] flag… the sheriff, or I don´t know what, the court assistant
that speaks English, like that´s the most serious part… and well, it´s also the
shield, it looks like a real American Court. And the more serious characters can
speak English.
And a bit later:
Erika: But it´s like, I don´t know, it´s like the white man there, who can also
communicate with the two worlds, because he speaks with his guardian [in
reference to the bailiff] who approaches him and hands him the pen and he [the
judge] can communicate with them [the participants] but also, he treats them
terribly! So, first he told the plaintiff not to speak like Cantinflas, like, Wow! He
is first telling him how he must address him. What they have to think, what they
have to say… but very badly! And even worse than that is the way he treats
women, the ones that appear in front of him and well, the rest in general.

A few things stand out from their conversation. The first one refers to language
and some associated icons that help establish the place, as it did in the previous group.
This is, unmistakably, an American Court, despite the fact that those attending it, and
even the judge, can be easily identified as non-Americans (in this case the interviewees
identify them by their country of origin: Mexicans). However, there is an extra meaning
added to it: all the signs that refer to the territory, the U.S.A., are interpreted as marking a
distinction. The flag, the shield, and the judge and the bailiff interacting in English,
constitute a unity that represents what they call “serious.” But what does serious stand for
in this particular context? And what does it say about what is excluded? What does the
interplay between the spoken and the unspoken, the manifested and the implicit reveal?
Let us examine a little closer what emerges from their dialogue. For the first time Manuel
Franco is so clearly classified; he is not simply a successful Latino, he is, from the
perspective held by two members of this group, the White man there presiding over the
court. He is that man, the judge, who is able to cross the line and shift comfortably from
one world to the other. It seems that Manuel Franco is on that side of the line, the serious
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one (though we can never be too sure); and then by default we also know, since it is
implicitly stated, who is on the other side (the non-serious for now): those who appear in
front of him, those who speak Spanish, the unsuccessful ones.
Power is on the serious side, as are imposition, provocation, and knowledge. And
where there is power there is subordination, and where there is imposition there is
submission, and provocation leads to acceptance, as knowledge implies ignorance. They
offer the depiction of a disciplining power, which controls and directs the production of
speech, behavior and deeds.
So then I refer back to the bailiff and ask them how they see the fact that he
speaks only English. As we are about to see, the judge´s alluded whiteness is a prelude to
the shape of the answer/conversation after my question:
Yamile: Yes, it is to show that we are here, like the flag, and the whole scene. And to
give some power status to the one who doesn´t speak our language; he says “you,
come in.”It is like a mediator between the judge… he is the authority, like if there
is a fight he will send him and have him stop it, they can´t fight against him,
right? It is like he is actually real, he is an external agent. (…)Also as if to
enhance the respect for the judge, yes? He can communicate.
Erika: I was wondering whether it would be, like, forcing the interpretation too much
and analyze all the roles in the court [she laughs] and the fact that the bailiff is
black. Well, it caught my attention! I couldn´t say: “this is what it means.” But it
did call my attention32.
Farid: I think he had to be black because a white bailiff would mean a more imperial
matter. And they try, I believe, try to speak about justice and if it were a white
bailiff, well, a WASP, it would conflict with the program that is solving Latino
issues. Then, the fact that he is black, being black he is much closer to the Latino
community, he is a minority.
Erika: But I think it is more about power. It is simply that… it´s like…
Yamile: Yes, like the black is bigger, stronger. I felt it that way too.
Farid: Really? No, I would say that the black is intentional and it is supposed to be
politically correct, I´d say, I don´t know…
32

Interestingly enough, this is the only group that stressed race when discussing this particular character in
the program (the bailiff).
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Erika: Having a white cop would be too obvious?
Yamile: But, don´t you feel that when you see a black policeman it is a much stronger
and more powerful image than a white policeman has?
Erika: More powerful? Black policemen inspire more confidence in me.
Yamile: The type of power like I am here and you cannot do as you please here.
Farid: I feel that much more confident approaching a black cop than a white one…
Yamile: Are you serious?!
Erika: Of course!! [Reaffirming Farid´s statement]
Yamile: I feel exactly the opposite. I believe black policemen are much more violent…
Erika: Black cops more violent than White cops? No! Not a chance, because they have
themselves… and I would say that the history of aggressions has been more
towards the blacks…
Yamile: I think there is more resentment among black policemen than among white
policemen … towards people.
Farid: So what would it mean to have a black bailiff there?
Yamile: That there is a much tougher image than if it were a white policeman. Look, I’m
afraid of black cops.
Farid and Erika: Yes? I am not…
Yamile: I prefer a white cop. Well, as a matter of fact, black Americans… I believe, there
is nothing worse than a racist black … blacks are sometimes far more racist than
whites…
The fact that the bailiff is not a member of the Latino community helps set and
establish the location, it territorializes. From that standpoint, the judge stands as a bridge
between the United States, represented by the bailiff, and the Latinos and it is, at the
same time, a door to access the American Justice System. Although language itself is
another way of marking the territory it constitutes, at the same time, a boundary that
needs to be crossed in order to belong. Speaking English is a sign of power, and agateopener: from their standpoint the message could be summed up in terms of: if A then B
(“if I speak English I can be like the judge”). So English, in this context is connected to
authority and respect.
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Within this particular group the figure of the bailiff acquires a new density as race
is introduced as a significant feature. There are two distinct and opposing interpretations
and evaluations that emerge from their discourses. On the positive side we have both
Farid and Erika; from their point of view, having an African American person assisting
the judge is far from unintentional; the black bailiff is there for a reason. Reading him as
a minority too, makes the process of identification easier and smoother. African
Americans and Latinos are paired in their common subordinate experience, setting them
apart from what White represents. Besides, one can perceive there is an almost emotional
connection; the black bailiff inspires more confidence and trust in Farid and Erika than a
white one would have. He is almost an equal.
On the negative side there is Yamile, for whom blackness condenses the sum of
terms that lead to a negative connotation. In a certain way, Black is also associated with
submission and subordination; however, it is so in a different way. Black imposes an
order upon us instructed by another (the white Judge). For Yamile, black is toughness +
power + imposition + violence + resentment + racism, and all this results in fear and
mistrust. There is no sign of identification. Black is the line, it is the boundary which
establishes her limit.
The two opposing perspectives cannot reach a point of agreement. Erika and Farid
are in complete disagreement with Yamile but decide to drop the subject and end the
discussion with a smile. There is tension in the air and I move on to the next question.
In the case of group 6,I introduced the subject by asking them what they think
about the Judge and the bailiff speaking English:
Nanette: Oh, that´s true … yeah, now I realize!
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This is obviously something that has gone unnoticed by them so I ask what they
think about it:
Urdaliz: I don´t think that´s too bad, because it can happen that the bailiff doesn´t know
Spanish, so he [judge] needs to address him in his own language. I don´t think it´s
wrong, not in that sense. Depending on what he says, if he makes comments about
the participants it would be wrong, but he almost always says: “pass me the paper,
hand me the evidence”… I don´t see anything wrong, maybe those are things we
can understand, I mean… we understand what he is asking for, what he is talking
about…
(…)
Urdaliz: Maybe… the point is that if this is a court for Hispanics, why isn´t the bailiff
Hispanic too?
Nanette: People who don´t know English have the right… who don´t know any English,
have the right to know everything that is happening there, and … I think he does it
to feel superior: “I am so intelligent, I speak English too, I speak another
language… You maybe don´t understand what I´m saying to the bailiff.”
Antonia: For me, there is no, how can I say it, I don't see anything wrong with it. I mean,
he may not speak the language, he´s not Hispanic, so, that´s probably why…
Nanette: No, I don´t think there´s anything wrong, the only problem is that I think he
[judge] does it to feel superior, to feel more important. But I was thinking about
the other [court shows], like Sala de Parejas or Family Court and I’m just
realizing that the bailiffs are Hispanic. So, why do they choose an American
person? Because, I mean, I don´t know if it was the judge who chose him, but
they gave this opportunity to that person and it should have been for a Hispanic.
Thinking it through, he should have been Hispanic.
This group offers a quite different response than the previous one. Observe that
one of the members of the group, Nanette, only notices it when I pose the question. I
would argue that in this case the fact that the judge and the bailiff interact in English is
initially accepted as a natural thing, and only when they begin to discuss the subject and
start comparing with other similar programs do they suggest that it would be more
appropriate if the bailiff were Hispanic. However, even if in this case the bridging
between the two worlds is not as evident as it has been in the other groups, it still implies
a mark of distinction: according to some of the women, having a bailiff who does not
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speak Spanish is a strategy the judge uses to feel more important, better, more intelligent
than those who don´t have a command of a different language. So their questioning that
the bailiff is not Hispanic has more to do with the judge, his self proclaimed importance,
than a boundary between the two worlds.
Something stands out, though, and it is the fact that they will refer to the bailiff as
American and not as African American (contrary to the definition offered in group 5), but
this is a point that stands out only in comparison to the previous group. Since race was
not the focus of attention I cannot risk an interpretation on the way they classify the
bailiff mostly because I did not pose any particular question about this matter during the
interview. Nevertheless, neither this group nor G. 4,brought up the subject spontaneously
and they offered a view of the bailiff that allows them to place him as a “natural” anchor
to the territory. Mainly because he only speaks English, he represents, metonymically, the
U.S.A.; it is through him that the judge can come to be the bridge that connects both
worlds. And this is one of the perceived ways in which the judge sets himself up as an
example of how to become.
D. To Be or Not To Be, Is That the Question?
One can wonder how real reality TV is and how real these court shows are, and be
tempted to search for an answer. And yet, those would probably not be the most
important questions: what really seems to matter at this point is what lies beneath the
belief or disbelief, or what it would mean to believe or not to believe. I would suggest
that trying to disentangle what people make of the differences (or similarities) is one of
the many possible ways to address this subject; as it is delving into what they think could
be learned from these types of programs.
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1. Similarities and Differences between Courts and Shows
Even if in some cases during the interviews I had to ask directly about the major
differences they perceived between real courts and La Corte del Pueblo, the subject is
scattered all over their discourses and emerged differently in each group. Sometimes
explicitly but more often implicitly, the differences between real courts and TV courts
arose when questions that were meant to bring a particular subject into the discussion
allowed the interviewees to bring their own experiences and knowledge to bear and refer
to it.
In the case of group 4 it was their own experience in court, due to their job, which
brought the subject up. For example, Flora narrates different circumstances in which she
had to attend Family Court and the District Court and points to the differences between
one and the other:
I had to attend Family Court once as well as the District Court, and the District Court
judge was much tougher than the Family Court judge, and the jargon was very different.
The Family Court was very family focused, things are like this, happen like this… and the
judge at the District Court was, you shouldn’t have been there… hello?! It’s like…
Flora goes on to explain how people usually get nervous and intimidated when
they have to appear before a judge, and how they sometimes need to coach people as to
how to behave in Court and so on. Like Flora, many other members of this focus group
have direct experience of attending real courts, while in the case of others their
experience is more indirect. Nevertheless, they share a basic knowledge of the legal
system.
The following are extracts of conversations that took place at various moments
during the interview and condense the views of the group:
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Rosa: I believe, many of us go to court here and it is a lot more serious… [I can hear
other people agreeing]. When the judge is talking (…) I can´t say something just
because; or if I go against her she will answer back and we are going to start an
argument and the judge will say something to put us down and that… that does
not happen, at least at the hearings that I… no, it does not happen here, so, for me
this is more like a program, like a comedy.
At another moment José intervenes:
José: I believe that if he wasn´t on TV he wouldn´t be that way. I think they read the
cases (beforehand) and have someone to write something and they learn the lines
to make it more intense in that half hour and do the show they have to do…
And later on:
Rosa: Basically, as I was mentioning before, there is not a single Court in the Springfield
area where a judge will speak to people like that. And by the way, there was a
female judge[the rest of the group are familiar with the case and laugh. One of
them mentions the name of the judge] who addressed someone in a way she
shouldn´t have and it cost her a suspension, ok? So, she simply said something she
should not have said…
Elía: I think these types of programs should be banned from TV, because they give a
very bad example …
Sylkia: Can you imagine if less educated people (because there are lots of uneducated or
even ignorant people) watch a program like this and think this is the way to act in
a court, for example in Springfield? Can you imagine?!
Olga: That’s why I was saying before that it depended on each one, because there are
some people that see this as a court… they watch this and say, well this is as they
will treat me in a court … so, it has a double meaning!
If I had to choose a single expression that could account for the difference
between what they perceive as real courts and the way they interpret the episode of La
Corte del Pueblo that they watched before the interview I would say seriousness. And I
would suggest that other terms and meanings could be deduced from it. Such seriousness,
which applies to real courts, affects the way that judges behave as well as the way
litigants are supposed to behave; and it affects the procedure, which implies not only the
use of a particular language (jargon), but also the specific legal knowledge and the
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different steps considered necessary to reach a conclusion. From this group we have also
learned the consequences of breaking the laws of conduct in a court; laws that apply not
only to common people but also to judges, who can be subjected to suspensions for
misconduct, etc. In that sense, these laws set the limits for the way in which order can be
maintained inside the court thus guaranteeing a fair treatment for those involved in the
process.
Such depiction of what “a real court” is like is far from the image that emerges of
the show from the discourses of the interviewees. In Manuel Franco’s court things are
manipulated to make them more appealing, to make audiences laugh. Cases are edited
and even (believed to be) re-written for added intensity. The judge is offensive, talks too
much and listens too little. He says things that are completely out of order and beyond the
case, insults people and makes fun of them. And yet, the cases are never said to be fake
or false. In the end, the program offers a bad image of the legal system, and if it does so, I
wonder if it isn’t because ultimately, it is somehow granted certain degree of reality or
credibility.
In the case of Group 5, there were two clearly identifiable moments in which the
matter was discussed; once, when they were discussing why, according to them, people
would watch the program; and secondly, when I asked them to outline the similarities and
the differences between a real court and the program. This is the dialogue that took place
after I asked them for the similarities they found between the program and a real court:
Farid: They look alike since there are two parties and a third one judging, and there is
that other character, the bailiff… they look alike, I think that courts in the U.S are
a bit authoritarian. I saw on the news that there is a Disciplinary Committee
investigating a Latino woman judge because she treated the District Attorney and
some lawyers very badly… And they were showing the hearing where she was
shouting at them, but… she looked like Don Manuel, shouting, insulting, she said
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to the District Attorney something like “You are a moron, you shouldn’t be in this
court” and that type of language, to a colleague and… I think they are alike. And
they are not alike in the sense that they don´t use a formal jargon in the court
[meaning La Corte del Pueblo and such] and that there are no lawyers…
Yamile: No lawyers and no defense attorneys…
Farid: Well, some courts don´t require lawyers…
Erika: Right
Farid: But they still use a legal jargon
Yamile: But the jargon wasn´t legal at all! [Referring to La Corte del Pueblo]
Erika: I´m not too sure, but I think that the main difference is that a judge, even if he can
be aggressive it is a lot less so… and speaks a lot less, gives less speeches, I think
that judges, if they ever moralize and give a speech it´s during the closing… But
this man [Judge Manuel Franco], he is moralizing all the time, and giving his
speech and saying… it´s this character and you don´t know whether he is the
announcer of a show or a judge... ´cause he is there doing all that and that´s the
difference, because the structure, the set, looks very much like a real court.

The depiction offered by them fits a real court. Even the absence of defense
attorneys is justified: not all courts require the presence of lawyers, as Farid correctly
points out and Erika agrees. Aside from the set that very much looks like a real court, two
things make the difference, though: the jargon (or lack of) and the way the judge behaves
which makes him look more like a showman than a real judge. So let us see how the
argument evolved when they were discussing what they thought attracts people to watch
the program:
Yamile: It’s ah… to watch how they insult each other [she laughs], like having fun with
it.
Farid: I would say it’s because of that, because the cases are appealing because it’s real
people’s lives. They watch to see how people fight with each other, how they treat
each other and how the judge treats them.
Erika: I don’t know, I think this is a whole staged circus, so you say this and you say that
and when the judge tells you to go you go and sit down… and then…
Yamile: A staging,
Farid: But it had to have been real before.
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Erika: Well yes, but one thing is …
Farid: People would realize that, you know what I mean?
Erika: Well, it doesn’t seem real to me!
Yamile: But look, people do realize, for example those things in Laura de América are
not real.
Erika: And they laugh their heads off! [laughter] And they love it!
[They laugh]
Yamile: Well, this is the same only that they put someone dressed like that [meaning the
judge] instead of Laura, and then people get distracted.
Farid: Well, I would say this is real and many of them, I’m telling you, many of the ones
who are on the programs in English are former judges.
Erika: Maybe, sure, they need a person who will generate credibility, obviously.
Farid: Judy, Judge Judy, she is a former judge. She used to be an Appeal Court judge of
the United States and she made a lot of money and she resigned… because she
earned, like, let´s say 120 thousand dollars a year and with this she makes a
million a year. So, for them this is a great business. So I would say that yes, they
have a mediation license or something like it.
Once again, this is the group in which there is more disagreement in comparison
to the rest. The idea of the staging of the program, first brought up by Erika, is embraced
by Yamile. From their perspective, the icons that represent the Justice System, such as
the gown or the uniform, are there as elements of deception. They are mere appearances.
Those signs distract audiences’ attention making them believe they are seeing something
that is actually not the case. Behind the judge, beyond the court is the reality of a show
staged to make people laugh.
On the other hand, Farid insists on the veracity of the program. He will accept the
proposition of the staging but imposing on it the idea that before the production of the
program things happened, that at some point things were true, they were real. Actually,
agreeing seems only a strategy used to pose his counter argument.
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The two women compare the program with a Latino talk show; this helps them
strip La Corte del Pueblo of the disguise of reality: those two programs are basically the
same despite their appearances. In the meantime, Farid provides his own evidence. He
relies on other television shows, he relies on the other English-speaking judges on
television, he relies on Judge Judy. It is not a matter of appearances or suppositions or
believing or not; it is pure and simple knowledge (could we dare to say facts?), if all the
others are former judges, so is Manuel Franco, and by transitivity, if those are real than so
is this one.
To sum up, Farid takes quite a different view from the two women and in order to
do so he brings to bear knowledge about other court shows and former judges hearing the
cases. But the women also bring into play other discourses that become handy when
explaining their point of view. In both cases it is interesting to see how intertextuality
operates; on Farid’s side, other court shows play a major part in informing his discourse
and reaffirming his believed status of reality of the program, while on the women’s side
the source comes from other television programs. Similar logic, different outcomes.
The women in group 6 go back and forth from discussing the program to giving
examples from their personal lives or experiences of people they know. They tell me
about their own experiences in court, the reasons why they have attended and how they
have been treated by the judge. They all feel it is a serious, fearful, and threatening
situation and claim they would never want to have to go through that again.
Urdaliz: I went to court once, and it was the first time, and it all seemed so informal. I
was there to accompany my aunt who had been involved in an accident (she hit a
horse) and for me, that judge, comparing him with Mister Franco, that judge was
worse, the language! He treated my aunt…! She and I were both terrified. And
this man was talking and saying that my aunt was out of control… [she goes on to
explain how unjust the whole thing had been]So, I never want to have to go to
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court again, ever! (…) The simple fact that you are summoned leaves you
speechless. Many people may be eloquent and be able to speak anywhere, but the
rest, most of us don’t… And that person, with all the authority and one doesn’t
know… one doesn’t know anything about the law either. But in my aunt’s case,
she just stood there, couldn’t say a word! She accepted all the blame, and I was
standing by her and whispering, “tell him that it wasn’t you, tell him what
happened,” but she couldn’t, she just stood there, still, quiet.
Antonia: I’ve been to court… at the beginning of the case they tried to intimidate me,
assigning a lawyer to my son, and blah blah blah, and thank God my boy won the
case! And I was the bad one!! [She laughs but one can tell that she is very
nervous. One can see the emotional effect this still has on her. The other women
remain quiet and look at me to see my reaction]. And what I saw is that they have
no consideration, that we are human, and that as parents we all make mistakes
(…) But they treated me really badly, I had a really bad experience and I said to
myself, well, I don’t want to go back, I don’t want to go to Court again, don’t
want to go through that experience again. And it is like she said, it’s very tough…
and one feels inhibited, one does not assert one’s rights… and you learn, little by
little, little by little you start to exert your ability to express yourself and
everything else… but if there weren’t these educational cases like now, well…
Nanette: I’ve never been to court (…) but my father was involved in a case -he was shot
in a robbery- (…) and I’ve been told it’s very difficult and tough because it’s my
word against yours, facts against facts and everyone has to state their case… so
yes, I’ve been told that it’s a very tough experience.

So I ask if they see any resemblance between that and the program, and the first
answer is no. They are very involved in their experiences and keep telling me, and each
other, about their personal situation. Nevertheless, other moments shed light on this
particular matter, for example, when they tell me why they watch the program or think
other people do. The following exchange allows us to examine their view of the court:
Urdaliz: I used to watch it because I like to learn about the law, and many times one is
ignorant of so many things and it’s like Daysy was saying, through this program
we learn what to do when we go to court, those are the things you can learn. But
at the same time, I don’t know, I think it’s mostly for publicity, his in particular…
(…)
Nanette: I believe people watch these types of shows with the purpose of learning:
“What do I do if I´m ever involved in a similar situation?”But the truth in
analyzing this program, is that the judge, if he was a real judge, I don´t think he
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would be doing this program. (…) I have seen other programs, but in this case I
didn’t see, I didn’t hear him explaining the law. And I didn’t get the idea that he’s
someone who knows… the laws and how to judge…
Antonia: But there is the law, there are codes… it is supposed to refer to codes, this is
code number x which implies that you can lend your car and… and you know
when you borrow it that… knowing that… you know… and for me this episode
didn’t teach you anything. Right now it taught me that I can go to court and if
someone disrespects me I can do the same, you know?(…) I am skeptical. I find it
hard to believe that these cases are real, because I believe that the system and this
is in the States, right? The system in the States is very clear so… why would
someone go on to TV to solve a problem?

The program can’t match all of their expectations. Urdaliz is the one who holds
the most positive perspective. Her belief in the possibility of learning about the court
system implies that she believes that that television court is similar to a real court; such
transference of knowledge from one to the other is only possible if the two can be
equated. Her last objection arises more from her need to agree with the rest of the women
than as a true deep conviction. In the cases of Antonia and Nanette it is the judge who
doesn't pass the test. It is his lack of reliance on the law, the lack of references that could
certify and legitimize his knowledge which marks the difference. One can only wonder
how much Antonia’s personal and traumatic experience with the Judicial System might
influence her view; notice her contradiction between one moment of the interview and
the other. In one case she is confessing she never ever wants to go to court again and in
the other she does not understand why people would go to a television court instead of a
real court. She is skeptical, but is she skeptical about the judicial system, or this television
court or both?
Before I move on to present the next subject, I would like to take a moment and
discuss briefly a matter that has come up in the previous pages: the matter of
serious(ness). The first time it came up I was pointing out a series of interconnected terms
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that emerged from the discourses in G. 5 (see: b. The Bailiff). At that time I said that
according to the interviewees there was a "serious side" of things (in other words, of the
interaction that takes place on the screen). The serious side, the judge's side, in that
context, results in the amalgamation of: power + imposition + provocation + knowledge.
(Although at this point I will not refer to the implied opposed terms I will remind my
readers that they affect the litigants.) The second time that seriousness emerged, it was
with G. 4 (in this section: a. Similarities and differences). On this occasion the term
worked as a divide, but it marked the point of divergence between their experience in real
courts and Manuel Franco's court. In that regard, seriousness implies the sobriety,
solemnity, fairness, and equity which characterize real courts. As we can see, the same
term accepts different connotations; it is negative in the first one and positive in the
second. It is sarcastic in the first and serious in the second. The interesting thing about
this is that in spite of such a stark axiological opposition, the term allows us to establish
another axiological axis where they can meet; the one in which court shows stand on the
negative pole for most (but not all) of them. The groups may take different roads, but
such as in this case, they eventually (and only sometimes) cross.
2. What Have We Learned?
The lessons taught by the program, which emerge from the discussions that took
place with each group can be classified in many different ways, but two clearly stand out
and thus it seems convenient to present them separately. The first one is a lesson that
refers to what we could call technical matters related to the Court; in other words, the
question would be if the interviewees believed there was something positive (or negative)
to learn from the show.
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Group 4 is consistently concerned with the image of justice emerging from the
program.
Olga: They give people the wrong message, because the audience, as she said, will
think… “they will humiliate me, you know.”So they are sending a double
meaning to the audience. A double meaning, like she said, many people take it
lightly, so, if they expect it to be serious…, when they go to court they’re gonna
think, you know, they’re gonna laugh at me. This is not a serious thing, they won´t
take it seriously. So, they are sending a double meaning to people.(…) The
Hispanic audience would benefit more from one hour of Court TV in Spanish than
with this, so they can learn what a real court is like…
Elía: I believe this type of show should be cancelled because it gives a really bad
example.
Sylkia: Can you imagine? let’s suppose those less educated people -to put it somehow- or
simply ignorant people (…) who watch a program like this and think that that’s
the way to behave in a Court here, for example in Springfield? Can you just
imagine that person?
Olga: One can learn that that´s the way you´ll be treated in a Court, that you must take all
the things you need to take and that if you don´t you have to know what the result
will be like… I see that as a double meaning, there are some positive and negative
things you can take from this, but this type of court doesn´t really exist and people
watch it…
Carmen R.: Each State has its own court system…

It is obvious by now that their job plays a major part in the interpretations they
form of the program. The show is like a double-edged sword; it can teach useful tips and
give a wrong impression at the same time. But even if people might get something from
the shows, for example, the need to present evidence, to speak only as required, and to
behave in a respectful manner, their main concern is with the distorted image of the Legal
System people are receiving. In that sense this program, and mostly Judge Manuel
Franco, offer a bad example, a negative image of a serious institution.
Farid, in group 5, is the only one who expresses a positive side of the program:
Farid: I also think that people learn how it works, that is, many legal norms regarding
Insurance, for example: “you can make a claim with the Insurance Company and
if you prove what happened, in which circumstances that you didn´t know, the
278

Insurance Company will pay, and if it is false, well, you´ll go to jail for fraud.”
So, he is telling people, he is teaching them how things work and I think people
learn. Obviously not the way you´d like them to learn…[he laughs]
In spite of the many negative issues regarding the program, despite the way the
judge(mis)treats people, the mocking and insults, Farid persists and insists on his
definition of the show, and based on it he can recuperate some positive and useful
lessons.
I introduced above what women in group 6 think in terms of what can be learned
from the program. In addition to the perspective held by Urdaliz, Daysy, too, feels that
the program offers some useful knowledge:
Daysy: For me, this court, I´ve been following it for a while… I like it because I learn,
there is a good side to it; many times I learn some legal terms that maybe will
come in handy in the future.

And despite the negative view offered by Antonia in the quote presented before,
during other moments of the discussion she has been able to find a more positive aspect:
Antonia: But we need to consider the pros and cons. Because we think it’s bad, but if we
think harder, those women who are suffering some kind of physical abuse in their
homes and they dare not go to a Court, maybe they watch this and it encourages
them to do so. “Oh, look, she is going through all that and she dared to go, so I’ll
dare too.” So we may not like it, but other people …
Nanette: Benefit
Antonia: They benefit, because maybe we say “what a piece of trash, and this and that”,
but if we think it over… other people may see it and get the strength to go to court
and fight their case…

In this insightful moment they can go beyond their own interests and think of
those in a disempowered situation and at that point, to a certain degree, the program can
be empowering. Not exactly because of how it deals with and presents justice, but
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because the litigants stand as a good example of people who have the strength to face
their problems; an example for those who witness that process and can find the courage
to do the same and seek justice (in a real court, though).
Now, as I anticipated in the beginning of this section, beyond the particular or
specific knowledge or the examples which might help the audiences in reference to how
courts or the Legal System function, there is a crucial theme that flows through the
interviews and affects all their readings; a subject I have purposely been postponing until
this moment, a lesson they all refuse to learn.
E. The Final Lesson
At risk of stating the obvious, the first thing to observe is that there is no single
positive mention in the discourses of all three groups about the way Latinos are
represented in La Corte del Pueblo. What is less obvious, though, is how each group
deals with this particular matter that affects them all directly.
The following are comments made by members of group 4 during different
moments of the interview:
Elía: Because it’s a humiliation at a national level, because it’s on TV. And I believe this
is very wrong, because we are Hispanic and that doesn’t mean they can treat us in
such a degrading way. On the contrary, he [judge] should be helping us, if there is
something we don’t know, let’s learn, but not in such a humiliating manner…
José: I think they are so trying to imitate Anglo-Saxon programs that can’t reach the
Latino, Hispanic level… the way he is presenting it (…) is really degrading…
(…)
Flora: In other words, we Latinos are poor irresponsible pigs.
[Unidentified voice]:Exactly.
(…)
Elía: What I see is this message: It’s like… telling the Latino people: “you can be
humiliated and must remain silent. We are the authority and you have to…”
That’s the message that I get when he speaks like that. Because he is the Supreme
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Court, he is the one who holds all the power and thus the rest of us have to
humiliate ourselves in front of him. And that is unacceptable! Because, how can
we be educating our people like that? I don’t think it is right for this man to be on
TV.
(…)
Rosa: But think of what he said, in the example he gave: if it had been a white family
they wouldn’t have left the orange in the middle of the sidewalk, so, what
Americans say about the Hispanics because we leave all the garbage… so, for me,
he is teaching prejudice against his own Latino people. Because… I teach my
child: you dropped something? Pick it up and throw it away. But I don´t need to
say “if it had been an American he wouldn´t have thrown it there”… there’s no
need for that! Look sweetie, pick it up, that doesn´t belong there. But he taught
being prejudiced when he mentioned a white family.

So what is peculiar to this particular group? Is it probably the way in which the
two spheres intertwine; how the domain of the Justice System crosses the field of identity
and vice versa? We can begin to understand their views by analyzing and recognizing
different dimensions that can be inferred from and detected in their exchanges. I would
suggest four ways of addressing the matter: The field of action; the exhibiting of cultural
features; a field of instruction, and a space of self-awareness.
I refer to the field of action as that place in which things happen. The degradation
that the Latino community is subjected to is openly exposed in the new and extended
public sphere the media (television in this particular case) help to construct. It is what I
would call: debasement in the public eye. And this overexposed ignominy leaves no room
for a just defense. Such degradation comes with specifications; that is, the exhibition and
crystallization of cultural features assigned to those who have been degraded:
irresponsibility + filthiness + poverty+ ignorance + benighted = Latino. I define the field
of instruction in its double meaning: to provide certain knowledge and to give orders and
directions. This field is composed of a lesson that is both at once: from their perspective,
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Latinos are taught to be submissive and commanded to obey and accept such condition;
and that might also include, accepting the direction given as of how to no longer be and
how to become something else. In other words, to let go of their characteristic features
and acquire new ones. And this all comes from someone who has already traveled that
road, he who imitates Anglo-Saxons’ shows.
One last thing deserves to be addressed regarding this group and I refer to it as
self-awareness. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as conscious knowledge of
one’s own character, feelings, motives, and desires. I believe this is an important issue
because even though they embrace the Latino identity, they differ not only from such
representations (and those features) they perceive in the program, but also because they
distance themselves from those Latinos upon whom the representation falls. How can we
establish this distinction, where does this come from? Well, we will have to go back and
take the bits and pieces scattered among their discourses, those recurrent signs which
make clear the distance they take from those who either participate in the show as
litigants or from the images they project about the audiences. I will reiterate only three
brief moments which support this idea: “let’s suppose those less educated people –to put
it somehow- or simply ignorant people (…) who watch a program like this and think…”
“when they go to court they’re gonna think, you know, they’re gonna laugh at me,” and
more explicitly: “how can we be educating our people like that”. So they can be critical
of the judge and at the same time distance themselves from those other poor Latinos. I
would suggest that those who take this stance reproduce a similar pattern than the one
they have at work. They are sensitive to those people’s problems and reject the idea of
being portrayed in such a demeaning manner, however they are not equal. They refer to
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people at work as “clients,” they are people who receive their assistance, their advice and
counseling and within that particular structure, they hold a privileged position. In sum, it
seems that they reproduce the same logic and the same hierarchy when it comes to
reading the shows and rejecting the image that the show offers of the Latino community.
So in this case we can see how class and ethnicity cross. On one side there is their Latino
identity, which they obviously embrace, but there is also a class issue playing a role here
too. It is not only that Latinos are not like that it is also the fact that we (the interviewees)
are not like those poor, those less...; and those are two distinctive statements because
although they (the interviewees) cannot relate to such depiction (offered by the program),
they can still find there some resemblance of the people they know from work (their
“clients”).
The graduate students (G. 5) chat and comment on some programs that are
produced in their home country, Colombia. In one case the host is a female lawyer; all
three consider her to be a legitimate, knowledgeable person. The other program is
presented by a former model, who is granted less legitimacy. However when Erika
compares the programs with La Corte del Pueblo she makes the argument that the
technical knowledge is less relevant in this kind of program since justice is not what this
is about; according to her, this show does not require a judge or a person with legal
knowledge but someone capable of delivering a very different message/ lesson:
Yamile: Not to lend your car to your friends.
Erika: No! Not to speak like Cantinflas… because I think his is a very clear pedagogic
role, like “we Latinos never go straight to the point, go to the point!” and… “I
don´t care … if this is what you wanted, if it was your friend… No, what is the
problem?” He is teaching them how they have to present their case, even the
words they have to use and the attitude: the lady, you, your girl, because he
addressed women informally [by Tú instead of Usted], sit down, don´t talk…
Yamile: “You have nothing to say”
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(…)
Yamile: This is what I mean: I think a woman would say to another “see? Never lend
your car, see what happened to the man in the program?” I believe these are
lessons about mistrust, because this is how people learn, people who watch soap
operas or these things take them as role models and examples to follow. And
people who are stuck in front of the TV, that´s the role that soaps play, that´s the
model ... So I think this would be like… I don´t know how useful the judge might
be, and whether we don’t have to talk about Cantinflas. I don´t know if this
actually reaches them.
Erika: But if they tell you the same thing every day of your life it´s like: “hey, look at
him, and he´s the judge, look how important he´s become! He is the judge and
look how well he speaks.”
[They laugh and one says: “the judge speaks like Cantinflas!”]
And at another moment:
Erika: But I think that it´s like… there is something that comes out of the program all the
time, how one must behave this way… and those things you are not supposed to
do are the things that are more Latino-like…
Farid: The model the judge is giving is the White Anglo-Saxon model, and Latinos, in
order to be successful in this country have to behave like Anglo-Saxons. So, he is
implicitly sending a message: that we have to go straight to the point, we have to
be punctual… in order to be successful in this country, otherwise we won´t. And
that is a position of superiority that he assumes; he feels he is not like the rest of
the Latinos, he feels he is successful… look, I changed my way of being, I speak
correctly and you, as long as you don´t you´ll remain there, being a chichipato33
[they all laugh]
What stands out here is the ideological question in terms of how Latinos are being
represented; which cultural features are selected and how they are valued by the program.
There are two sets of lessons being taught in the program from their perspective. The first
one alludes to people learning to be selfish and distrustful ("Not to lend your car to your
friends"). How curious and interesting one simple assertion (and joke) can be, and how
much can lie behind it! The fact that people need to be taught such characteristics means
that they have to be stripped of some other features in order to refill the void. And the

33

Colombian expression which refers to someone who is informal, not honest, unfulfilling
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implicit and unspoken characteristic would be the opposing match: trusting, generosity,
unselfishness. So people need to unlearn those attributes in order to learn and incorporate
contrary traits. And this says a lot about the image they have of Latinos as well as their
image of non-Latinos (i.e., whites). So the judge represents white power which tries to
impose itself over this cultural group. The judge represents the incarnation of success, the
full adaptation to the Anglo-Saxon (in their own terms) world. And that is the model to
follow if one also wants to enter that world. The cost is high, though, because the
pedagogic role (and I would suggest, disciplinary instead of pedagogic) once again,
searches to erase those features that are considered characteristic of the Latino identity to
impose upon them the new, whiter, ones. Again, obey and accept and then you’ll become.
Women in G. 6 take issue.
Daysy: What I dislike is that this man (…) he starts with denigrating arguments,
attacking their intelligence, and many times their origin, being a Latino himself!
Daysy: To me, honestly, he is not a Latino, to me he is a frustrated gringo. He wants to
be a gringo and looks down on those people “who are not like me, because I am a
judge,” the American way, not like those Latinos. And that poor humble Latino,
because many times those who go before him are humble people, and many times
Your Honor [with sarcasm] treats them like you are Latino, we are Latino, “but
you are there and I am here”. So, to me he is a frustrated gringo.
Urdaliz: So, it’s like “I studied, I studied, you, like you don’t know, you have no future,
that is your problem, but I studied. I am Latino but I moved on, I’m not the type
of Latino who remained lowly. He uses that argument very often, and not
everyone, look how many Latinos we are here, and we can’t expect that they all
go to the University, and … but because we are Latinos we need to support each
other and help those who need more help than we do, we can’t just cast them
aside just because we made it …
Daysy: Exactly, and I think that’s one of the main things that keep us apart and doesn’t
help us progress in this country, because each one looks after his own and,
everyone tries to find his own way and we are not united in our efforts. And on
Election Day I will vote. Sure, we lost, they swept us, and nobody showed their
face, right? That's the problem, if we don’t unite… if we are united we can move
on, otherwise we are very vulnerable to anyone who wants to come and boss us
around. So there is no direction, no goal we can pursue… everyone is after their
own goal…
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Nannette: I have realized that in all these programs, even shows that are not about
judges, like Laura, they use humble people to make money! Because their only
goal is to make money and they are there for free, so, they use poor people who
go to the program in good faith and it’s a scam, he uses them. He simply uses
them and makes us look like the most inferior race there is…
Daysy: And less intelligent
Urdaliz: I think he has some kind of obsession with Latinos. He denigrates us in such a
way, that Latinos are ignorant, that we can’t think… I mean, I don’t know
whether he was born here or if he came as a little boy, and he sees Americans as
more powerful and maybe he feels more respect for them, and that’s why…
The program triggers a rich, though brief discussion about the situation of Latinos
in the USA. Of all three groups, this is by far the one that offers the most radical reading
in relation to ethnic identity. Latinos are under attack; they are portrayed as uneducated,
less intelligent, and shoddy. And what hurts the most is that the attack comes from one of
their own; after all, Manuel Franco whether he likes it or not, is a Latino, or is he not? He
is obsessed with Latinos, they argue, but what does it mean? Probably, it means that
somehow he rejects his own background. Or that he uses it only to prove that he has
improved himself: that he has been smart enough, strong enough to cross the border (both
literally and metaphorically) and that he has been able to mix in and blend. To a certain
point, Manuel Franco evokes the Gregor Samsa of Kafka’s Metamorphosis. This
“frustrated gringo” -as they call him- may like to think he has bettered himself (attending
university, getting a degree, becoming a television judge, speaking the language), but if
he turns his back on his Latino identity it does not matter, because these women have
already declared him to be a traitor, and it is they, now, who have the power to deny him
his Latino identity.
Finally, the program results in an empowering text. The perceived attack opens
the door to a new type of resistance. Theirs is a proactive reaction to produce a new
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place. Theirs is not just a critical reading of the program; the text is a way to enter a new
phase: the hope to unite and find their home in a strange land.
There cannot be a simple explanation as to why or how these groups reached
those views. And it is hard to ponder the different aspects that shape their opinions. What
do all three groups have in common? The fact that they all read very negatively the way
in which Latinos are represented in the program. But there are some similarities and
differences beyond that general statement. I would say that Groups 4 and 5, for instance,
show a similar perspective regarding what in one case I referred to as “field of
instruction, ” and in the other the “pedagogic” (disciplinary) role of the program. In both
cases, a call to relinquish some cultural traits (which identify Latinos) and the appeal to
acquire new ones in order to become “whiter,” is perceived. However, their defense
mechanism (or way of coping with the situation) is different; in group 4 they disapproved
of the judge and simultaneously disassociated themselves from such a representation
which affects others more than them (a class issue). I would suggest that that was the case
for them because they were well-established people who had managed to adapt without
having to turn their back on who they were. And they had a job where they could not
only make a living but also helped members of their community who were in a less
favorable situation. In the other case (G. 5), humor came to the rescue and they laughed
at the judge and were also critical of the litigants. I wonder if their more detached view of
the program could have been caused because they assumed the role of the outsider; one
who can see things from afar and take them less personally, thus less painfully, and
therefore probably less threatening, as well. But for group 6, when it comes to identity,
the response is much stronger. They fight back, I would say, and turn things around,
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stripping him, the judge, of his Latino identity and putting him in a nowhere land: no
longer a “complete” Latino and at the same time a “frustrated gringo.” These women find
some sort of empowerment that goes beyond the program. It was probably the fact that
these women were in a weaker situation, more vulnerable, but at the same time, more
used to having to struggle, which helped them build solid arguments to contest the judge
and reinforce their strong sense of dignity.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

In Chapters IV (Court Shows: An Invitation to Believe) and V (Order in the
Court), I analyzed the programs Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo, paying attention to
the mechanisms that are used to create a sense of reality (or reality effect) and of
"liveness." I focused on the interaction that takes place between the judges and the
litigants, and the judges and other characters present in the courtroom (the bailiff and the
live audience/gallery); and also on the types of knowledge that are in play. I addressed
how order is imposed and how the decisions are reached, and outlined strategies that are
used by the judges against the litigants. Analyzing the multifaceted complex form of the
programs I was able to question the alleged intention of "mere justice" and offered an
alternative interpretation of how the programs operate from an ideological point of view.
And I also analyzed how gender and ethnicity play a significant role in differentiating one
show from the other.
In Chapters VII (People Watching Judge Judy) and VIII (Don Manuel.
Audiences Reading La Corte del Pueblo), I focused on the audiences, how different
groups of people held different opinions about those programs, how they interpreted the
interaction, and that allowed me to examine the way in which they read everyone
involved in them. The conversation that took place with the groups allowed me to
observe and analyze how experience, knowledge, and media consumption in general play
a significant role in the process of interpretation, and how important it is to be able to
detect the particularities of each one of them. But also, it helped me to appreciate the
importance of the place people occupy in the social structure, their specific conditions of
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existence at the moment of reception, and how that affects the process of identification
(or not) with what happens on the screen (which consequently affects the emerging
readings of the programs).
In the following pages I will address some questions that I posed at the beginning
of this research regarding theoretical matters such as the power of the text to fix a
particular reading and the possibility of opening up and exploring the notion of
negotiated reading and find some kind of spectrum that can help us better understand the
notion of hegemony in media discourses. In addition, I will tie up some loose ends that
were left behind during the analysis of the shows and the interviews and try to offer an
interpretation of the role they play within the process of reading and in relation to the
social significance of reality shows; for example, the importance (and the meaning) of
laughter and the blurring of limits between public and private.
A. On meaning
The study of any given type of television program on its own is an artifice; its
isolation from the total programming is nothing other than an artificial cut we make -for
analytical purposes- on the continuous semiotic process where meanings take shape. This
is one of the many possible strategies that can be used in the search for the understanding
of the process of mass communication, in this case centered on the practice by which
social meanings are produced, circulated, and received and interpreted (which might
imply its acceptance, rejection, or negotiation either total or partial).
Working within the Cultural Studies paradigm -as I have pointed out beforeimplies the conviction that the media play a significant role in the construction of
hegemony, the shaping of common sense, and in offering a reservoir of meanings people
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can (and do) use. And people use these meanings not simply to follow a rational need to
make sense of the world and to find out about the latest events (which would be a very
narrow and naive idea), but also to relax, to have fun, to identify, to escape, or simply to
connect (to name only a few possible uses). Trying to differentiate the uses of media from
everyday life would be, by now, almost impossible. If there was a time when people's
routines allowed for a discrete time for media consumption, that time is gone. It was not
that long ago that households had one television set and families would sit and spend
time together watching the news or a soap opera. Then, questionnaires would begin by
asking if people had a TV set in their homes, now, they simply ask how many they have,
and how many computers, and what types of connections they have to the world, etc. A
very simple exercise can make evident how much the media have become a "natural" part
of people's lives; when I ask my students to tell me what a regular day in their lives is like
they have the tendency to omit anything related to the media. They wake up, they have
breakfast (or not), they exercise (or not), they study (or not), they go to class (or not).
They do, and their deeds seem to exclude the one thing they all do: to wit, consume some
sort of media. They turn on the radio, or the TV, or connect to the world via the internet
even before they get up, but that is not part of their narrative. So when I point to that
neglected activity they all say:"Oh!" and by that they are saying: "but that's obvious."
Therefore, as I stated before, focusing on meanings is one way of entering the
world of the media and studying their social significance. And centering on the
discourses produced by the media is one way of addressing the problem of meaning. And
this is still central because words and images shape and offer certain definitions of the
world (over others), and they have material consequences; through meanings we classify
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the world, we exclude or include, annul or extend, impose or accept, etc. The desired
democratization of media representations is still part of an ideal yet to be reached.
Television's tendency to produce the same sort of programs, to repeat the same formulas,
selling products and giving (the same) ideas cannot be thought of as free of power. Now,
how we deal with power and how we define it is not just a complicated matter but a
problematic one. And it is problematic because there is still much theoretical discussion
ahead of us before we can clearly define its range and how to locate it. Semiotics made
significant contributions by introducing the notions of language, culture, and ideology to
the field of mass communication and offering a better understanding of the complexity
that that process entails. The message is, in itself, a very dense meaning structure and
very difficult to analyze. To say that programs have a single and unique meaning would
imply the denial of everything that has been learned so far, but to open the text to just any
reading would imply ignoring the constraints that meanings are subjected to.
Thus once we agree to accept that programs are a complex structure we can begin
to deconstruct them, and then we can search for the ways to access them. Although I was
initially tempted to appeal to the metaphor of a multilayered configuration I am
undecided since I think it might be confusing; it could suggest the idea that once we start
taking off the outer layers we will finally reach the "real," the "true," the indisputable
"core" of meaning. Can we think of layers that don't overlap in a fixed way? Might I
propose M.C. Escher's work, more specifically his 1953 Relativity lithography as that
metaphor? I tried to open different views of court shows in order to see them from
different angles. Focusing on the interaction, focusing on the actors, focusing on the set,
focusing on the expressions, and focusing on the words, was a way of looking at the
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shows, deconstructing them momentarily to capture those layers from which meanings
emerge; and that was meant to keep my approach to the programs as open as I could
before letting the groups tell me what they had seen and how.
In Chapter II (Audience Research. From Manipulation to Semiotic Democracy...),
I discussed how some authors took different positions regarding the notion of polysemy
within the field of communication. Starting with Hall and the subsequent developments
by Fiske, Radway, and Condit we were able to see the broader and the more narrow
definitions of the concept. That is a key matter since it has methodological and theoretical
implications. The problem lies, from my perspective, in trying to deal with this subject as
if we were dealing with programs independently. And one thing is to establish the
boundaries for a particular analysis, and quite a different one to establish how the
processes of meaning work. So the distinctions that Condit (1989) introduces among
intertextual polysemy, internally polysemic texts, and polyvalence might be provocative
at a theoretical level or somehow productive in its search to set some limits to a certain
notion of semiotic democracy. However, it still requires stronger grounds. Polysemy does
not imply that there can be just any reading, but can we say that polyvalence is not one of
the possible results of how connotation works? Besides, the fact that Jack and Jill
understand the text and are able to anticipate how the other would respond is not
sufficient argument against polysemy. On the contrary, the fact that they position
themselves the way they do might well be interpreted as the result of the work of
ideology. They can agree or disagree with the text the way they do because they already
had strong and definite feelings and ideas towards the matter. And what are systems of
values? Can they not be said to represent an ideological frame which shapes our
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understandings of the world we live in? And don't they depend on the reservoir of
concepts and ideas offered by those ideologies that circulate socially? From my
perspective, trying to separate polysemy from intertextuality could imply an interesting
intellectual exercise, but a rather less relevant one to the process of analyzing media
products and how they actually operate ideologically. Therefore, I would argue that in
order to understand the way in which media meanings operate in the attempt to find some
sort of fixing, we need to reinsert the program in the intricate semiotic web and follow
the threads that lead to the special configuration in which and from which they take
shape. In that sense, we can understand openness and closure simultaneously. In other
words we take social, historical, and cultural conditions into consideration at the same
time as we acknowledge that they are never free of any constraints. In synthesis, the texts
under analysis (La Corte del Pueblo and Judge Judy in this case), start to take shape
within the limits of their genre, the publicity surrounding them, and other media texts
from different genres.34 Some of the connections might be evident and clear from the
very beginning and others may only become clear during the course of the investigation.
In this sense, I am acknowledging Verón's Socio-semiotic perspective (1987) as well as
Fiske's (1987b) approach. This idea became clearer during the analysis of the shows, a
moment in which I was able to appreciate the significant role that the media in general
played (other television programs as well as books and press articles, among others). But
also, it became clear when analyzing the discussions in the groups and how their
members consistently referred to other media products to make their points and offer a
reading of the court show they had seen with me.

34

For instance the news, commentaries, police/crime dramas, and/or even comedies and games, to name
only some particularly related to court shows.
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In sum, thinking we are analyzing these programs -Judge Judy and La Corte del
Pueblo- separately from the meanings that circulate in the media (and society in general)
is somewhat of an illusion. And when I say illusion in this context it is not meant to be
interpreted in terms of deception, but rather as the temporary acceptance of the possibility
of separating this particular phenomenon from the entirety of which this is only a part. As
I have stated before, Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo do not stand alone; they are
part of the genre of court shows, a sub-genre of reality shows, and are intertextually
connected to different discourses that belong to other realms of social life and
particularly, the judiciary and the media. In that sense, these programs do not escape the
logic that any television product is part of a media landscape that is built upon multiple
signifiers that compete to produce certain signifieds (which privilege the emergence of
certain meanings over others). And people experience that and take in or leave out ways
of understanding the world they live in.
B. On reading
Of course reading is another way of making meanings. If I referred to M.C.
Escher's 1953's lithography a few paragraphs above I will now invoke his 1948 Drawing
Hands as a metaphor of the moment of reception. We are all readers and writers, we all
produce meanings during our daily conversations, our daily actions, at the workplace and
at home, and we also contribute to the more general notion of the social semiosis.
Although its more limited range cannot compete with the media in the process of
producing messages, it does not imply that it is devoid of power (but on a different level
and a different scale). In Chapters VII and VIII, I analyzed the way in which six different
groups interpreted these court shows. I kept their readings as open as I could, and
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followed their lines of thought as closely as possible. I tracked the connections between
their ideas and other discourses which helped them elaborate their own discourses and
their positions. I compared them, established the points at which their views intersected
and those where they diverged. As I did with the analysis of the shows, I focused on the
many layers I found in order to enter and understand their readings of the programs.
I will now try to do the opposite; in other words, I will present a system of
classification in order to try and clarify and make more evident how the groups stand as
regards the programs and from there offer a possible way of establishing an array of
reading positions. (Bear in mind that Groups 1, 2, and 3 watched and discussed Judge
Judy, and G. 4, 5, and 6, La Corte del Pueblo.) For that purpose I have established some
key dimensions which are condensed in the graphic below:
Table 1. Groups reading Court shows.
G
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Once again, it is certainly not my intention to risk losing all the richness of the
analyses I presented in the previous chapters. On the contrary, it is only because of it that
I am now able to close their discourses with the single purpose of seeing how they fit in a
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spectrum of reading positions and try to disentangle some of the major aspects that define
them.
The first dimension points to the general attitude each group takes towards the
program; they emerged at different moments during the discussions, in some cases it was
evident from the beginning, and in others, was the result of an overall reading of the
interviews. Let us take Group 1 (college students) and G. 5 (graduate students) for a
moment; it could be said that they hold a similar attitude, mostly in comparison to the
rest. Nevertheless, and since I am looking for gradations I will make the first distinction
that applies to them35; G.1 is Cynical*, i.e., "distrustful or contemptuous of virtue,
especially selflessness in others; believing the worst of others, especially that all acts are
selfish; sarcastic; mocking." While G 5 is Skeptical*: "one who questions the validity of
something that others believe to be factual." It seems subtle in face of the rest of the
groups, but such subtlety will become a bit clearer when considering the rest of the
dimensions. I have classified G. 2 (co-workers from Springfield) as Scrutinizing; it could
have been the fact that there were two distinct tendencies within the group which led
them to analyze the program that we discussed quite in detail, quoting moments from the
show and giving their different perspectives. Group 3 (the married couple) took what I
would define as a Neutral attitude towards the program. They were analytical, and
measured. Group 4 (NPO - Springfield) were Motivated. They were enthusiastic during
the interview, they compared what they saw on the screen to their experiences in court,
they offered examples, analyzed the situation. And finally, Group 6 was probably the
hardest one to classify because it presents many facets. I have come to name them Rebel
35

The terms marked with an (*) have been defined using Word Reference and /or Merriam-Webster online Dictionaries.
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because they went beyond resistance, because in the end, they took issue with and they
questioned the judge (of this particular program but not of the rest, though).
The second dimension focuses on their level of engagement with the program. I
have established two categories, there are those that were more detached (distancing
themselves from what happened on the screen) and those who were more involved (who
found more connections with the programs). Again, there are some slight variations even
within these apparent opposite categories, but they actually make more sense when put in
relation with the rest of the dimensions.
The third refers to which side they took; did they take the judges' side, or the
litigants', or no one's side? This dimension increases the level of understanding of the
groups; it is more concrete than the first two, which might probably seem too abstract.
Group 1 took sides with the judge, and against the litigants. Group 2 was divided. Let's
remember that there were two clearly different positions within the group: a. those who
placed the accent on the rules of interaction, and b. those who placed it on the law. So
when it came time to take sides, the ones supporting the rules (a) sided with Judy, while
the others (b. the law) leaned more towards the litigants. I have put Group 3 in a level of
acceptance; their neutrality prevented them from taking sides. Group 4 was against the
judge and in favor of the litigants; in this case, while they supported the "weak" they
simultaneously set themselves apart from them. Group 5 couldn't be said to take sides
with anyone, while Group 6, on the contrary, supported the litigants, with whom (unlike
G. 4) I detected some level of identification.
The fourth is an overall appreciation of the judge. With this dimension the
differences in the readings of the two shows become starker. Although it wouldn't be
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accurate to say that Judy emerges from the groups' discourses as a wonderful character,
or a model to follow, nor would it be to say that the general evaluations of the groups
were completely and absolutely negative. Group 1 finds Judy to be funny; they like the
discrepancy between her image (the "little old lady") and her temperament: tough, rude,
in charge, plus quick-witted and good at character reading. Group 2 finds Judy to be
biased, opinionated, and egocentric, and even if she doesn't always rule according to the
law they consider her to be knowledgeable. Again in this group we see the division that I
referred to previously. Although they might all agree with this general view of Judy,
those who stress the rules of interaction found there a justification for her decisions and
tended to give a more positive image of Judy than the others. In the case of Group 3, their
neutral standing permeates the whole interview, again. I would say they responded
positively to Judy's no-nonsense characterization (the slogan of the program). Judy is
knowledgeable, she can see through things, she knows how to read characters, and yes,
she can be intense, or tough, but that's who she is. No-nonsense, and authentic.
But Manuel Franco... well, he brings people together. No matter the initial
attitude, no matter their level of engagement with the show, they all have a very negative
image of the judge. Hostile, arrogant, abusive (G.4); unprofessional, insulting, vulgar,
rude (G5); and rude, tough, sarcastic, (apparently) strong (but actually weak) (G.6) result
in a single expression: he is a Despot, can it get more negative than that?
The fifth dimension refers to the overall view of the litigants. G. 1 sees them as
buffoons, as stupid people who want to be on TV and knowingly put themselves in an
embarrassing situation. Although G. 2 also believes that people go there to be on TV and
have their five minutes of fame, they also believe them to be authentic people with real
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problems and willing to solve them. G. 3 sees them as people who want to solve
problems (and should learn the rules of interaction). G. 4. sees the litigants as people in
need, helpless, and weak. Although they feel sympathy for them, as I suggested in a
previous chapter, they assume a paternalistic attitude towards them, which implies a
certain degree of connection and simultaneous distancing. Members of Group 5 read the
litigants very negatively; to them those people like exposing their problems in public and
are willing to accept ridicule in exchange for being on TV and receiving a monetary
reward. This group could be characterized as judgmental. Group 6 is quite the opposite.
They feel sympathy for the participants; they believed them to have been tricked by the
production team into participating; they are no fools, but have been fooled.
The sixth dimension is simple; it expresses which of the words, "Court" or
“Show," they stress. Is the accent on the former or the latter? Notice that I point to the
accent because groups tended to fluctuate from one to the other, depending on what part
of the programs they were referring to during different moments of the discussion.
Therefore, the information shown in the graphic regarding this dimension is the overall
tendency they expressed throughout the interview. The last dimension (7th) is also selfexplanatory, and deals with whether the shows are believed to be authentic or not. There
is only one case (G. 1) in which the authenticity of the program is clearly doubted and
yet, it cannot be said to actually be refuted. It is a sham, it might feel phony... but at the
same time the litigants are fools and buffoons who know what to expect... they are there
for the money, although, it is said more than once during the interview that they are
people who need to solve a problem. I would say that they are closer to disbelieving the
authenticity of the show than to denying it altogether. The other case, G. 5, is torn
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between the women on one side, who put the accent on the show and also challenge the
status of genuineness and Farid on the other, who clings to the idea of authenticity based
on all the knowledge he brings into play about the judges (from other television shows
and press articles).
Thus, as I mentioned above, the dimensions don't make sense on their own but
require that they be linked to each other in order to demarcate the boundaries between the
groups more effectively. And another consideration is to bear in mind the fact that there
are many aspects converging in those dimensions. But there is yet another facet to their
readings, one which makes a real difference, a facet that can be revealed when ethnicity
comes into play. And that is what might explain the readings of the judges and the
litigants in one case and the other, and why the three Latino groups can be molded into
one while still being able to distinguish between them. In other words, the negative image
of Latino features that Judge Manuel Franco presents and the counter-features he
proposes in order to "become" are profoundly rejected by them all and on that point they
conflate into one single group. However, the attack that comes from within, from one of
their own, is dealt with differently. The groups resort to different strategies to confront
the aggression. In the case of Group 4, I would suggest that they take a strategic distance.
The involvement that characterizes this group does not prevent its members from taking
distance and differentiating themselves from those to whom the negative features could
eventually apply. I suggested before (Chapter VIII) that there is a class issue that can be
introduced to understand how they position themselves. They feel sympathy for those
poor people, less educated (they are even said to be ignorant), who need help, just like
their "clients" at work. However, that is not their case. They have a good job, they are
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educated, and they help their own people and other minority groups. They can cross the
line, the same as Manuel Franco, rather comfortably, but unlike him, they cling to their
Latino identity. So they are no renegades as Manuel Franco, but neither can they identify
with those poor people, they are not the same as them. Group 5, on the other hand,
manifests their detachment. I suggested that theirs is the strategy of the outsider. They
don't like what they see, they reject the judge, but those people... the things they do to be
seen on TV; they have no dignity. In the end this group takes it more "humorously"
because they don't identify with anyone there; neither with the judge nor with the
litigants. Finally Group 6, the Rebel. They earned the name because of the way they take
a stand against the judge. Theirs is an empowering strategy; they turn what they interpret
to be Manuel Franco's arguments upside down. If he thinks sarcasm is a sign of power,
they destroy his argument and turn it into a sign of weakness; if he thinks he is smart,
they prove him wrong; and more importantly, that "gringo frustrado," if he thinks he is
Latino, he is wrong, because they deny him even that.
The previous chart allowed me to differentiate and organize the groups according
to some key dimensions. Now I need to take the next step and try to reorganize their
readings and establish a scale that might allow me to measure the distance between the
groups and the programs(by distance, I mean a degree of acceptance or denial of the
programs either by the groups in toto or by some members of the groups). I must narrow
them down, assign them a place and then reopen the interpretation (and present the
justification). The first thing to say is that no single group agrees completely with the
program they discussed during the interview, but neither does any single group stand
absolutely in the antipodes, which is understandable, since the layers I mentioned before
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allow for people to move closer to and farther away from the program (or from the
figurative scale).
Table 2. Scale of proximity
1
E

2
1&3

3
2a

4
2b- 4- 5b

5
5a

6
6

7
E

The scale ranges from 1 (Total agreement) to 7 (Total rejection). The intermediate
positions are: 2 = very close; 3 = close; 4 = transitional; 5 = distant; and 6 = very distant.
As we can see, positions 1 and 7 are empty (E). In other words, no single group (or
member of a group) can be said to take any such extreme and definite stand (which would
represent total acceptance or total denial of the program). As we can observe, groups 2
and 5 have been subdivided into a and b, according to a distinction that can be
established among their members. Groups 1 and 3 are in the first position. Although
initially it could have seemed that the students would assume a more critical position
regarding the show (putting all their communication skills into play), they end up taking
sides with Judy, accepting the humorous side of the program and rejecting those who
willingly subject themselves to the humiliation that is heaped upon them by the judge.
And Group 3, because they take things in a rather neutral manner, analyzing and trying to
see both sides present in the show, take Judy as she is ("natural," "authentic"), don't have
expectations about learning (judges have to rule, not teach), and enjoy the moment, as if
it were a sporting event.
Group 2 is divided; those who stressed the rules of the interaction (2 a) over the
law tend to be closer to the judge. It is John who takes the lead of the subgroup (while
others swing from this position to the next); it seems important to bear in mind that he
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held a higher position within the group and having people respect authority and play by
the rules might have had significant influence at the moment of the reading and during
the discussions. Thus G. 2 (a) stands in position 3.
In position 4 (transitional) we have 2b, 4, and 5b. The first ones are those who
belong to G 2 but stressed the law over the interaction. These scrutinizers recognize
Judy's authority and knowledge, however at times they assumed a critical stance mostly
because of the unfulfilled expectations that Judy might use the law more than she does. I
include Group 4 in this position because even if they reject Manuel Franco's behavior
(both as a judge and as a representative of the Latino community), at the same time they
see the positive side of it: people can actually find a solution to their problems, don't have
to pay the court fees, and might even be rewarded with money for being on the show.
And also include 5b (Farid), because of his struggle to justify the judge and support the
idea that these shows are authentic as opposed to the other two members of the group. (I
wonder if he's not even half way between positions 3 and 4, considering his view against
the participants).
In Position 5 we have the women in Group 5 (b). They are the true skeptics in the
group, more so than Farid. They distance themselves more from the show; they question
its authenticity more, and are in constant disbelief. Therefore their place within the scale
is more constant than the other groups, although some of Farid's arguments might seem
convincing, especially to Erika (who, like Farid, has a background in Law).
Finally the women from Group 6, our Rebels, are in position 6. I have to say, it is
their rejection of the judge and the strength of their ethnic identity that led me to place
them at this point on the scale, as the most radical of them all. They are the ones who take
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the whole thing more personally, and therefore get more defensive than the rest. As I
mentioned in chapter VIII, it is probable that their being in a more vulnerable situation
helps them to identify with the litigants more than the rest, and reject how they (the
litigants) are treated by the judge (projecting, perhaps, what could happen to them).
However, they too, as the rest, move up and down the scale when considering different
matters36.
The scale and the positions presented above, represent an effort to synthesize the
range of readings in reference to the programs La Corte del Pueblo and Judge Judy
taking them separately from the rest of television programming and other texts.
Nevertheless, it has been made clear that the groups' readings are inherently and
inextricably filled with their own experiences in their everyday lives (with all its density),
as well as being media consumers. As a matter of fact, if we open the spectrum we may
be able to rearrange their positions on the scale. For example, let's take group 6, our
rebels. They can be said to be rebels regarding La Corte del Pueblo; they reject the judge,
how he treats people, etc. However, they do not reject the genre altogether. On the
contrary; they are regular viewers of other court shows, which played an important role in
how they positioned themselves. So, are they really opposing what these types of
programs stand for? Doubtful. However, the program is potentially empowering in so far
as it confronts them with their own situation and helps them search for new (and
hopefully better) ways to fight for their (as a group) place in the community. And in that
sense, the program is potentially productive.

36

Let's remember that some of them consider that there might be things to learn from the show, such as
how to prepare for court, etc.
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So things can get even more complicated. If we were to broaden our scope even
further the picture might change, perhaps not completely, but it would be worth finding
out. Although the data gathered for this research would not be sufficient to engage in
such analysis, this presents itself as a point that could offer some interesting insights.
In Chapter two I discussed the three reading positions that Hall had proposed in
his Encoding/Decoding model. I referred to his assertion that “negotiated is not one
position at all, it’s filled out by a number of positions in relation to subcultures, [and that]
negotiated readings is probably what most of us do most of the time” (1980, p. 265). I
wondered then, if only preferred readings are to be considered hegemonic and if most of
the time most of the people engage in negotiated readings, how is hegemony constructed
and sustained? I also posed the question whether negotiated could be considered within
the range of hegemonic readings. And in order to begin to answer that question it was
necessary to analyze in more detail the way people deal with meanings that are offered to
them by television programs (or actually any other media products). Logically, then, I
needed to examine the notion of negotiated reading, given that a category that includes
almost all the cases within it is obviously a category that has lost its explanatory value
(and strength). And in the end, if that was the case then we would not even need to go
into the field and do audience research, we would already know what we need to know.
Now, even if it was Hall himself who had made such an assertion, he was also the one
who gave me the initial prompt. By the way he defined the reading positions when
presenting the Encoding/Decoding model and in subsequent articles, it was fair to
interpret that negotiated reading resulted from the combination of dominant and
oppositional readings. Put differently, the instance of negotiation implied the acceptance
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of the core of the dominant meaning while it incorporated, at the same time, (some
oppositional) situational features. Thus one can take that idea a little further and speculate
whether it could also be the other way around, or what would happen if or when one
accepted the situational aspects and yet rejected the "central" (dominant) meaning? And
could the notions of form and content be related to that too? (For instance, having a
member of the audience agreeing with the way in which a syndi-judge "mistreats" a
litigant but not with the reason why he or she does.) Or should we take a more radical
step and try to open up the reading positions altogether, loosen them up and begin from a
less restricted, less constrained starting point? I believe that all these questions (and
others) were in my mind when I approached the programs and the interviews with
analytical purposes; that that is why I consciously focused on the meanings (on the side
of production) and the readings (on the side of reception) with some degree of liberty. It
would have probably been easier to force the readings into fixed categories, but also less
productive. However, once the meanings/readings are opened up they require further
analysis and subsequent work (thus the scale of proximity presented before and to which
I will refer again later on). But there is more. Meaning itself is hard to grasp and quite a
slippery notion, and all we have learned about it has made us conscious of its complexity
and wary of its analysis. The concept of polysemy itself has been extremely useful
(particularly from a theoretical point of view) but it has also made things more difficult
(in particular when speaking analytically). And the definition of Ideology as the power of
the text to close some meanings and promote and privilege others (close to the semiotic
notion of metonym) is appealing, but we still have a lot to learn in terms of how it
actually works. And there is hegemony, of course, with all its productive potential.
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There are moments in which I think that the notion of hegemony has been reified
to the point in which we look for "the hegemonic meaning" as if it existed in its purest
state. If that is the case, if I am not mistaken, we need to start working in order to change
such monolithic idea of hegemonic meaning and start thinking about it theoretically and
practically again. I think many of us might have been confused (I obviously include
myself) and conceived it to be more coherent than it actually is. I guess that somewhere
along the road we forgot the distinction between dominant and determinant, and that is a
crucial distinction we need to keep in mind. If we are to agree with Gramsci's definition
of hegemony, then, we cannot accept the idea of determination, not in general, and
certainly not in terms of the discourse (in its widest or broadest definition).
So if hegemony operates by bringing together the interests of the dominants with
those of the subordinates, then, it can never be totally coherent, and it's tricky and elusive.
And herein lies the difficulty in grasping it, "finding" it, apprehending it. It is everywhere
and nowhere; it is scattered in every meaning-making practice. Maybe those are the
maps, the reservoirs of meanings Hall mentioned so many times in so many of his
writings. Maybe it is like Foucault's Discursive Configurations. Or, perhaps, the
Hegemonic Discourse that Angenot talks about. They might be internally contradictory,
and yet they are not void of power to define, and circumscribe, and crystallize some sets
of meanings over others (which persist, maybe driven by the will to survive, maybe as a
way to comfort those who would otherwise be excluded). So this brings me back to
redefining the readings. It brings me back to my idea that (at least) there are moments,
circumstances, or ways of working in which negotiated meanings can and should be
considered within the range of hegemonic readings. I believe that there are situations in
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which the dominant definitions are strong enough as to impose themselves over the
oppositional (situational) traits. How often does that happen, or how long the spells in
which certain dominant ideas prevail over other more circumstantial experiences (as
meanings) that could potentially change the course of the defining power may last, are
questions that this research will not allow me to answer, but that deserve to be posed.
So the scale of proximity presented above (and the way the groups can be
arranged within it) constitutes an alternative to Hall's three theoretical reading positions.
After opening the readings for the analysis I went back and rearranged them in a different
light. And I believe that the scale constitutes an indication that my supposition was
correct; that the process of negotiation in which most people engage in most of the time
allows for a differentiation, for example, in terms of more or less proximity to the
meanings offered by the programs (always keeping in mind the complexity of how
meanings are shaped, as I pointed out in the previous section). And I believe it provides
strong evidence for the pursuit of more research in this area. However, in order to
consider such a hypothesis as valid, we need to reintroduce both the program/text and the
audiences' readings back into the thick semiotic web where they belong. That web might
not be easily seized, but is not as chaotic as it might seem; and if it offers a reservoir of
meanings, not all imaginable meanings are part of it. The infinite semiosis is not free of
struggle; there are some mechanisms that operate closing or preferring some meanings
over others in such a way that that infinitude is not unlimited37.

37

Again, I suggest that this idea is similar to what Hall calls "maps of meanings" and Angenot, "hegemonic
discourse."
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C. On laughter
The previous pages may have given the impression of solemnity; however, that
would be a wrong idea. As I have stated before, the shows invite us (audiences) to not
only witness the hearings but also to enjoy ourselves. People in the gallery laugh, and so
do the judges. And the interviewees laughed while watching the episode and while
talking about it. And even when people got upset about the judge or how humiliating the
situation was for the claimants, they still laughed. Therefore, laughter becomes a
problem. Don't take me wrong, laughter is a pleasurable sensation no one should be
deprived of. No, laughter is not a problem for the "laughing," but for those who want to
make sense of it.
Laughter comes with understanding, with the sharing of codes. In general, there is
a connection between humor and laughter, and humor is very culturally grounded. We
could also say that (most of the time) laughter is a type of pleasure; nevertheless, not all
pleasures involve laughter. That is not a minor difference and it should not be ignored.
It is hard to talk about laughter and not think of Bakhtin. His analysis of the
Carnival is so well known that it frees me from developing it extensively. The author
points to the ambivalent character of laughter; it can be said to express either the
celebration of the (apparent38) infringement of the rule, or its opposite, i.e., its
consecration. The Carnival, the moment in which rules and hierarchies are suspended,
can be said to be a fleeting time of excess, and a momentary liberation (after which
everything goes back to normal). I agree with Eco (1989) when he states that the theory
of the carnival as global liberation might be wrong, and that to think of the Carnival as a
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I point to appearances because during the Carnival the rules cannot be broken because of the simple fact
that they have been temporarily suspended.
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real liberation might not be adequate. The comic effect, suggests Eco, comes from the
violation of the rule, by someone we feel no sympathy for, which makes us feel superior,
and the resulting pleasure is mixed: we enjoy the violation of the law and the misfortune
of an inferior individual. The distinction between tragedy (where the rule that has been
broken must be made explicit) and comedy (in which the transgression must be
presupposed but never made explicit) helps Eco to affirm that both comedy and Carnival
are not examples of real transgressions, but rather of the reinforcing of the law; they
remind us of the existence of the rule. And Bauman (2001) also wonders whether it still
makes sense to repeat after Bakhtin, that laughter is the power of the impotent, that
laughter is far from the reach of the official fear fabricated by the real powers to break the
resistance of the oppressed. On the contrary, it seems that the modern power has found its
way to subdue its old enemy -laughter- and put it to its own service.
Bauman (2001) also reminds us of the beautiful story of laughter that is told by
Kundera in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting. When the angel heard the devil's
laughter -says Kundera- he felt defenseless and not knowing how to react he imitated his
adversary. These represent, according to the writer, the two types of laughter: the original
laughter, which sprouts from the devil, and its imitation, which emerges from (or is
reproduced by, perhaps?) the angel. The angels are not in favor of God but of the Divine
Creation -continues Kundera- while the devil is the one who refuses to give rational
meaning to a world created by God. Therefore, while the devil's laughter initially
signified the absurdity of things, the angel's, on the other hand, expressed the rejoicing in
the order of things, wisely and kindly conceived, and full of meaning. According to
Kundera, both laughter (the original and the semantic imposture) blended into a single
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one39, and since there are no terms that would point to the distinction it becomes difficult
to tell them apart. The beauty of the narrative gets lost in this synthesis, but I hope the
idea remains clear. So laughter is, indeed, a problem.
So let's go back to the theme of court shows placing the accent on laughter and
pleasure. As I pointed out while analyzing the shows, the people in the gallery have a
limited role but their participation is important since they help guide the mood of the
audience: now it is time to be surprised, now we can laugh, and so on. Laughter can
always be ambiguous, even coming from them. So, even if most of the time their laughter
is a celebration of the imposition of the rule, sometimes it might not be. How can we
establish the difference in that case? Who is laughing, the devil or the angel? Well, the
judges rule over the courtroom and over the gallery's laughter. Here the preposition is
crucial: if they laugh with the judges they will get a mild (rewarding) shushing; however,
if their laughter could be interpreted as at then they will be disciplined (and the nonverbal communication is essential to read the judges).
But when the groups laughed, were they following the same pattern? Not exactly.
The prepositions and their possible combinations might become useful. Laughing with
the judge and at the claimants would probably be a strong indicator of where people
stand on our scale of proximity; for instance, the case of group1. But if the scale was only
based on laughter, then G.3 would be more difficult to position since in their case
laughter wasn't a strong feature. Yes, they enjoyed the show, but in their detached way, as
they would a game. And let us analyze some less obvious situations. For example, group
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Kundera would say that laughter and fear are not opposed, that they are branches that have fallen from
the same tree, and that in every laughter sounds the weak echo of fear.
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6. They sometimes laugh at the judge; at other times they just get frustrated (I can tell
from the expression on their faces, their tone of voice; the way they look at each other,
and at me). But leaving that ambivalence aside, these women laugh at the participants
too. They feel sorry for them, they feel sympathy, and still, they laugh. And they know
they shouldn't40. So one wonders, what triggers that laughter? Is it perhaps the echo of
fear? Is it maybe the angel finding its way through? I don't think that laughter on its own,
at least in relation to this kind of program, can be a reliable measure of the readings. They
can give some indication, point to a North, but we need a more detailed compass to learn
how to read them. I did not dig enough into the meanings that members of the groups
assigned to their laughter, and maybe this subject deserves to be addressed on its own.
What I can say from the discourses of these interviewees is that we cannot follow the
theme of laughter and take for granted that the pleasure that might hide behind it is a
liberating, subversive one (nor its opposite). I believe that laughter can be effectively
used (by the dominants) against our interests in so far as once we have enjoyed the
spectacle of someone doing what we dare not do (challenging authority, breaking a rule)
and have vicariously experienced rebellion without any of the costs involved, we can go
back to our subordinate place and embrace our (more or less) comfortable routine.
D. Private lives in the public eye
Confessions in the courtroom. That's what claimants do when they go to a
television court: they willingly (or unwillingly) confess their story to the judge, and to the
people on the set; and to their families; and to their friends; and to millions of anonymous
viewers who tune in to watch the program. The stories they tell and the problems they
40

Antonia: and at the same time... it makes you laugh. [keeps laughing] Daysy: well, it's like that. One
laughs out of nature, because it sounded funny, but you know that it's wrong. It's a habit [laughs]. (G.6)
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present might seem funny or serious, interesting or boring. And it is up to the interaction
that takes place on the screen, and up to the judges, and the whole production team
whether that minimal story might appeal to the viewers or not. The ratings tell us that
millions of people watch court shows (and other reality shows) and hear the confessions.
During the interviews the groups discussed this matter, as we saw, and they gave
different opinions, but behind their comments (and regardless of their perspective) one
could see that they were intrigued and I detected some hidden attraction towards those
people and their lives.
Every day court shows deal with people's personal problems. Every day men
compete over a bride and women over a groom. Women give birth and decide whether to
keep the child or give him/her up for adoption. Cameras follow cheaters and expose them
on the screen. People fight, scream, cry, hug, kiss, laugh. They reveal their lives. Every
day "E!" (Entertainment channel) has some new story about a movie star, or a television
star. (And political scandals are bigger and juicier when sex is involved.) In the end there
remains a profound uncertainty about the meaning and the implications of this focus on
the person and this general tendency to center on and exploit the individual and his/her
private life.
If most of the time most people watch fiction and reality television (which clearly
expels the genre which by definition refers to reality; i.e., information and its byproducts:
the news, opinion programs, reports, etc.), how does that affect the general environment
in which people live? How does that affect what people know about the world of politics,
the world of business, the world of justice, or the world of wars; the world where the big
decisions are made? And how does that affect what people want to know? And how does
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that affect the way in which the media speak to people; i.e., are they interpellating us as
citizens, or as (individual) consumers (of goods of any kind, including, of course,
symbolic goods?)41.
Are we becoming gossipy neighbors provided with a bigger window? I agree with
Mathiesen's metaphor (1997). The author suggests that instead of Bentham's panoptic we
should now think of the "synoptic," since in society the roles have been reversed and the
many can observe the few. The problem is who we observe and what we are allowed to
see. The spectacles take the place of policing without losing their disciplining power.
Today, obedience to the standards tends to be imposed more by seduction than coercion
and reveals itself under the guise of free will (rather than as external imposition).
The public space is the arena where common interests are negotiated. The fact that
decisions which affect society as a whole are made public and exposed to the scrutinizing
eye of the people might not guarantee the transparency of the acts of the powerful, but
would offer a way to control them more closely. However, in the blurring of the lines
between public and private, it is the private which has gained ground over the public. In
this invasion ("privatization") of the public, how does politics fit in? What is Politics
(with a capital P) other than the translation of individual problems into public affairs, and
common rights into individual duties; Politics defines what is best for all, the common
good, social justice, etc. The politics of life are limited to an individual frame: it is the
fight over the space of one's self-identity (Bauman, 2004). The two might show
contrasting interests, but they need to be linked for real change to be possible. Unless
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I am aware of the fact that these questions might be more relevant for some places rather than others.
Coming from and living in a third world country I know things don't look the same as they do in the first
world. However, I believe that some of these questions can be related to a great part of western capitalist
societies (be they more or less developed).
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individual interests find their way into groups' interests (and vice-versa) and they
coordinate to struggle in the public arena where Politics rules, significant change will
hardly be attained. And drawing after Whitaker (1991) I will suggest that at a time when
the States seem to retreat in face of the advancement of the international private sector,
the trivialization of the public space in which the media (and particularly television) play
a major role, could accelerate the denigration of the public in favor of the private, the
substitution of politics by markets, and of the States by multinationals.
The accent on class and its further displacement towards the personal is political;
from the analysis of macro politics to the microphysics of power, it has had a substantial
impact on the understanding of the different levels in which power operates; and it has
also had an enormous impact on the lives of groups, subcultures, and minorities that
found in it a source of empowerment which allowed them to fight for their visibility, the
social acknowledgement of their existence within a frame of normality, the search and
ongoing struggle for acceptance and integration. Nevertheless, the accent put on the
micro (within the frame of some versions of Cultural Studies and more specifically
regarding audience research) led to a dismissal of the interest in the macro processes
where Power clearly still governs. Have we gone too far? Hasn't the line between
understanding the popular and the celebration of anything that can be thought to be
popular been lost? Haven't we celebrated the individual enough? Haven't we been too
concerned with "how the hell do we make it through the night" and forgotten too much
about "how the hell do people make it through life?"
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E.On ethnicity
As I mentioned before, when analyzing the shows, one of the main differences
between Judge Judy and La Corte del Pueblo had to do with ethnic identity. And, as I
hope I was able to make clear, while Judge Judy is careful when and if she crosses the
ethnic (or racial) line, Manuel Franco is her exact opposite. The same difference could be
perceived through the analysis of the groups; while in the case of those who watched
Judge Judy this subject was never brought up, in the case of the three Latino groups the
matter became key in understanding their readings of the programs. So I think it is
appropriate to take a moment to discuss this subject, albeit briefly, from a theoretical
point of view which can help shed some light on how to understand the groups' readings.
Many authors argue that it is both the effect of internal or external conditions
which give rise to processes of renewed or new ethnicity (Barth, 1969; Waters, 1998;
Nagel, 1998). Barth’s theory tends to explain the maintenance of ethnic groups through
the establishment of boundaries. Opposing other perspectives which center their attention
on cultural processes, the author considers culture as “a result, rather than a primacy and
definitional characteristic of ethnic group organizations” (Barth, 1969, p. 297). He points
to ethnic boundaries as group-defining. Central to Barth’s theoretical departure are the
notions of ascription and identification by the actors themselves and ascription by others
to the group. Of course, from this standpoint, ethnic ascription is not the only possible
identity, but the most general and prevailing. In Barth’s words, “ethnic identity is
superordinate to most other statuses, and defines the permissible constellation of statuses,
or social personalities” (p. 302). What features or cultural forms shall be taken into
account and regarded as significant by the group is not easy to predict. Two types of
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markers can be identified: "overt signs" and "value orientations." The former refers to the
way people express and identify such identity, like hairdo, dress, language, etc. The
latter, related to moral standards, implies belonging to the group and expecting to be
treated as one. Like Barth, Nagel considers the notion of boundaries pivotal to
understanding ethnicity. According to the author, Barth’s perspective conceives ethnicity
as mutable, as a process of labeling in which everybody is involved.
Nagel defines the concept of ethnic identity as “the result of a dialectical process
involving internal and external opinions and processes, individual self-identification and
outsiders' ethnic designation” (1998, p.240). The mutability of the notion of ethnicity
allows thinking of different layers to which, according to the situation, people can hold
on to. Espiritu (1992) makes the same point asserting that individuals choose from a
matrix of identities depending on the “perceived strategic utility and symbolic
appropriateness of the identities in different settings and audiences.”
In "The Cost of a Costless Community," Waters (1998) makes a similar point.
Drawing her analysis from symbolic ethnicity, the author remarks on the element of
choice that is involved in it. According to this, only the positive aspects of ethnicity are
recovered, leaving aside what is considered negative, like lack of change and rigidity.
This is what one could consider the costless aspect of the symbolic ethnicity. People are
able to take from a sort of reservoir only what it is convenient for them, what suits them
well, not having the need to commit to it in their everyday life, and not having to face any
kind of consequences because of it either.
But a point that deserves to be emphasized is that, although ethnicity might be a
product of personal choice, it is not always the case. In other words, ethnicity might be
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optional, but many times it is also obligatory. As both Nagel and Waters point out, not all
groups enjoy the privilege of choosing what to be, on which occasions. An interesting
interplay between inside and outside, between within and without the group, in which a
relation of forces begins takes place. The dialectical process by which one acquires ethnic
identity then becomes an arena of conflict in which ethnic identities are contested and
redefined. In other words, the mandatory condition introduces the concept of power, that
is to say, of someone (someone identifying as a member of the group, perhaps? Such as
the case of Manuel Franco?)who exerts the power to categorize others in a certain way.
The problem with the notion of symbolic ethnicity, asserts Waters, is that for
some -the dominant group-, to whom ethnicity means an enjoyable situation, it becomes
difficult to understand that for others, it involves more implications than pleasures. It
becomes difficult to assume that for others, ethnicity is not symbolic and voluntary but it
has material and painful consequences.
According to Nagel, in the political construction of ethnicity, political policies and
institutions play a pivotal role, for example, through immigration laws, ethnically linked
resources of policies, and the census, etc. And, from my point of view, the media in
general, and television in particular, also play a major role through the portraits they
display. As I mentioned at the end of Chapter VIII, members of the three groups I
interviewed took different positions regarding the Latino portrayal offered by Judge
Manuel Franco. Although they all had in common their rejection of such an image, the
groups resorted to different strategies. I believe that that is what Espiritu means when
affirming that “faced with external threats, group members can either intensify their
solidarity or they can distance themselves from the stigmatized segment.” The distinctive
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positions members of the groups hold in the social structure allows them to deal with the
image that is offered by Manuel Franco differently. In some cases, they can actually
choose the signs that identify them as a group and set themselves apart from or reject
those which don't, such as in the cases of Groups 4 and 5. In other words, ethnicity is,
following Waters, rather costless (or less costly than it can be to other groups). However,
I would suggest that the women in Group 6, who can identify more with the people who
participate in the program (i.e., with the litigants), feel that those negative traces are being
imposed upon them and don't have the same "freedom" to choose among repertories of
signs, as can the other groups. Since their choices are more limited, then, their rejection
towards such negative representation is taken more personally, as more threatening, and
that triggers their stronger stands. So, allow me to go back to my previous statements and
justify once again why the women in G.6 have earned their name, why they are the Rebel
compared to the rest. Because contrary to most of the people in the other groups, these
women stood and read against Manuel Franco as citizens. Ethnicity, and how they live it,
allowed them to call for a common struggle not only against representations but also in
terms of the place they might be able to make for themselves in society as Latinas, not
simply as individuals. And therefore, they gain another density.
F. Some Final Thoughts: on Limitations & Suggestions
To paraphrase George Gerbner, communication makes us humans, it is through it
that we learn about the world, how it works, and how to deal with it, and the media
(particularly television, still today) play a major role in the definitions and systems of
classification that organize our life experiences. The media offer multiple options for our
daily lives; they produce information, deliver entertainment, and offer company, they can

320

worry and/or comfort us, let us see some hidden story or hide it from us. Each narrative
they offer is intertwined with many other coexisting narratives, past and present. They are
there for us to watch and read. However, as it is clear by now, those narratives are not
free of constraints; maps of meanings (as Hall refers to) set the limits to the emergence of
new ways of producing and interpreting the events and the stories that are told; power
intervenes.
From my personal experience as a scholar who regularly participates in academic
events, I have been able to compare the amount of research in different areas and
methodological approaches. A simple glance over conference programs gives us an idea
of how limited qualitative audience research is compared to other areas of interest (at
least in some parts of the world). There are, probably, many explanations as to why this
happens; audience research is time consuming (and demanding), and costly, and presents
varying levels of difficulties. And although there are different methodological and
theoretical approaches within this broad field of research, they all pursue a common
objective, to delve into meanings, to understand how the complex process of making
sense works, and what it means in a broader sense, and what its social, political, and
cultural implications are.
There were a few things I had in mind while I was reading and re-reading and
analyzing the interviews that I conducted: the fact that those were not spontaneous
discourses; the fact that no matter how comfortable and relaxed the situation with the
groups might have been, those conversations would have not existed had it not been for
my intervention, and what are the implications of such intervention. So how do we bring
this artificial situation into the analysis? One cannot avoid wondering how much of what
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was said during the meetings, and the agreements the groups reached, was part of the
situation itself, or of a fleeting consensus? How much of it was the product of their
acquiescence, of going with the flow, and how much of it was the result of those thoughts
and ideas that were just waiting for the opportunity to be expressed? Perhaps some of the
silences during the interviews speak of that; those moments in which a member of the
group hides behind a smile, or a smirk. And that is one of the big challenges doing
qualitative audience research; to participate in the interaction, to follow their lines of
thoughts and ideas, and to be alert for those signs that speak of contradictions or
disagreements which will give us, as interviewers, the chance to open the dialogue and
make it as inclusive as possible. And always keep in mind that all the suggestions we
have read on methodology books never seem to be enough at the moment in which we
face our interviewees.
I can propose the idea that those conversations we have access to through group
interviews (although in some respects this can be extended to one-on-one interviews as
well) express ideas that are part of the social discourse and therefore, whether flowing
with the current or not, the interviewees still allow us to interpret and attempt to
understand the processes of meaning-making. It would be hard for me to think of a better
way to reach the audiences' opinions, their views of the world, the discourses they rely
on, and reach this level of understanding. In other words, the situation allowed me to
establish a dialogue between the programs and the members of the groups, a dialogue
between a media discourse and portions of the social discourse that permeates and speaks
through the interviewees. The groups granted me access to the richness of the process of
reading and meaning-making, but this process has a level of complexity that makes it
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difficult to grasp in its entirety. The more we produce in terms of audience research the
more we will be able to enrich our understanding of how -going back to an initial
concern- hegemony is worked and reinforced throughout the media. In that sense, there is
a hope that quantity will eventually turn into a qualitative change in our understanding of
social processes. I will reiterate something that I have already said before, I am very
thankful to the people who agreed to participate in the group interviews and shared their
thoughts with me. It was (as always is) a wonderful experience to sit and interact with
them and listen to their conversation, to follow their lines of thought, to observe their
contradictions, and to learn so much from them.
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